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Abstract 
Deep sleep has traditionally been deemed as a period that lack consciousness. However, 
recent evidence challenges this assumption and highlights the possibility of experiencing 
awareness during deep sleep. By drawing from Indian philosophical traditions, this thesis 
defends a positive view of consciousness during dreamless sleep – the period of sleep where 
we are aware but not dreaming. Moreover, this thesis also challenges classic views on the 
nature of conscious states where consciousness is reduced to representational content. For 
that purpose, this thesis develops a taxonomy of dreamless sleep that, contrary to other 
research in the area, considers the existence of different sorts of awareness with different 
degrees of content. Thus, a full spectrum of mental states during conscious dreamless sleep 
are considered: from awareness of substantial content to awareness devoid of content 
altogether. The aim of the thesis is to show how such a taxonomy can encourage a shift from 
a two-dimensional view of consciousness to a multidimensional one — from a view that 
only considers brain activation and reportable content to one that assesses conscious states 
on different level of analysis. This shift will result in an adequate conceptualisation of 
dreamless sleep as a period where we could have conscious states with content, but also, 
conscious states without content. Moreover, this shift on a multidimensional approach will 
allow us to undertake a proper comparison compare between different sleep phenomena.  
In order to develop this taxonomy of dreamless sleep, I explore definitions on awareness 
during dreamless sleep found in Indian philosophical traditions and Western analytical 
philosophy. From the definitions found in the literature, I argue that all the types of conscious 
states proposed in my taxonomy can be identified. Then, I test my taxonomy in a pilot study 
about awareness during deep sleep that I carried out. The results show that the different types 
of awareness can be recognised in the phenomenological descriptions gathered from the 
participants. Finally, I compare the phenomenon of dreamless sleep with other associated 
experiences, such as dreams and hypnagogia. My claim is that the differences among sleep 
phenomena are gradual and that in some cases there is not a strict cut-off line between them. 
Notwithstanding this assumption, I defend the development of future research were my 
proposed taxonomy can be improved by considering typical cases of dreamless sleep.  
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Introduction 
Traditionally, sleep research has been focused in investigating a phenomenon well-known 
by all of us: dreams. In folk psychology terms, we understand dreams as a wakefulness-like 
experiences had during sleep; an experience in which we are completely immersed in what 
we think is reality but in fact is a simulated world. In dreams, we experience things that do 
not exist, and things that are not possible to experience in wakefulness; we can fly, we can 
be someone else and we can travel in time. However, the focus of research of this thesis are 
not dream experiences, but what is considered as their counterpart: dreamless sleep 
experiences. For now, it will suffice to conceptualise dreamless sleep experiences as 
experiences happening during sleep that cannot be considered as dreams. Before going in 
more detail on dreamless sleep, first we should consider some basic notions in sleep 
physiology. 
The canonical taxonomy of sleep divides sleep in 2 major states: REM and NREM 
sleep (American Academy of Sleep Medicine, AASM, 2007). REM sleep is one of the most 
well-known sleep phases because it has traditionally been related with dreams. When 
awoken from REM, we usually report full-fledged and vivid dreams — an immersive 
experience during sleep that resembles wakefulness. REM sleep is also called paradoxical 
sleep because is a period of sleep that shows very similar electrophysiological features to 
wakefulness. This phase also receives the name of Rapid Eye Movement (REM) because our 
eyes start moving from left to right while the rest of the body remains paralysed. During 
REM sleep, the brain displays low-amplitude waves, which are related to high levels of 
arousal.  
NREM sleep is the first kind of sleep state to appear when we are falling asleep and 
consists of three stages: N1, N2 and N3. Stages N1 and N2 also receive the name of Light-
sleep because during them it is very easy to return to wakefulness.  While N1 can be better 
described as a state of drowsiness where the brain is still functioning quite fast, in N2 brain 
waves start to slow down. N2 is characterised by two EEG features, sleep spindles (bursts 
of oscillatory brain activity) and K-complexes (high voltage waves).  N3 is also referred to 
as Deep Sleep because it is very difficult to wake up from this stage. Deep sleep is 
characterised by low brain activation produced by Delta Waves, a type of cerebral activity 
of very high amplitude (0.5 to 2 Hz).  During this stage, the brain is functioning very slowly 
and for this, it is also described as a state of very low arousal. Similarly, there is fewer 
recollection of mentation during this state, which is thought to be the consequence of a 
breakdown in cortical connectivity (Massimini et al. 2005; Tononi and Massimini, 2009). 
  10 
These electrophysiological features of deep sleep have led theorists to conclude that during 
deep sleep we are not conscious. Therefore, dreamless sleep is considered as that period of 
sleep where we are not dreaming, typically associated, but not exclusive, to N3. 
The two-dimension model of consciousness (Laureys, 2005; Mormann & Koch, 
2007) supports claims about deep sleep as a period where consciousness is lost. According 
to this model, we should classify consciousness states according to two directly correlated 
parameters, level of brain activation (arousal), and the complexity of the reportable content 
(awareness). The higher the level of arousal, the higher the level of awareness, and thus, the 
more content reported. Similarly, the model predicts that, a state of low activation, such as 
N3 or deep sleep, would result in the absence of awareness. Therefore, this model implies a 
view of consciousness in terms of levels or degrees: an individual is in a state of 
consciousness or another depending on their level of consciousness (calculated by their 
amount of arousal and awareness). However, this conceptualisation of consciousness as 
something that comes in degrees has been recently challenged (see Bayne, 2007; Bayne, 
Howhwy and Owen, 2016). This thesis supports this challenge on the two-dimensional 
model by focusing on the evidence of conscious states during dreamless sleep. I take the 
evidence on the presence of consciousness during deep sleep as the starting point to argue 
for a multidimensional model of consciousness — a model that permits the comparison 
between states of consciousness based on different dimensions of analysis. Contrary to a 
two-dimensional model, a multidimensional model of consciousness would allow a better 
understanding of the phenomenology of dreamless sleep that is not merely based on the 
physiology of such state (neural activation), but also on other parameters (e.g. gating of the 
content, availability of the content). By developing a multidimensional model, we will be 
able to account to dreamless sleep as a period where we can have conscious mental states, 
and not as a period of ‘deep sleep’; a period with lack of activation. Moreover, a 
multidimensional model will allow the conceptualisation of several mental states during the 
same global state (i.e. multiple conscious states during a period of dreamless sleep). 
However, is the presence of awareness during deep sleep enough to challenge the two-
dimensional model of consciousness? And what would this challenge imply for conceptions 
on the nature of consciousness? 
First, if it is possible to be aware while in a state of very low brain activation such as 
deep sleep, should we still understand awareness as directly related with the level of arousal? 
The existence of periods of awareness during deep sleep calls into question a two-
dimensional model. It also asks for a new taxonomy of sleep that considers the possibility 
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of awareness during states of relatively low brain activation (i.e. deep sleep). Recently, new 
studies on sleep research have addressed the issue whether consciousness remains during 
deep sleep by investigating in more detail the physiology of this period (Massimini et al. 
2010; Nieminen et al. 2016; Siclari & Tononi, 2017, Siclari et al. 2017; Lee et al. 2019). 
These studies have resulted in different views on the neural organisation of deep sleep.  Some 
of these views support the idea that sleep appears locally in the brain. For instance, there is 
evidence that deep sleep is not uniformly distributed along the cortical surface and thus it 
can appear in some regions at a different time (Siclari & Tononi, 2017). Recent studies have 
also evidenced the non-uniform appearance of NREM in different sleep conditions 
(Christensen et al. 2019; Gorgoni et al., 2019), which highlights the possibility of variation 
of sleep architecture in different subjects.  Consequently, if sleep can be a localised state — 
does not happen in all the brain at the same time — different sleep phenomena can occur 
during that period.  
Second, if conscious states during deep sleep can occur, how can we explain the 
phenomenology of those experiences? Changes in the sleep physiology of expert meditators 
shows the possibility of periods of awareness during deep sleep (Ferrarelli et al., 2013; 
Dentico et al., 2016; Maruthai et al., 2016). This evidence is accompanied by reports made 
by the same individuals reporting having been aware during sleep in the absence of dreams 
and, moreover, having had instances of contentless awareness (Alexander et al. 1990; Mason 
et al., 1997; Mason & Orme-Johnson, 2010). If such reports of consciousness allude to a 
conscious experience that is contentless, how would this affect current notions of 
consciousness? The presence of such states would call into question one of the main views 
on philosophy of mind about the nature of conscious states like representationalism, which 
identifies conscious states with representational states (Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995). 
Representationalism is one of the dominant contemporary approaches on the nature of 
consciousness where the phenomenal character — the what is likeness of our experiences 
—is reduced to a representation.  If it turns out that we can be conscious without being aware 
of anything, no intentional content whatsoever, representationalism will be deemed false. 
Summing up, dreamless sleep offers an interesting case for the study of 
consciousness because it calls into question traditional views on the nature of conscious 
states. While it seems intuitive to assert that during REM sleep — a period of relatively high 
brain activation — we experience dreams, neuroscientific research shows that dreams can 
be experienced during other sleep stages (Foulkes & Fleisher, 1975; Foulkes & Scott, 1973; 
Foulkes & Vogel, 1965; Vogel, 1991). Moreover, there is also evidence that other sort of 
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dreamless sleep phenomena can also be present (Alexander et al. 1990; Mason et al., 1997; 
Mason & Orme-Johnson, 2010; Ferrarelli et al. 2013; Dentico et al., 2016; Maruthai et al., 
2016). As such, the main argument for this thesis is that different states can be distinguished 
during dreamless sleep and thus, we need to develop an adequate taxonomy that allows us 
to identify and capture all of them. In the case of sleep, this would imply considering deep 
sleep as a state where different conscious states can appear. Therefore, we should develop a 
taxonomy of sleep phenomena that permits the existence of different conscious states in a 
same global state (i.e. deep sleep). Similarly, the construction of such a model will also 
question the use of ‘deep sleep’, as implying lack of awareness, to refer to dreamless sleep. 
Although some work on conscious dreamless sleep has begun (see Windt, Nielsen 
and Thompson, 2016), previous research on this area has not considered the whole picture. 
The descriptions of conscious dreamless sleep, far from homogenous, provide an obscure 
account of this state that makes difficult its philosophical analysis. Is it actually conscious 
dreamless sleep a state different from dreams? Does this state take more than one form? How 
can we be sure that reports of awareness during sleep are reports of conscious dreamless 
sleep?  With the aim to provide answers to these questions, I introduce a novel taxonomy 
that considers a priori all the kinds of dreamless sleep states that there could be. This 
taxonomy serves twofold. First, it situates previous research and clarifies the use of notions 
such as ‘bare awareness’ or ‘contentless states’ found in the literature. Second, it creates a 
framework in which to develop empirical work on dreamless sleep. For this purpose, this 
thesis is divided in two parts. On one side, I revisit previous definitions on awareness during 
dreamless sleep and provide an alternative account to their interpretation.  I argue that the 
definitions presented in the literature allude to different sorts of conscious states, and not 
solely to a state of awareness devoid of content, as it is claimed. On the other side, I present 
a pilot study I performed to gather phenomenological reports of consciousness during 
dreamless sleep. These reports, after careful analysis, are compared to the categories laid out 
in my taxonomy. I claim that conscious dreamless sleep experiences can take various forms, 
ranging from an awareness of substantial content to an awareness with no content 
whatsoever. 
 Chapter 1 starts by presenting a taxonomy of dreamless sleep that distinguishes 
between non-conscious and conscious states and between awareness with content and no 
content. With this, I distinguish among the possibility to experience during dreamless sleep: 
(a) non-conscious periods, (b) awareness of substantial content (AoSC), (c) awareness of 
minimal content (AoMc), (d) awareness of awareness itself (AoAi), and (e) awareness 
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devoid of content. With the exemption of the first, non-conscious periods, the rest of states 
are described as conscious states insofar as they preserve their phenomenal character — 
individuals report there is something it is like to be in those states. I argue that the difference 
among those conscious states is solely in the available content of awareness, but that in all 
cases, individuals should be regarded as having been ‘conscious’ during dreamless sleep. 
In chapter 2, I analyse the definitions of dreamless sleep found in Indian 
philosophical traditions and focus on the accounts offered by the Advaita Vedānta, Yoga 
and Tibetan Buddhist traditions. Advaita and Yoga schools consider instances of awareness 
during dreamless sleep as a sort of awareness devoid of content that can only be remembered 
at a time later that being in this state (Āraṇya, 1983; Arya, 1989; Bryant, 2009). Meanwhile, 
Tibetan Buddhism considers the possibility of a state with content where we can gain lucidity 
of dreamless sleep (Rinpoche, 1998; Ponlop, 2006). I then move to the explication of the 
Transcendental Meditation programme (TM) on conscious states during deep sleep, called 
by their supporters ‘witnessing-sleep’. Similar to the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, the TM 
programme talks of a state of consciousness during deep sleep that can be reached through 
meditative practice. Moreover, TM proponents talk of witnessing-sleep as a state that can 
provide us with information about consciousness as such. In this section, I revisit the 
taxonomy presented in the introduction and I distinguish between AoAi and AdC in deep 
sleep by providing an alternative reading of the descriptions by Indian philosophical 
traditions. 
In chapter 3, I present one of the newest accounts of consciousness during deep sleep 
in analytical philosophy by Jennifer Windt (2015a). According to Windt, Nielsen and 
Thompson (2016), we can distinguish between three different types of conscious phenomena 
during deep sleep. One of these types is a contentless state that receives the name of ‘lucid 
dreamless sleep’ (LDS). These authors also claim that LDS is a good candidate to study 
consciousness itself. Windt defends the assertion that LDS should be understood as an 
experience where only a sense of ‘pure temporality' remains (2015a: 22) — a sense of just 
present time or ‘nowness'.  I argue that if one accepts Windt’s account of LDS then we need 
to consider, in a way that Windt does not, whether LDS really is an experience of minimal 
content and whether consciousness itself involves an experience of content. Therefore, I 
argue that we should understand Windt’s proposal on LDS as a case of awareness of minimal 
content (AoMC) during deep sleep and not as a case of awareness without content.   
In chapter 4, I compare the conceptual analysis carried out in Chapters 2 and 3 to 
the results of a pilot study that I have conducted on phenomenology during dreamless sleep. 
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I interviewed various participants experiencing instances of awareness during dreamless 
sleep using a qualitative research technique. During the analysis, four recurring experiences 
are identified: 1) Perception of absence, 2) Perception of self, 3) Perception of emotions, and 
4) Perception of awareness.  In each of these experiences, I isolate different categories, 
among them, awareness devoid of content. I conclude this chapter by outlining again the 
taxonomy of conscious dreamless sleep states and claim that different kinds of states can be 
recognised during deep sleep namely: (a) awareness of content, (b) awareness of minimal 
content, (c) awareness of awareness itself, (d) awareness devoid of content. 
Finally, in chapter 5, I present two goals that should be addressed in future research 
to adequately develop a full taxonomy of sleep phenomena. First, we should be able to 
compare properly dreamless sleep to other associated phenomena, such as dreams and 
hypnagogia. Future research should acknowledge dreamless sleep as a sui generis 
phenomenon different to other sleep phenomena. Second, we should take a 
neurophenomenological approach where we combine neuroscientific research with 
phenomenology, thus, considering sleep research and subjective reports to explore the 
experiences had during sleep.  With the adoption of such approach we will be able to develop 
an adequate taxonomy of sleep states that considers a wider variability of sleep phenomena. 
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Chapter 1: Conscious states during dreamless sleep 
The main argument of this thesis is that, contrary to what has been traditionally assumed, we 
can distinguish among different conscious states during dreamless sleep. I challenge 
mainstream views of consciousness research in which consciousness is seen as what is lost 
during dreamless sleep (Tononi, 2008; Tononi & Koch, 2008).  In this first chapter, I outline 
this taxonomy of conscious dreamless sleep by contrasting each of these states to some views 
held in philosophy of mind. In the following chapters, I examine previous definitions on 
awareness during dreamless sleep and compare them to my proposed taxonomy.  
This taxonomy lays out all states that should be considered as possible candidates to 
describe mental states during dreamless sleep (see Figure 2). In chapter 3, I will expose in 
more detail what makes dream experiences different from conscious dreamless sleep 
experiences, namely, their immersive and simulative character (Windt, 2010, 2015a; Windt 
et al., 2016). For now, it will suffice to say that conscious dreamless sleep experiences are 
experiences had during sleep that do not meet the criteria to be classified as dreams. I argue 
that during this period several mental states are possible.  It could be than none of these states 
is had, or that an individual has more than one of them 
Figure 1 Taxonomy of states during dreamless sleep 
Dreamless 
sleep
Non-conscious states Conscious states
Awareness with a 
content
Substantial 
content
Awareness of 
substantial content 
(AoSC)
Minimal content
Minimal content 
other than 
awareness itself
Awareness of minimal 
content (AoMC)
Minimal content 
of awareness 
itself
Awareness of 
awareness itself 
(AoAi)
Awareness without a 
content
Awareness devoid of 
content (AdC)
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1.1. Non-conscious states vs conscious states during dreamless 
sleep 
First, we can distinguish between non-conscious and conscious states. On one hand, non-
conscious states during dreamless sleep are those states that lack phenomenal character.  By 
phenomenal character I understand the subjective experience of a mental state; the what-it-
is-likeness of the experience (Nagel, 1974). During a period of non-consciousness during 
dreamless sleep, there was nothing it is for me to be in that state and thus, the state in question 
is not conscious.  Here, I assume that if there was no phenomenal character of a mental state, 
there was no reportable experience. From that reason, although I acknowledge non-
conscious periods of dreamless sleep — periods in which consciousness has been lost — I 
will not consider them in this thesis. These non-conscious states are the ones that have been 
majorly studied in sleep research and has led to the assumption that consciousness disappears 
in dreamless sleep. The argument has been that, if, upon awakening from dreamless sleep, 
we did not report anything, it is because there is nothing we can experience during dreamless 
sleep. On the other hand, conscious states during dreamless sleep are states in which I 
experience something it is like to be in them. I claim that there are instances during deep 
sleep in which consciousness remains and thus, I can have conscious mental states. We have 
good reasons to believe that there are conscious states during dreamless sleep from the large 
number of reports of conscious states during sleep. These reports are numerous and have 
been reported by contemporary subjects as well as by several Indian philosophical traditions 
over centuries (these will be presented in chapters 2 and 3).  What I will do here is to set out 
all the forms of possible conscious experiences that there could be that are not dream 
experiences. From now on, I will refer to this period as conscious dreamless sleep. 
Second, we can make a distinction in the content of a conscious state. By content, I mean 
what the mental state represents, that is, what it is about. States that have content are often 
called intentional states. When the content of a state takes propositional form, then the 
content is called ‘propositional content’. During conscious dreamless sleep, we can 
distinguish between states that have content and states that do not have content. 
1.1. Contentful dreamless sleep: substantial content and 
minimal content 
On the contentful spectrum, we can classify instances of awareness according to the 
complexity of their content. These are distinguished in basis of: (i) substantial content, or (ii) 
minimal content. First, I call awareness of substantial content (AoSC) states in which there 
is a perception (veridical or non-veridical) of an object of awareness. Instances of AoSC 
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usually take the form of propositional content, but they do not need to. I will regard as AoSC 
instances of awareness during conscious dreamless sleep in which the content of awareness 
is complex and thus, it might be similar to other forms of consciousness during standard 
wakefulness.  
I claim that most occurrent conscious thoughts (sleep thinking), perception of body, and 
perception of simple and static hallucinatory forms (hypnagogic experiences) are examples 
of AoSC. During those states, there is usually a mental representation associated (i.e. 
ruminative thoughts) or veridical and non-veridical perception (i.e. the feeling of the own 
body in bed; the experience of hallucinatory forms). These states often (although need not 
only) happen while we are falling asleep, and so these states have been studied empirically 
under the term ‘sleep-onset experiences’ in the empirical literature. Sleep-onset experiences 
vary in form, from linguistic intrusions (Noreika et al., 2015; Speth, Schloerschedit & Speth, 
2016), kinaesthetic images (Hayashi et al., 1999; Nielsen, 2017) to visual and auditory 
hallucinations. These last ones have been called hypnagogic hallucinations (Mavromatis, 
1987) and can take more complex or simpler forms. These hallucinatory experiences are 
called hypnagogic phenomena (if happens during wakefulness to sleeping transition) and 
hypnopompic phenomena (if happens during sleeping to wakefulness). Hypnagogic 
experiences are described as different from dreams because they are not experienced as 
immersive experiences. Individuals usually report experiencing them as if they were 
watching a movie or if they were seeing a picture (ibid). On the contrary, in dreams, we have 
a full sense of immersion, including the sense of being present in place in time in an 
environment (Windt, 2015b). In chapter 5, I will analyse this distinction in more detail, and 
I will support the view that the transition between dreamless sleep and dreamful sleep is a 
gradual one. From now, I just assume that sleep-onset experiences, including hypnagogic 
hallucinations, are dreamless sleep experiences and thus, are not dream experiences.  
Second, I distinguish among experiences that have a minimal content.  These instances 
of awareness of minimal content refer to special cases of content that have been discussed 
in the literature of dreamless sleep. They also consist of a subtler form of awareness and thus, 
contrary to AoSC, they lack conscious occurrent thoughts and visual/auditory/kinaesthetic 
perception. Despite this lack of perception, forms of awareness of minimal content still 
involve awareness of some sort of intentional content. They are usually forms of non-
conceptual content which is also non-representational. I distinguish between two sorts of 
minimal content: (i) a minimal content other than awareness itself (AoMC), and (ii) minimal 
content of awareness itself (AoAi).  
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The first sort (AoMC) can be found in contemporary literature of dreamless sleep. 
One example is the case of Thompson (2015a, b) who interprets the descriptions found on 
dreamless sleep by the Indian philosophical school of the Advaita Vedānta as instances of 
‘feeling of sentience'. Thompson describes this feeling as the bare feeling of being or feeling 
alive (2015b:11). He takes awareness during dreamless sleep to involve a minimal sense of 
embodiment to explain the presence of consciousness during this period.  On a different note, 
Windt (2015a) describes awareness during dreamless sleep as the most minimal form of 
consciousness. According to her, this awareness takes the form of a pure temporal experience 
described as a feeling of ‘nowness'. In this state, there is no feeling of passing time or any 
other temporal dimension — there is a bare feeling of the present moment, of presence. In 
both cases, Thompson and Windt describe instances of awareness during dreamless sleep 
that seems not to involve an object of awareness. According to these authors, these are forms 
of pure phenomenal experiences (they lack propositional content). However, I claim that 
descriptions taking the form of ‘feeling of sentience’ or ‘feeling of nowness’ should be 
regarded as AoMC. The reason for this is that, although the content of awareness is very 
minimal, we can recognise some sort of intentionality, i.e. towards ‘sentience', ‘nowness'. 
Similarly, this is a conscious state different from that of awareness devoid of content, AdC 
(see §1.3). This condition on having an intentional content that can be identified will be key 
to discern between AdC and AoMC.  
Finally, instances of AoMC also includes the experience of ‘nothingness’ during 
dreamless sleep, instances where the individual reports having experienced ‘nothing’. I claim 
that these instances of awareness of nothing should be regarded as mental states with 
intentional content (i.e. towards ‘nothingness’). Thus, these states should be differentiated 
from instances in which there is an absence of content. The mental state is still directed at 
something (it has intentionality). Conscious states during dreamless sleep with minimal 
content (AoMC), can include the experience of different sorts of minimal content as long as 
this content is not about awareness itself. 
The second sort of minimal content is awareness of awareness itself (AoAi). Here, I 
understand by AoAi a mental state that represents itself. In AoAi, the object of awareness is 
not some external object, but the same awareness. Therefore, we should not confuse AoAi 
with the experience of ‘meta-awareness’ such as “I’m right now having an experience of 
awareness”. In this case, we have a higher order state in which we reflect on our own 
experience (i.e. I am reflecting about the fact that I am aware). Contrary, AoAi should better 
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be understood as an experience that is the “act of awareness and the object at the same time” 
(Kriegel, 2005:29). This is, thus, a reflexive state.  
AoAi has been described previously in the literature of philosophy of mind by self-
representational theories of consciousness. These sorts of theories allow the existence of a 
sort of awareness in which we are aware of awareness as an ‘object’. Self-representational 
theories consider awareness as self-intimating state: I can have direct awareness of 
awareness itself without needing to be aware of my state as such. An example of this is 
Kriegel (2009) who claims that a conscious state C is conscious in virtue of representing 
itself (p.16).  Self-representational theories such as Kriegel’s claim that we can distinguish 
between two components in the phenomenal character of a conscious state: (i) qualitative 
character, and (ii) subjective character. The (i) qualitative character is what makes a 
conscious state the phenomenally conscious state it is, while (ii) subjective character is what 
makes a conscious state a conscious state at all (Kriegel, 2009: 2). It is this second component 
what explains awareness of awareness, which in turn it is a self-representing state.  
Following this, for a state to be considered an AoAi, what I experience is not an 
awareness of something distinct to my state (i.e. the object of my awareness), but I 
experience my very state of awareness. AoAi then does not represent something different to 
awareness itself:  
“All phenomenally conscious states are phenomenally conscious in virtue of 
being represented (in the right way) by a mental state that is not numerically 
distinct from themselves—that is, in virtue of self‐representing (in the right 
way) (Kriegel, 2005:15) 
This similar idea of a self-representative state of consciousness is found in Brentano’s work 
who claims that a conscious state has an attitude towards an intentional content, but also 
towards itself (Brentano, 1973). 1 It is this second attitude that is self-intimating and allows 
the possibility to have awareness of awareness itself — we can have an immediate 
experience of awareness itself. This reading of AoAi supports the claim that we can be aware 
of the external properties of the objects of our awareness, but also of the awareness itself 
(Kriegel, 2009, Montague, 2017). Montague has supported this view and developed a thesis 
of awareness of awareness in which she defends that conscious states display a self-
intimating feature that allow us to gain immediate awareness of itself.  
 
1 Note that one of the constraints in Brentano’s account is that all mental states are intentional, and thus, we cannot have 
non-intentional states. A mental state needs to be always about something. Therefore, Brentanian views assert that a 
minimal state of consciousness would be about the mind itself – a self-referential state with the mind as an object of 
awareness.  
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“In having a veridical visual experience of a red ball, for example, in addition to 
being aware of features of the ball, the subject is also aware of the experience 
itself. The awareness of the red ball and the awareness of the experience itself 
constitute a single conscious mental episode” (Montague, 2017:362) 
Thus, when I have the visual experience of a red ball, I experience the redness of the red ball, 
but also the awareness of the red ball itself (which should not be confused with the experience 
of meta-awareness like, ‘I’m experiencing a red ball’).  
Moreover, some authors defending Brentanian views claim that there exists a special 
phenomenology of this awareness of awareness, namely, cognitive phenomenology (Bayne 
& Montague, 2011).2 Views on cognitive phenomenology support the idea that, although we 
do not directly perceive the state of ‘awareness of awareness' as such — we do not perceive 
something that it is an ‘awareness’ — there is a phenomenology associated to a state of AoAi. 
When we introspect our awareness of awareness, there is something it is like to be in a state 
of awareness of awareness.3   
I claim that in some moments during deep sleep, we can encounter experiences of 
AoAi. This can be explained by the fact that, during some moments of dreamless sleep, there 
is nothing to perceive, except, our own awareness. Thus, by taking again the distinction 
between the features of consciousness ((i) attitude towards intentional content, and (ii) 
attitude towards itself), instances of AoAi would only have the second feature — there is an 
attitude towards the conscious state itself.  Then, reports of AoAi would take the form of a 
phenomenological report in which the individual reports having been aware of ‘their own 
awareness’, in which awareness, was not something external to their experience, but the 
experience of awareness itself. This proposal on AoAi will be exposed in further detail in 
Chapter 2 when analysing Tibetan Buddhist descriptions of awareness during dreamless 
sleep.  
 
2 Cognitive phenomenology is the phenomenology that mental states display – there is something it is like for a subject to 
be in a mental state. Advocates of cognitive phenomenology assert that there exists a phenomenology of been in a mental 
state insofar there is a difference between ‘having a mental state C’ and ‘the experience of having a mental state C’. For a 
detail account on the different views regarding Cognitive phenomenology, see Bayne & Montague (2011). 
 
3 Montague (2017) explains this with the example by comparing the ‘perception of a blackbird’ and the ‘perception of a 
black bird with the knowledge that this is a blackbird’ (p.374). According to Montague, my experience when seeing a 
blackbird without conceptualising this as a ‘blackbird’ is not the same as my experience of me seeing a blackbird with the 
understanding that this is a ‘blackbird’. Her argument is that, seeing a blackbird and recognising this as such, instantiates a 
cognitive-phenomenological property – that of the experience of ‘blackbird as a blackbird’. However, when we just see the 
blackbird without recognising this as such, this phenomenological property is not instantiated, and thus, both experiences 
are phenomenologically different.   
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1.2. Contentless dreamless sleep 
Finally, a taxonomy of dreamless sleep should also contemplate the possibility of having 
states that lack content altogether. Contrary to minimal forms of awareness, during these 
instances there are no content of awareness whatsoever, including that of AoAi. Although 
there is no content of experience, there is still something it is like to be in those states. That 
means that, despite the absence of content of awareness, the individual is still conscious. I 
call these instances of awareness devoid of content (AdC). The existence of these states 
might have not been widely supported in Western philosophy, but they have been largely 
discussed in Indo-Tibetan philosophical traditions. An example of their discussion are the 
descriptions made by the Advaita Vedānta School, one of the major schools of Hinduism. 
This school asserts the existence of a period of conscious dreamless sleep in which the 
individual is aware and nothing else. I will revisit these descriptions in the next chapter. 
My claim is that instances of AdC during conscious dreamless sleep would be 
evidenced in the form of epistemic reports upon awakening such as: ‘I knew there was a 
period I was aware’. However, the subject does not necessarily need to report it in this way. 
In most cases, the phenomenology of AdC, after its experience, would be that of ‘knowing 
that one was in such a state’. In some other cases, this experience would be reported solely 
by descriptions such as: “I remember I was aware”. It is not after the experience of AdC that 
we realise that this experience took place in time and space, but while the experience 
unfolded, there was no sense of time or space. Similarly, we attribute this experience to 
ourselves after the experience is over, but during the experience, there was no sense of self. 
During the experience of AdC there was no content of awareness, including that of ‘nothing’, 
‘absence’ or ‘awareness itself’. Therefore, conscious states during dreamless sleep should 
not be confused with the experience of ‘nothingness' during deep sleep. I mentioned before 
that the experience of nothingness should be regarded as AoMC instead. While in a state of 
consciousness devoid of content, I am not aware while I am having that state that I have this 
state, neither am I aware of something during that state. If I was conscious of this state during 
the state, I would then have awareness of awareness itself (AoAi).  Moreover, these states 
of AdC are not lucid because while in them, I do not acquire insight (I do not know I am 
having a state of AdC). It is only when I wake up that I can describe what it was like to be 
in that state of AdC by recalling the experience.  
In the philosophical literature, the possibility of such kind of awareness like AdC has 
been controversial. There is a large debate over the question of whether all phenomenal 
character can be reduced to representational content (Tye, 1992, Drestke, 1995; Block, 1990; 
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1996). In philosophical terms, the distinction between the object of representation and the 
carrier is understood as the ‘content' and the ‘vehicle'. The ‘content' is what is represented, 
and the ‘vehicle' is the carrier. The carrier is the experiential state that carries the content. 
Because of this assertion, some representationalists claim that we can only be aware of the 
properties of the object being represented, but not the carrier of the representation (Harman, 
1990). For other authors, like Kriegel, we can be aware of the object itself, which in turn, 
make us to be aware of our awareness itself (see AoAi). Similarly, mainstream models of 
consciousness also advocate for an explanation of minimal states instead of states with 
absence of content altogether. Thus, the general view is that consciousness, per definition, 
cannot be contentless and as such, even the so-called contentless experiences involve some 
sort of content (i.e. ‘emptiness’; see Hohwy, 2009; Bachmann & Hudetz, 2014). Despite this 
controversy regarding instances of AdC, we do not have a priori reasons to reject its 
existence, and thus, I will consider them in my taxonomy. 
Some previous views in philosophy have discussed the issue of pure consciousness, 
by referring to this as consciousness itself. Advocates of instances of pure phenomenality 
(episodes of AdC), reject the idea that conscious states need representational content. I can 
have a state of consciousness with nothing that represents that state (including that of 
awareness itself). Similarly, this state is different from a non-conscious state inasmuch as it 
preserves its phenomenal character. However, some of these views involve different 
metaphysical constraints. In some cases, these views still support a phenomenology of this 
state of pure consciousness that involves some content. An example of this is Moore (1903) 
who defends that phenomenal character has relational properties. Moore exemplifies this 
property with the ‘sensation of blue’. When I have a sensation of blue, there is a particular 
property on my consciousness that instantiates on me the experience of ‘sensation of blue’ 
and makes my experience of ‘sensation of blue’ phenomenologically different from my 
experience of ‘sensation of green’. Let us call the property of ‘sensation of blue’ the B-
property. There is also another property that makes that ‘sensation of blue’ to be conscious. 
Let us call this the C-property.  Moore argues that the C-property is what is common in both 
sensations (Moore, 1903:448). This property is usually ‘diaphanous’ and ‘transparent’ (ibid, 
p.450) — we cannot access it. However, says Moore, this property can at times be 
introspected. According to him, the C-property cannot be introspected as if was an object; I 
do not perceive the C-property as ‘consciousness’. Thus, the introspection of the C-property 
would give place to a phenomenology of ‘knowing'.   
“The element that is common to them all, and which I have called 'consciousness,' 
really is consciousness. A sensation is, in reality, a case of ' knowing' or ' being 
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aware of' or 'experiencing 'something. When we know that the sensation of blue 
exists, the fact we know is that there exists an awareness of blue. And this 
awareness is not merely, as we have hitherto seen it must be, itself something 
distinct and unique, utterly different from blue: it also has a perfectly distinct and 
unique relation to blue, a relation which is not that of thing or substance to content, 
nor of one part of content to another part of content. To be aware of the sensation 
of blue is not to be aware of a mental image — of a 'thing,' of which 'blue' and 
some other element are constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and 
glass are constituents of a blue bead. It is to be aware of an awareness of blue” 
(Moore, 1903:449).  
Although Moore claims that the introspection of the C-property leads to a state of pure 
awareness, if this property C instantiates a phenomenology of ‘knowing’, this should 
be regarded as a state of content — that of awareness of knowing that there is C-
property.  
In other cases, defenders of pure consciousness also defend the idea, like Moore, that 
there is some intrinsic property common to all common states that is always present. This is 
the case of mysticism and the account of pure consciousness event (PCE; Forman, 1986). 
PCE is described as a period in which "one is awake but devoid of objects for attention" 
(Forman, 1988: 257). The PCE can be reported after having its experience:  
“Ultimately one may become utterly silent inside, as though in a gap between 
thoughts, where one becomes completely perception- and thought-free. One 
neither thinks nor perceives any mental or sensory content. Yet, despite this 
suspension of content, one emerges from such events confident that one had 
remained awake inside, fully conscious” (Forman, 1999) 
PCE has been regarded as a kind of experience that explains consciousness itself 
(Shear & Jevning, 2011). This view supports the claim that there is an underlying property 
that is shared by all experiences, namely pure consciousness. PCEs then would involve 
instances in which we recognise consciousness as such. Because of this, advocates of PCEs 
have been trying to find the common neural substrate for these experiences (d’Aquili & 
Newberg, 1999) arguing that those can tell us which the basis of consciousness itself is. For 
instance, Travis (1994) developed the junction point model, which claims that there is an 
underlying field common to wakefulness, NREM and REM sleep (Maharishi, 1972). 
Following this, the junction point model also claims that studying the transition points 
between waking, NREM and REM sleep can reveal the moments in which consciousness 
itself appears. This idea of pure consciousness as the essence of consciousness and 
something that can goes among and beyond standard consciousness is largely discussed in 
contemplative traditions. For instance, the Advaita Vedānta School uses the concept of 
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turiya to describe a state that underlines waking and dreaming (Gupta, 1998). In Western 
philosophy, O’Shaughnessy (1986) has defended this view on consciousness itself as 
something different to standard consciousness. He talks of ‘consciousness itself’ as different 
to ‘particular consciousness’ because this consciousness persists even when there is no 
object of awareness (p.51). Metzinger (2019) has recently addressed the issue of 
consciousness itself with the research on the minimal phenomenal experience. This research 
investigates whether there is a form of experience that is common to all sort of experiences 
and thus, there is something like the substrate of consciousness. I will return to the issue of 
PCE on §2.3. 
For the moment, I will argue that we can have forms of consciousness devoid of 
content during dreamless sleep (AdC), but I will not defend a view in which these instances 
of consciousness provide evidence of the essence or substrate of consciousness. 4 Instead, I 
will argue that instances of AdC can be recognised during deep sleep — a form of awareness 
that is devoid of content whatsoever and that can only be reported afterwards. This AdC 
during dreamless sleep takes the form of a conscious mental state during deep sleep in which 
the subject is not aware of anything, including the awareness of having that state. Therefore, 
it is only upon awakening when the individual reports a period of consciousness during 
dreamless sleep, that was devoid of any sort of perception or cognition.  Moreover, contrary 
to a state of AoAi, during AdC there is no representational content. We have a state of 
consciousness with nothing that represents that state (including that of awareness itself).  
To sum up, we can lay out the following range of possible conscious states during dreamless 
sleep: 
1) Non-conscious states They do not have any phenomenology, and 
thus, they are not conscious. 
2) Awareness of substantial content 
(AoSC) 
They instantiate a mental representation. Are 
more similar to wakefulness perception 
(veridical and non-veridical). 
3) Awareness of minimal content 
(AoMC) 
These are usually described as non-
conceptual, although they need not. Do not 
 
4 For an exposition on the conceptual problems of pure consciousness, see Griffiths (1990) and Gennaro (2008) 
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include (veridical or non-veridical) 
perception of an object of awareness.  
4) Awareness of awareness itself 
(AoAi) 
Same as above, but the intentional content 
refers exclusively to that of the mind. 
5) Awareness devoid of content (AdC) 
They are not directed at anything, neither 
instantiate any content. Nonetheless, this 
state still has phenomenal character. 
Table 1. Possible states during dreamless sleep 
I claim that these possible states are not mutually exclusive, and thus, we can experience 
several of them over a period of dreamless sleep. Thus, while a great number of authors in 
the literature claim that the conscious contentless awareness during dreamless sleep refers 
to the last kind, AdC, the descriptions offered do not always allude to a state that it is actually 
devoid of content. One of the aims of this thesis is to explain this apparent discrepancy by 
taking descriptions several authors have given of dreamless sleep and identifying which 
states in the taxonomy that I have just provided they are. All this will be done by bearing in 
mind that the descriptions found in the literature usually describe a period of time during 
which the people have successive different kinds of states of conscious dreamless sleep. I 
argue that most of the descriptions that we find on awareness during dreamless sleep actually 
refer to states with intentional content, either minimal content other than awareness itself or 
awareness itself (AoMC and AoAi respectively). The next chapter examines descriptions 
found in Indian philosophical traditions. 
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Chapter 2: The Indian contemplative literature on deep 
sleep and witnessing sleep 
This chapter aims to analyse the literature on awareness during deep sleep found in the Indian 
philosophical traditions of the Advaita Vedānta, Yoga and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. These 
ancient traditions offer very rich descriptions of the nature of consciousness that are crucial 
to Western philosophy of mind. While Advaitins, Yogic and Buddhists all agree that 
consciousness is present during dreamless sleep, the metaphysical accounts of the mind vary 
among the different schools. There is a great heterogeneity among their views on the 
phenomenology of awareness during deep sleep, a heterogeneity that is even present within 
authors of the same school.  This variability makes the task of interpreting those texts more 
daunting and requires a formal analysis that can provide a standardised account of those 
views. For this reason, this chapter undertakes a careful analysis of some of the main texts 
in the Advaitin, Yogic and Tibetan Buddhist and provides a possible interpretation of their 
descriptions on deep sleep. Moreover, this chapter develops an analysis that correlates the 
aforementioned taxonomy with the descriptions in Indian texts.  
The chapter starts with a review of the key definitions of dreamless sleep found in 
the Advaita Vedānta and Yoga schools. This state is described as the ‘sleep of ignorance’; a 
state where the individual, upon waking up, remembers that there was a period during deep 
sleep in which there was nothing to perceive or to cognise. For the Advaita Vedānta and 
Yoga, awareness during deep sleep is a state of consciousness that can be apprehended and 
reported after awakening. This state is also described as an instance of consciousness as such 
— a pure phenomenal experience without object of content. Then, I turn to the Indo-Tibetan 
Buddhism’s approach in which they talk of different meditative practices that aid the 
acquisition of lucidity in deep sleep. This view, slightly different from that of the Advaita 
and Yoga schools, claims that during awareness in deep sleep the practitioner can recognise 
‘the clear light’, a state that is described in the Buddhist texts as the nature or essence of 
consciousness. Following these definitions, we should distinguish between three kinds of 
conscious dreamless sleep states: (a) one that does not have any content, (b) one with content, 
(c) one that has a referential content. The first one, (a), is a pure phenomenological state in 
which the individual cannot gain self-awareness while in it — the state, does not contain any 
object of awareness. In the second one, (b), the individual can reach a state of awareness of 
their own dreamless sleep state, which has a content of awareness. The third one, (c), the 
individual can also reach awareness of this state while in it, but what they discover is their 
own awareness — the content of awareness is awareness itself. 
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Thompson (2015) establishes a similar distinction when comparing the different 
readings of awareness during deep sleep made by the Advaitin and the Indo-Tibetan 
traditions. For this, he distinguishes between ‘ordinary deep sleep’ (i.e. sleep of ignorance), 
and ‘lucid deep sleep’, which he calls clear light sleep (ibid, p.4). I borrow this distinction 
from Thompson and argue that we can take three possible readings from the Advaita, Yoga 
and Tibetan approaches that can be correlated to my proposed framework. Thus, we can 
distinguish: 
-Awareness of minimal content (AoMC):  perceptual awareness of a ‘light’ or 
some object that appears as ‘clarity’ during deep sleep. 
-Awareness of awareness itself (AoAi): The experience of our own consciousness 
during deep sleep. We can acknowledge AoAi as it happens if we are skilful in the 
practice of Sleep Yoga or Yoga Nidra, a meditative practice. 
-Awareness devoid of content (AdC): The experience of consciousness as such — 
a pure phenomenal experience without content of any sort. This can only be 
acknowledged and reported upon waking up.  
2.1. The Sleep of ignorance: Advaita and Yoga accounts 
The Advaita Vedānta and Yoga are major schools of philosophy of mind in Hinduism. While 
these schools differ on various epistemological and metaphysical claims on the nature of the 
mind, here, I will exclusively focus on their similar ideas regarding the phenomenology of 
awareness during deep sleep. The main commonality between these two schools is the claim 
that consciousness is never lost during deep sleep; they claim that deep sleep is a special 
state of consciousness. Several mentions of dreamless sleep as a state where consciousness 
remains can be found in the Mandukya Upanishad and the Yoga Sutras of Patañjali, key 
texts for the development of the phenomenology of dreamless sleep in those schools.5 In 
these texts, the Advaita and Yoga schools consider dreamless sleep as a mode of 
consciousness; a state with a specific type of cognition (Arya, 1989: 178). The reason given 
by these schools is that, upon awakening, we recall having slept peacefully, and we can 
reflect on this previous state of dreamless sleep (ibid). According to these schools, reports 
about this awareness can only be explained by the fact that consciousness was active 
somehow during dreamless sleep. Otherwise, we could not have woken up with such a clear 
 
5 For the Mandukya Upanishad see translations and commentary by Nikhilananda (1949), Gambhirananda (1937) and 
Olivelle (1998). For commentaries on the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali see Āraṇya (1983); Arya (1989); Bryant (2009) 
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experience of awareness of having slept peacefully, and especially, of having been sleeping 
(Nikhilananda, 1949:59; Arya, 1989: 178; Gupta, 1998:27). The Advaita Vedānta and Yoga 
stress the fact that reports of consciousness during deep sleep are memory reports — the 
subject reporting them is describing something that happened. Chatterjee and Datta talk of 
‘direct experience’ of deep sleep: 
‘Such memory of what took place during sleep supposes direct experience of the 
state of sleep. So, there must be in sleep some cognitive mental state or process 
which is concerned in the experience of the absence of knowledge (1950:301-
302)   
Thus, Advaitin and Yogis argument on consciousness during dreamless sleep goes in the 
lines of, ‘if, upon awakening, I have such a clear feeling that I have an episode of awareness 
during dreamless sleep, why should I doubt that I did have consciousness during dreamless 
sleep?’. Following Chatterje and Datta’s previous quote, this clear feeling of knowing that I 
was aware during dreamless sleep is caused by the awareness had during dreamless sleep. 
During dreamless sleep I had a ‘direct experience’. Therefore, Advaitin and Yogics claim 
that the memory of this episode of awareness after awakening from dreamless sleep is not an 
inferential thought, but a memory report. Advaitins and Yogics say that, what has been 
retrospectively generated afterwards is the fact that this thought pertains to the same self that 
wakes. Because during deep sleep I do not have an awareness of myself — I do not have self-
awareness —, it is upon awakening when my wake ‘I’ associates the experience during 
dreamless sleep to itself. 
Since for the Advaita and Yoga school’s consciousness does not fade during dreamless 
sleep, they talk of this state as ‘sushupti’ (Sanskrit: सुषुप्ति), one of the four states of 
consciousness. 6  In the Advaitin tradition, sushupti is distinct from wakefulness and 
dreaming consciousness because in this state we lack perception or cognition and, thus, the 
necessary faculties for experiencing. Consequently, they claim that, during sushupti, there is 
no awareness of anything — not of oneself, not of a lack of an object, not of an absence. 
Sushupti appears in the Upanishads described as a state of absence, a state where “a sleeping 
man entertains no desires or sees no dreams” (Mandukya Upanishad, 5 in Olivelle, 1998: 
475). However, during dreamless sleep, we are not aware of this absence — dreamless sleep 
is absence, a period of void. 
 
6 The four state of consciousness according these traditions are wakefulness (jagrat), dreaming (svapna), deep 
sleep (Sushupti) and a higher state of consciousness (turiya).  
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To explain the kind of consciousness present during dreamless sleep, the Advaita 
Vedānta alludes to the ‘sākṣīn’ (Sanskrit: साक्षिन्) which etymologically means “direct and 
immediate perception” or “that who undertakes the direct and immediate perception” (Gupta, 
1998:3). Yet the sākṣīn should not be confused with something, like a cartesian ego or a 
material thing inside our head that perceives. Because of this, in her book, Gupta (1998) 
translates ‘sākṣīn’ as ‘witness-consciousness’ a concept that other authors have used to refer 
to the kind of consciousness that the Advaitins and Yogics say remains during deep sleep 
(Chatterjee, 1982; Fort, 1984; Albahari, 2009; Fasching, 2010). Gupta refers to witness-
consciousness as a kind consciousness “that simply witnesses, without getting involved in 
the ongoing process of experience” (Gupta, 1998:6). To explain this, Gupta presents the 
distinction between the two modes of seeing described by the Advaitin texts: the ‘sight’ and 
the ‘seen’. The first is the usual ‘sight’, the kind of perception that we undertake with our 
eyes when we see something. The second, is described as an ‘eternal seeing’, an attribute 
that is essential to the sākṣīn (Gupta, 1998:25). Although during sushupti the usual sight 
cannot take place — there is nothing to perceive and our senses are occluded – the sākṣīn 
and its ‘eternal seeing’ remains.  
“The self does not perceive any object in deep sleep, because although it is (really) 
seeing in that state, it does not see in the usual manner through the eyes. 
Consciousness is imperishable; there is no cessation of the seeing of the seer. In 
the state of deep sleep, there is nothing else but pure consciousness. As fire never 
loses its property of burning or the sun of shinning, similarly the seer, the self, 
never loses its power of seeing […] Thus, the seeing of the seer, being its own 
intrinsic nature, never ceases; even in deep sleep, where there is nothing to be 
seen, it sees” (Gupta, 1998: 25) 
Different authors have argued that the concept of the sākṣīn in the Advaita Vedānta is 
deeply rooted in that of consciousness as such. By this, they mean that witness-
consciousness alludes to the essence of consciousness. However, the views that support this 
assumption vary in the descriptions of what consciousness as such is. It is important to lay 
out these distinctions in the several descriptions of the sākṣīn and consciousness as such 
because of their implications. Some authors might assert that consciousness itself is the all-
prevailing feature of consciousness found in every conscious state, but this need not to be. I 
defend a view in which instances of consciousness itself should be considered in conscious 
dreamless sleep, but these instances should not necessarily be considered as the essence of 
consciousness. Some other authors assert the existence of consciousness as such, but they 
attribute to this a content of awareness that can be assessed, such as the experience of 
awareness of awareness itself, or the experience of ‘knowing’ that we are in state of pure 
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consciousness. I claim that these assumptions are not always compatible with a view of 
awareness devoid of content. 
For instance, Gupta claims that although consciousness as such is always present in 
every conscious state, consciousness as such cannot become the object of awareness: 7 
“The witness-consciousness, although the basis of all knowing, is different from 
the object known. It is implied in every act of knowing. It is the ultimate subject; 
it can never become an object of knowledge” (Gupta, 1998:18) 
Other authors like Chatterje, asserts that consciousness as such, the sākṣīn, can become 
aware qua awareness itself. This bring us again to the distinction established in the first 
chapter between the two features of awareness: the object of our experience — the content 
—and the awareness itself — the vehicle, the carrier of the content. According to Chatterje, 
we are not only aware of the content, but also of the vehicle. This view resembles that of 
awareness of awareness itself defended by Kriegel (2003, 2009) and Montague (2017). 
“When we have an awareness of an object, the object is indeed manifested, but 
it is not the only thing revealed; here we have an automatic awareness of the 
awareness too. The two awarenesses are simultaneous, but they are not of a 
similar structure, in fact they are the two aspects of the same awareness. Or in 
other words when an object is known, through a mental occurrent, the occurrent 
is also known by the knower without the mediation of any other mental state” 
(Chatterje, 1982:342) 
Finally, Albahari (2010) reads the notion of the sākṣīn in a similar way that Moore (1903) 
and argues that witness consciousness can be equalled to the diaphanousness of 
consciousness (Moore, 1903: 450). Consciousness as such, or witness consciousness, is the 
common feature present in all conscious states which cannot become our object of awareness. 
However, according to Albahari, and following Moore, this witness consciousness has 
intrinsic phenomenal character — a phenomenal character that cannot be attended.  
While mode-neutral awareness is not to be identified with the ability to 
reflectively tell that one is hearing, seeing and so forth, the ability to do so does 
serve as evidence for what would seem to be an aspect of mode-neutral awareness. 
If asked, we can consciously tell in a flash, from the first-person perspective, that 
a particular sense-modality. We don’t think that we think; we know that we think. 
This apparent epistemic vantage-point from which one can consciously survey 
the activity of various sense modalities seems mode-neutral. (Albahari, 2012:71-
2) 
 
7 This assumption is found in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad: “[You] cannot see the seer of seeing, [you] cannot hear the 
hearer of hearing, [you cannot] think the thinker of thinking, [you cannot] know the knower of knowing” (Brhadaranyaka 
Upanishad. III, 4.2 in Gupta, 1998: 19) 
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Its phenomenal character, we can recall, will be pre-attentional, in that being 
intrinsic to the very act of attending or inattending, it will never become an object 
of either attention or inattention. (ibid, p.74) 
I understand the intrinsic phenomenal character of the witness-consciousness 
described by Albahari as that which makes the experience of sushupti a conscious experience. 
The fact that witness-consciousness cannot become an object of awareness does not imply 
that it lacks phenomenal character — there is something it is like to be in a state of 
consciousness as such. However, the characterisation of the phenomenal character of 
witness-consciousness as ‘knowing’ should not be attribute to witness-consciousness per se, 
but to the phenomenology of the act of remembering this episode of witness-consciousness 
afterwards. 8 If we talk of the phenomenology of witness-consciousness as that of the act of 
‘knowing’ (see Metzinger, 2019), then, we are talking of the awareness of witness-
consciousness as a reflexive state (‘I know that I am aware’). Instead, what occurs in sushupti 
is that, upon waking up, I know that I had some sort of awareness during dreamless sleep, 
but that this period of awareness was absent of any other object of awareness. The only thing 
I will be able to say is that I knew that I was aware during deep sleep.  
The notion of the sākṣīn and the fact that cannot become the object of awareness, has 
been described in Indian texts with the concept of ‘self-luminosity’. In various descriptions 
we find mentions of the sākṣīn as a ‘self-luminous’ state (Albahari, 2009) or a state that ‘sees 
itself’ (Prasad, 2000:65). These descriptions, however, need to be handed with caution. We 
should think neither that the sākṣīn can become aware of itself (self-consciousness) or that 
we can become aware of the sākṣīn (object of awareness). Instead, we should take these 
descriptions of ‘self-luminosity’ as mere metaphors to explain the phenomenology of these 
states.   
Sushupti, or dreamless sleep, is also referred to in the Advaitin tradition as the ‘sleep 
of ignorance’. Remember that sushupti was described as a state of absence, including the 
awareness of absence itself. Sushupti then, is a period of void. However, because 
consciousness is still present during dreamless sleep, consciousness as such, we retain this 
absence in the form of ignorance — we retain knowledge of our ignorance.  
“[during deep sleep] 'there was consciousness of nothing' or 'I knew nothing', is 
actually an instance of knowledge on the part of the person who recalls that 
 
8 Moore (1903) argued that consciousness as such can become object of our awareness via its relational property (see 
Hellie 2007). We know that we are aware.  
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experience, and not of lack of knowledge of anything. This knowledge during 
sleep is, as already noticed, the knowledge of 'absence of knowledge' or, what is 
the same, of ignorance” (Sharma, 2011:217) 
This knowledge of ignorance in this state is retained during deep sleep and, upon awakening, 
we experience a felt absence (Āraṇya, 1983:30; Gupta, 1998:27). Advaita and Yoga 
traditions conceive of the felt absence of dreamless sleep as a “recollection of an experience” 
(Nikhilananda, 1949:54). Indich (1980) explains Samkara’s claim that “the absence of 
knowledge in deep sleep is a consequence of the absence of anything experienced separate 
from consciousness, rather than the absence of consciousness itself” (p.98).  Because of this, 
upon awakening, I remember this ignorance — there is something it was for me to be in a 
state of ignorance.  
 After having reviewed descriptions from the Advaita Vedānta and Yoga traditions of 
awareness during deep sleep, we can identify two features of these episodes of awareness: 
(i) a content of awareness, and (ii) a mode of awareness. First, as I explained above, both 
Advaita and Yoga schools claim that during deep sleep consciousness is preserved. However, 
since there is nothing to perceive or cognise during deep sleep, they say, there is nothing to 
be aware of. Therefore, the content of awareness is absent — there is no content whatsoever. 
Second, Advaitins and Yogics claim that what is present during dreamless sleep is a mode 
of consciousness. Dreamless sleep should not be understood as a period of lack of 
consciousness, but as instances of experiences of consciousness as such. To explain this 
mode of awareness, Advaitins and Yogics refer to the sākṣīn, a term that has been translated 
by Gupta as ‘witness-consciousness’ — an underlying awareness that cannot ever become 
the object of awareness. Therefore, dreamless sleep can also be understood as a state where 
the mode of awareness present is consciousness as such.  
I argue that the description offered by the Advaita Vedānta and Yoga schools of the 
awareness during dreamless sleep, or sushupti, is similar to that of awareness devoid of 
content, AdC, presented earlier. Thus, we can understand sushupti as a state where we have 
AdC; a state in which we are aware, but there is no content of awareness, we are just aware. 
It is not until awakening that we can report having been aware – we report knowing that we 
were aware. 
In the next section, I move on to the analysis of definitions offered by Indo-Tibetan 
Buddhism, which take a slightly different perspective on awareness during dreamless sleep. 
I will argue that Tibetan Buddhism talks of/describes a different experience: a conscious 
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experience during dreamless sleep that in this case, is aware of itself – awareness of 
awareness itself (AoAi). 
2.2. Dream of light. Lucid Dreamless Sleep 
The descriptions of awareness during dreamless sleep offered by Indo-Tibetan Buddhism 
are drawn from the teachings in two key texts, the Liberation Through Hearing During the 
Intermediate State (better known as the Tibetan Book of the Dead) and The Profound 
Dharma of the Natural Liberation through Contemplating the Peaceful and Wrathful.9 In 
these texts from the 8th Century, Padmasambhava talks of the ‘bardos’, which are translated 
as ‘transitional processes’ (Padmasambhava, Rinpoche, & Wallace, 2008). Each bardo 
corresponds to a different state of consciousness which are: waking, dreaming, profound 
meditation, death, experiencing reality, and rebirth (Evans-Wentz, 1960). In the teachings of 
Padmasambhava, we find instructions of different meditative practices that can be exercised 
in each of the bardos. In this section, I will only focus on the bardo of dream, which makes 
direct allusion to the period of dreamless sleep, and the meditative practices associated to 
this period: Dream Yoga and Sleep Yoga. 
 The teachings on the bardo of dream consist on three parts: (1) the illusory body 
(natural liberation of appearances), (2) dreaming body (natural liberation of confusion), and 
(3) luminosity (clear light and the natural liberation) (Fremantle, 2001; Rinpoche, 2008). 
The first two are related with Dream Yoga, a meditative practice that aims at recognising the 
dream state and thus, to understand that we are experiencing a delusion (Wallace, 2012). 
Following those premises, Dream Yoga would resemble the practice of lucid dreaming 
(Green, 1968; LaBerge, 1985). The third stage, the state of luminosity or clear light, talks of 
a period of dreamless sleep that can be accessed through the practice of Sleep Yoga. Sleep 
Yoga, or Yoga Nidra, is a meditative practice that aims at acquiring lucidity during deep 
sleep (Norbu, 1983; Rinpoche, 1998; Rinpoche, 2002). The goal of Sleep Yoga is to retain 
awareness whilst falling asleep and thus, be able to stay awake in the threshold of dreaming. 
10 Once skilful in Sleep Yoga, the practitioner can become aware of the period in between 
falling sleep and dreaming — the transition between both states. Meditators are trained to 
keep their awareness while falling asleep to be able to observe the transition from 
wakefulness to sleep and from sleep to dreaming. The practice of Sleep Yoga guides us to 
 
9 For translations and commentaries of the original texts see Evans-Wentz (1960), Padmasambhava, Rinpoche, & Wallace 
(2008) and Dorje (2005) 
 
10 I take this idea of a state in the threshold of dreaming by the description offered by Magallón (1987) who refers to it as 
a ‘pre-dream state’ (p.4) 
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recognise our state of awareness while we fall into deep sleep. This practice is also called 
Luminosity Yoga because it is believed that with the recognition of the state of deep sleep, 
we reach a state of “natural light” (Norbu, 1992) or ‘clarity light’ (Rinpoche, 2008). 
“The clear light of sleep occurs, I believe, as you’re falling asleep. It manifests 
during the interval after all of the daytime appearances have vanished and just 
before any dream appearances arise. Similarly, the clear light momentarily 
manifests when you’re on the verge of waking up after the appearances of the 
dream-state have passed and just before the appearances of the waking state arise” 
(Padmasambhava, Rinpoche, & Wallace, 2008:205).  
Once the practitioner has recognised the clear light in deep sleep, is it said that the 
practitioner has also recognised the nature of the mind — a state of ‘pure awareness’ (Ponlop, 
2006:86; Rinpoche, 2008:209). This is a state of void, emptiness, and clarity. 
“[luminosity sleep] which is realized through sleep yoga, is clear light sleep, the 
sleep of clarity. It occurs when the body is sleeping but the practitioner is neither 
lost in darkness nor in dreams but instead abides in pure awareness. Clear light 
is defined in most texts as the unity of emptiness and clarity. It is the pure, empty 
awareness that is the base of the individual” (Rinpoche, 1998:115).  
 
“Falling fast asleep corresponds to air dissolving into consciousness, and at that 
time, too, clearly and vividly focus on your heart, without losing the earlier sense 
of clarity and emptiness. Then the state of dreamless lucidity corresponds to the 
consciousness dissolving into the clear light, and at that time your sleep will 
lucidly remain in the clarity and emptiness that is unborn and devoid of 
recollection. If you recognize the clarity and emptiness of that occasion, which 
is free of the intellect, this is called “recognizing the clear 
light” (Padmasambhava, Rinpoche, & Wallace, 2008:209)  
This description of the clear light sleep requires a better analysis than the one we can 
find in the commentaries of these texts. My task is to consider its different possible 
interpretations and argue for the ones we should take. The Indo-Tibetan descriptions can be 
read in three different ways. First, we could interpret the state of ‘clear light’ in the literal 
sense of ‘perceptual experience’, that of light or lightness. As I will note in chapter 4, some 
individuals might experience this state as the perception of light. However, as for the 
teachings found in the Tibetan texts, we should not interpret the experience of luminosity in 
this way – as the visual experience of a light. For Tibetan Buddhism, the term ‘clear light’ 
or ‘luminosity’ is used to describe the essence or true nature of the mind (Ponlop, 2006:86). 
For the Tibetan Buddhists, the only thing that remains during deep sleep is this ‘luminosity’ 
or ‘pure awareness’. This is explained as “a light that sees itself, illumination that illuminates 
itself, awareness that is aware of itself” (Holecek, 2016: 177), which can be recognised while 
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we are in that state. Therefore, the descriptions involving light should be taken as a metaphor. 
This brings us to the second reading that we can make of the ‘clear light sleep’.  
The second possible reading that we can make is that the awareness of the ‘clear 
light’ is an awareness of our awareness itself, AoAi. This interpretation is possible if we 
follow the meaning of the concept of ‘clear light’ found in the Tibetan teachings of the 
Dzogchen. In those teachings, clear light is also referred to as rigpa, which is described as 
“awareness of the truth, innate awareness, the true nature of the individual” (Rinpoche, 1998: 
166) and “awareness or pure presence of natural self-perfected mind” (Norbu, 1992: 21). 
Rigpa is also described as ‘bare awareness’ (Ponlop, 2006: 13), the essence of our mind, the 
grounds of all other experiences. Gaining access to the state of deep sleep can reveal “the 
fundamental nature of the mind itself” (Dalai Lama, 1996: 127-120). Therefore, my claim is 
that what Tibetan Buddhism asserts we experience in the dreamless sleep is awareness as 
such — we encounter the pure appearance of consciousness (Ponlop, 2006:65). Therefore, 
we should ignore the first possible reading and take this second option as the most plausible 
one. Holecek also warns us of the previous reading on luminosity and claims that this should 
not be interpreted literally.  
“Sleep yoga works mostly with the deeper levels of the substrate and the clear-
light mind. This is why in the Tibetan tradition; sleep yoga is referred to as 
“luminosity yoga”: it’s dealing with the luminous nature of the awakened mind 
[…] It’s not a light that is seen in the usual sense (which would be dualistic), but 
it’s a light that sees itself, illumination that illuminates itself, awareness that is 
aware of itself (which is nondualistic)" (Holecek, 2016: 177). 
This interpretation of Holecek can be related to the case of the sākṣīn in the Advaita Vedānta 
where the only thing that remained during deep sleep is the sākṣīn, which is self-luminous 
but cannot be ‘perceived’ as an object of awareness.  Should we then interpret the ‘clear 
light’ in a similar way as the Sākṣīn — that of consciousness as such? That of awareness 
devoid of content? This is the third reading that we could do of the ‘clarity’ described in 
Tibetan Buddhism during dreamless sleep. The difference here would be that, while in AoAi 
we find a referential state, we are aware of an object, in this case, awareness itself, in AdC 
there is no object of awareness. As for this third interpretation, I do not hold a stand on it. 
While there is some evidence that shows the possibility of this third reading, most of the 
descriptions available refer AoAi. A version of the third reading could be found in Rinpoche: 
“There is a subtle difference that may occur here based on apprehending the clear 
light in light sleep or a deep sleep. If when you fall asleep your sleep is light […], 
you enter into your experience of clear light; but, because your sleep is very light, 
there is still a subtle grasping that occurs. If you fall into a deeper sleep with the 
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clear light awareness, there will be no grasping or conceptualization at all, and it 
will be the experience of deep meditative equipoise on the nature of emptiness 
which is the nature of clear light” (2002:65) 
 
My claim is that from Rinpoche’s description we can distinguish two different states 
of dreamless sleep: light sleep and deep sleep. The first one, light sleep, is a state that can be 
recognised — we can introspect this state while it is happening.  The second one, deep sleep, 
cannot be recognised and can only be reported afterwards. If this was the case, we would 
then have a similar description to that of the Advaita and Yoga tradition — a state of 
awareness devoid of content that can only be apprehended upon waking up. Thompson 
(2015b) also provides a distinction between what he calls the ‘sleep of ignorance’ and the 
‘clear light sleep’. He says that “Ordinary deep sleep is called the 'sleep of ignorance'; 
awareness is void or blank and in total darkness. Lucid deep sleep is called 'clear light sleep” 
(p.265). From this distinction by Thompson, I take it that we can identify two forms of 
dreamless sleep: one with content and one without.  
One of the views on consciousness held by Buddhism comes from the Vajrayana 
system, which differentiates between three levels of consciousness, including gross, subtle 
and very subtle. It is the very subtle level, which is said to be present during deep sleep: 
“And the very subtle level is the clear light mind, which manifests at the end of 
this dissolving. 'The experience of the clear light, which is said to be like a 'clear, 
cloudless autumn sky just before dawn', represents the mind at its subtle and 
awareness of it is called the natural clear light. When the practitioner maintains 
awareness of it, she has realised the fundamental nature of the mind itself, in that 
the clear light is the subtle basis of all other mental content” (Dalai Lama, 
1996:29) 
I take that the Buddhist stand to deep sleep is that a very subtle level of awareness remains 
— an awareness that is seen as the ‘fundamental nature of the mind itself’. Henceforth, I 
argue that the descriptions of awareness during dreamless sleep provided by this tradition 
should be considered as cases of AoAi.  
In respect to the Tibetan Buddhist descriptions of awareness during deep sleep, I 
claim that we should identify two features of this state: (i) a content of awareness, and (ii) a 
mode of awareness. However, I claim that those should be understood differently to that of 
the Advaitin and Yogic descriptions. As for the content of awareness during deep sleep, 
following the Buddhist descriptions, we should identify a minimal content — the object of 
awareness is not an external object, but awareness itself. Then, the mode of awareness would 
be AoAi, awareness of awareness itself. Thus, contrary to the Advaita and Yoga assumptions, 
  37 
Buddhists refer to a state where I can have immediate awareness of awareness itself. As in 
the case of the self-representational theory of consciousness defended by Kriegel (2009), I 
claim that the definitions of deep sleep in Tibetan Buddhism talk of a state that is aware of 
itself. I accept, however, as I presented in the previous chapter, that this is a state that does 
not involve a usual content of awareness –— object that is numerically different to my 
awareness — but instead, it is a self-referential state — the mental state represents itself.  
Summing up, I claim that we can distinguish between two different sorts of 
experiences of awareness during dreamless sleep in the Indian philosophical descriptions: 
awareness devoid of content (AdC) and awareness of awareness itself (AoAi). The first, AdC, 
corresponds to those descriptions of ‘sleep of ignorance’ or ‘deep sleep’ offered by the 
Advaitin and Yogic school presented in the previous section. The second, AoAi, are 
mentions of a state of ‘clear light sleep’ or ‘light sleep’ found in the Tibetan Buddhist 
traditions. Following this distinction, Tibetan Buddhism talks about a sort of meditation that 
can be practiced for recognising the state of clear light. I argue that Sleep Yoga should be 
understood as a practice in which we recognise awareness of awareness itself and not 
awareness devoid of content. The reason of this is that in AdC we cannot have any object of 
awareness. Therefore, when Tibetan Buddhist texts talk about awareness during deep sleep, 
they are usually referring to a state of AoAi. Although I agree that the view on AdC is 
compatible with the doctrines of Buddhism, in the case of deep sleep the descriptions refer 
to a contentful awareness — that with the content ‘the mind itself’.  
The next section will present the concept of ‘witnessing-sleep’, which was coined by 
the Transcendental Meditation programme and still used as a term to refer to the periods of 
awareness during dreamless sleep. I will argue that this term should not be confused with 
‘witness-consciousness’ and that it implies an assumption about what consciousness is 
different from the Advaita tradition. 
2.3. Witnessing-sleep and transcendental meditation 
In the last section of this chapter, I will present the concept of ‘witnessing-sleep’ introduced 
by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi to refer to a state of consciousness during deep sleep. This term 
has recently been used as a synonym of ‘witness-consciousness’, which refers to the sākṣīn 
and the experience of awareness devoid of content during deep sleep for the Advaita 
Vedānta. Moreover, the term of ‘witnessing-sleep’ has recently also been used to develop 
the concept of ‘lucid dreamless sleep’ which I will review in detail in the next chapter. 
Because of this, it is important to consider what ‘witnessing-sleep’ is, what the ideas behind 
this term are and whether this term refers to a similar experience to that described in the 
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Indian traditions. From this, we can conclude whether ‘witnessing sleep’ can be equated to 
‘witness-consciousness’ or to the state of ‘sushupti’. 
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi is the main founder of the Transcendental Meditation (TM) 
programme, a type of non-focused meditation that seeks to reach higher states of 
consciousness through its practice. TM bases its teachings on the Maharishi Vedic Science, 
the interpretation of the Vedas made by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi to explain specific 
psychological phenomena. 11 The teaching of the TM programme aims at fostering this kind 
of meditation to achieve altered states of consciousness, including what they call 
‘transcendental consciousness’ and ‘cosmic consciousness’. It is this later, ‘cosmic 
consciousness’, which is said to be the most heightened form of consciousness; a form of 
consciousness that transcends wakefulness, dreaming and sleeping. Cosmic consciousness 
can be experienced during profound transcendental meditation, but also, during deep sleep, 
thus giving place to ‘witnessing-sleep’ (Maharishi, 1969) 
“This experience of TC [transcendental consciousness] along with waking, 
dreaming and sleeping activity in CC is referred to as "witnessing" because the 
Self functions as a silent, uninvolved observer to all activity. The most stringent 
test for CC [conscious consciousness] is witnessing in sleep, the maintenance of 
Self-awareness during deep sleep” (Mason, Alexander, Travis and Gackenbach, 
1990: 3) 
Cosmic consciousness is also referred to as the ‘fourth state of consciousness’ following the 
Vedic tradition. Remember from §2.1 that, according to the Advaita Vedānta, there are four 
states of consciousness: wakefulness (jagrat), dreaming (svapna), deep sleep (sushupti), and 
the fourth (turiya).  According to Maharishi, cosmic consciousness is equated to the state of 
turiya mentioned in the Vedas (Mason & Orne-Johnson, 2010:29). Turiya is also described 
as the underlying state of all the other conscious states: 
“Turiya is the effulgent and all-pervasive source of objects. It is beyond 
ignorance. […] It exists in all being during the waking and the dreaming states 
and is called the seer of everything. There is nothing besides turiya” (Gupta, 
1998:29) 
While I will not delve in more detail on the concept of turiya itself, I will compare this 
notion with that of sushupti. In §2.1, I described the state of sushupti as consciousness as 
such, a state where the individual is conscious during deep sleep. After my analysis, I 
 
11 Although the Upanishads, key texts for the evolution of the ideas of the Advaita Vedanta and Yoga school are part of 
the Vedas, the Vedas themselves should not be confused with the school of Advaita Vedanta. These are the texts from 
which this school of thought arise. 
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concluded that we should understand the state of sushupti as that of AdC — a pure 
phenomenal experience of consciousness as such without intentional content. The concept 
of turiya is also described as a state of pure consciousness in the Advaita Vedanta texts, yet 
it is differentiated from sushupti.  
“Turiya is free from Svapna (dream) because it is free from Nidra (sleep) which 
is the cause of mis-aprehension of Reality (dream). It is because the Self is free 
from sleep and dream therefore the Jiva, then realises himself as the Turiya 
Atman, birthless and non-dual” (Nikhilananda, 1949:68) 
“Turiya then, cannot be found during dreamless sleep because it is a state that 
does not happen during sleep or during wakefulness – it is a state that transcend 
those states. While sushupti might resemble turiya, it should be considered as 
“almost turiya” (Raveh, 2008: 324).  
My claim is that sushupti should not be equalled with turiya because sushupti refers to a 
particular state of consciousness — deep sleep — whereas turiya refers to the underlying 
basis of all conscious states. Defenders of the concept of ‘witnessing-sleep’ describe this 
phenomenon as an instance of an underlying form of consciousness that can be observed 
during the practice of transcendental meditation, and in the transition between wakefulness, 
sleep and dreaming (Travis, 1994). My question here is, what does it make this state different 
from the experience of sushupti described by the Advaita and Yoga school? If sushupti 
should not be equalled with turiya, why should ‘witnessing-sleep’ be compared to this state? 
I claim that ‘witnessing sleep’ would be best equated to ‘pure consciousness experiences’ 
(PCE). Mysticism (Forman, 1999) maintains that PCE are the underlying form of 
consciousness common to all experiences. 
One of the main problems with the TM programme and the definition of ‘witnessing-
sleep’ is the lack of available phenomenological reports. Several studies developed by the 
TM programme and its followers attempted to study the experiences of ‘witnessing-sleep’. 
However, their results do not offer a clarificatory definition of how we should understand 
the phenomenology of this state. For instance, the study by Mason et al. (1990) compared 
the experience had during the practice of TM with that of awareness during dreamless sleep. 
After awakened from deep sleep, participants reported an experience of ‘heightened self-
awareness’ similar to that had during their TM practice. These reports are explained by 
Mason et al. vis-à-vis to what Maharishi describes in his texts as cosmic consciousness:  
“Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's Vedic Psychology describes the existence of "higher 
states of consciousness" with values of self-awareness qualitatively distinct 
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from those experienced during the ordinary states 'of waking, sleeping, and 
dreaming” (Mason & Orne-Johnson, 2010:29).  
It is, however, unclear what advocates of the TM programme mean by “heightened self-
awareness” and how this is supposedly related to the experience of turiya and pure awareness. 
Should we understand awareness during deep sleep as heightened self-awareness? And, is 
this experience of self-awareness different to consciousness itself or is it the same? In other 
articles, the experience of ‘witnessing-sleep’ is described by the participants as “comfortable, 
transcendental awareness throughout the night, even as the body rests deeply” (Travis, 
1994:99). None of these studies, though, provide further descriptions on what this 
transcendental awareness and its phenomenology were. Therefore, it is unclear what subjects 
reporting the so-called ‘witnessing-sleep’ did in fact experience.  
To sum up, while prima facie it seems that the descriptions of witnessing-sleep allude 
to ‘sushupti’ as described by the Advaita Vedanta, the proponents of the TM and the 
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's teachings refer to an underlying state of consciousness that is 
beyond waking, dreaming and sleeping. These differences between sushupti and turiya, and, 
thus, between sushupti and witnessing-sleep, should be taken into account when describing 
the phenomenology of awareness during deep sleep. Do we want to refer to awareness during 
deep sleep as a sort of consciousness that occurs during this state or as a sort of consciousness 
that underlies any other conscious experience?  
Thus far, I have argued that during dreamless sleep we can find different sorts of 
conscious mental states, namely awareness of minimal content (AoMC), awareness of 
awareness itself, (AoAi) and awareness devoid of content (AdC). Up to this point, I have 
argued that the Indian literature mention the last two, AoAi and AdC, in their definitions of 
awareness during deep sleep.  However, at all moments, these different conscious states have 
been described as possible states had during dreamless sleep and not as the ‘essence’ or 
nature of consciousness – the underlying basis of all conscious experiences. Nor have these 
states been described as an all-prevailing feature of consciousness that is always present. 
While this thesis will not delve further on whether we should conceptualise consciousness 
as such as the basis of consciousness, I should note some implications of such 
conceptualisation. One implication is that, if we accept that consciousness as such is an 
underlying form of all conscious experiences, we should also stablish what the common 
ground for all sort of experiences is. By advocating for an underlying property, we would 
also be committing to the fundamentality constraint (Metzinger, 2019) —  the assumption 
that there is a mark of conscious experiences. Thus, this assumption assumes that there is a 
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fundamental basis of consciousness, which in turn, can be found by in the neural correlates 
of consciousness. If this is the case, then finding the neural correlates of consciousness would 
solve the problem of consciousness — we would have found the mark of conscious 
experience. Although I do not think that such assumption is plausible, in this thesis I will not 
engage with this issue. Instead, my goal is to argue that different sorts of conscious states 
can be had during dreamless sleep. 12 Because of this, the proponents of the concept of 
‘witnessing-sleep’ should also consider whether it is the case that awareness during 
dreamless sleep is an instance of an underlying form of consciousness or, instead, it is just a 
state of minimal consciousness.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 The advocates of Transcendental Meditation (TM) assume the fundamentality constraint. As I mentioned above, they 
assert that there is an independent entity that can be ascribed as consciousness as such, in this case, something similar to 
the term of ‘turiya’ found in the Advaita Vedanta – a state that goes above and beyond to normal consciousness.  
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Chapter 3: Contemporary accounts on lucid dreamless 
sleep  
In this chapter, I investigate a contemporary taxonomy of dreamless sleep experiences 
developed by Windt, Nielsen and Thompson (2016). First, I start by explicating the 
simulation theory of dreams by drawing from Windt’s Immersive Spatiotemporal 
Hallucination (ISTH) model, one of the most recent conceptual frameworks on dreams 
currently available. The ISTH model serves Windt and colleagues as the departure point to 
develop their taxonomy of dreamless sleep experiences. Following this model, these authors 
establish the criterion to differentiate between sleep dreamful and dreamless sleep 
phenomena– namely, their immersive and simulational character. Moreover, Windt and 
colleagues defend a new classification of dreamless sleep experiences that identifies three 
different kinds of phenomena: (1) Non-Immersive Imagery and Sleep Thinking, (2) 
Perceptual Experiences and Body Sensations, and (3) Selfless States and Contentless Sleep 
Experiences (Windt et al., 2016:873). While the first two kinds involve the experience of 
perceptual phenomena, such as visuospatial, auditory and kinaesthetic imagery or movement 
sensations, the third kind integrates a set of experiences devoid of any sort of perceptual 
experience and substantive cognition. This last kind, Selfless States and Contentless Sleep 
Experiences, will be examined in more detail, and will be the focus of investigation, in the 
second half the chapter.  
The reason of delving further into Selfless States and Contentless Sleep Experiences 
is Windt and colleague’s claim that the experiences that integrate this cluster match to the 
descriptions presented in Indian philosophical traditions on awareness during deep sleep. 
Windt et al. refer to these phenomena as Lucid Dreamless Sleep experiences (LDS for short), 
that of a dreamless sleep experience characterised by being selfless and, prima facie, 
contentless. LDS is a state that lacks any intentional object, including a sense of self 
(Thompson, 2015a; Windt, 2015a). Moreover, they claim that LDS is an instance of the 
simplest form of consciousness, the minimal phenomenal experience (MPE; Windt, 
2015a:18). Because of this, Windt et al. defend that a careful investigation of LDS, as well 
as the descriptions found in Indian traditions, is key for providing a proper account of 
Selfless States and Contentless Sleep. This investigation on LDS is also said to have the 
potential to shed light on what the most basic form of consciousness is.  
In the second part of the chapter, I will examine Windt’s argument on the ‘pure 
temporal experience’ (PTE). According to her, the only thing that remains during LDS is 
pure temporality; an experience of just ‘nowness’. Windt defends that pure temporality is 
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the mark of LDS and, consequently, what characterises the minimal phenomenal experience 
(MPE). I will close the chapter by considering the implications of this view. I will argue that 
following Windt’s definition supposes the rejection of LDS as a ‘contentless state’. Similarly, 
her definition also entails the rejection of the MPE as a state of ‘pure consciousness’, a state 
where there is no awareness of any intentional content. Thus, I argue that we should instead 
acknowledge LDS as an episode of awareness of minimal content during dreamless sleep, 
AoMC. In regards of the MPE, we should consider instances of awareness devoid of content 
(AdC) instead. 
3.1. Simulation Theories of Dreaming. The Immersive 
Spatiotemporal Hallucination Model by Windt. 
When we think about sleep phenomenology, we tend to think about dreams. If I ask you 
whether you remember anything from your last night’s sleep, you will likely try to remember 
your dream experiences. If the answer is affirmative, you will typically recall an experience 
in which you felt immersed in space and time somewhere; an experience that was very similar 
to your wakefulness reality but that was happening during sleep. If the answer is negative, you 
will likely tell me that you do not remember last night’s dream and thus, you do not remember 
anything from last night’s sleep. That being the case, you might conclude that you were not 
aware while sleeping. However, are conscious sleep experiences limited to dreams? Is there 
other sort of conscious mental phenomena that takes places during sleep? And if there are, 
how shall we properly account for them? And, what can we learn from these forms of 
dreamless sleep? Windt and colleagues provide an account of dreamless sleep in which they 
explore what makes those experiences different from dream experiences. For this, before I 
delve into their account on dreamless sleep, I will first investigate the counterpart of dreamless 
sleep: dream experiences. 
Currently, there is no clear consensus on how to conceptualise dreams. While it is clear 
that dreams happen during sleep, the definition of these phenomena changes from author to 
author. Windt and colleagues (2016) support a definition of dreaming situated within the 
framework of simulation theories. Simulation theories of dreaming describe dreams as a world 
simulation of our wakefulness world (see Revonsuo, 1995, 2006; Revonsuo et al. 2015). 
According to these theories, dreams are (i) multimodal, (ii) complex, and (iii) dynamic 
experiences (Nielsen, 2010). Contrary to other mental phenomena during sleep and sleep-
onset, in dreams, we can perceive not only a wide range of sensorial experiences, such as sight, 
hear, smell, taste, but also experience multisensorial perceptions similar to our waking life, 
such as emotions, body experiences or movements (idem). These perceptual experiences are 
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not random, but have a complex organisation, usually related to the dream setting in which 
the dream is unfolding. Finally, dreams present a temporal continuity and are experienced as 
dynamic experiences rather than static ones — there is a dream narrative and the experience 
evolves in time. Dreams are characterised by similar elements to the wake-world.  In dreams, 
we can distinguish an experience that is happening around a central agent; the self. Theories 
that endorse this framework of dreams as simulation are the Protoconsciousness Theory 
(Hobson, 2009), the Continuity Theory (Foulkes, 1985), the Virtual Reality Model (Revonsuo, 
2006), and the Immersive Spatiotemporal Hallucination Theory or ISTH (Windt, 2010). 
Although each of these theories aim at a different level of analysis about dreams, they all aim 
at providing a theory of consciousness through the knowledge gained from dream research.  
Windt and colleague’s account of dreamless sleep is based on the ISTH model proposed by 
Windt. 
Windt (2010, 2015a, b) defends a simulation model of dreaming based on the 
differences between dreams and wakeful experiences. According to Windt, although dreams 
resemble wakefulness experiences inasmuch as they recreate an immersive environment, 
dreams can neither be considered the same as experiences had during wakefulness, nor 
replicate wakefulness in the same way (Windt, 2015a). Thus, Windt’s model aims at 
investigating what makes dreams different. For instance, Windt claims that even our 
experience of self in dreams is different from that of wakefulness:  
“Dreaming is interesting precisely because of the ways in which it fails to 
replicate standard waking experience; dreams typically involve a self, but this 
self isn’t phenomenally embodied in a strong sense, nor is it consistently a 
cogitative self, or a thinker of thoughts” (Windt, 2015b:551). 
Windt draws from dream research to argue that our sense of self is distorted in dreams, and 
thus, dreams fail to replicate wakefulness. For instance, in the literature, there is evidence of 
selfless dreams (LaBerge & DeGracia, 2000; Occhionero et al., 2005); dreams that lack a 
sense of bodily self or self altogether. 13 From this evidence, Windt claims that the sense of 
self varies so much among dreams and thus, this cannot be common feature. There must be 
something else that characterises all sorts of dreams. Windt stresses the importance of 
studying the phenomenology of dream experiences — their phenomenological character of 
those. Windt’s perspective marks a shift in dream research by advocating the investigation of 
what is it like to be in a dream for a subject, something that had not been stressed enough in 
 
13 Windt calls this first phenomenal disembodied dreams (Windt, 2015a), dreams in which subjects report feel themselves 
as a disembodied entity, but still situate themselves in the dream.  
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any previous dream theory. 14 With this aim, she builds her ISTH model around three main 
tenets, claiming that dreams are (1) immersive spatiotemporal hallucinations, that (2) occur 
during sleep or sleep-onset transition, and (3) are reportable. 
 First, Windt takes inspiration from the Virtual Model of Revonsuo (2006) to build 
her model and attributes immersion in a virtual world as one of the defining characteristics of 
dreams. 15 According to Windt, immersion is to be understood as the ‘feeling of presence’ 
(Windt, 2015b), or what she calls ‘spatiotemporal situatedness’; the feeling of being immersed 
in a place here (space) and now (time) (Windt, 2015b: 520).  In her view, dreams are subjective 
phenomena that are experienced from a first-person perspective; a virtual reality is created 
around the main character, the dreaming self, which perceives this as real. Windt claims that 
dreams, contrary to wakefulness experience, occur in a “hallucinatory reference frame” (ibid, 
p.551). According to Windt, it is this shift in the reference frame, from a veridical to a non-
veridical one, which differentiates between dreaming and wakefulness:  
 “the transition from wakefulness to dreaming involves a shift in spatiotemporal 
self-location. […] dreams occur when the phenomenal here and now is located 
no longer relative to a largely veridical, perceptual environment but rather 
relative to an alternative, largely internally generated environment, the so-called 
dream world, that is at best weakly constrained by external stimuli and hence 
hallucinatory” (Windt, 2015b:522).  
Second, although it seems indispensable to claim that dreams occur during sleep, it is 
important to stress this point. If we only assert that dreams are ‘spatiotemporal immersive 
hallucinations’ without stressing that such experiences need to happen during sleep, the same 
description could apply to other phenomena happening during wakefulness. An example of 
this are Out-of-Body Experiences (OBEs) and other autoscopic phenomena. 16  According 
to Windt, dreams resemble OBEs inasmuch they involve an illusory bodily experience and 
an illusory self-location (Windt, 2010:310).  Thus, setting the condition that dreams should 
occur during sleep and sleep onset distinguish them from other phenomena such as OBEs.  
 
14 Windt (2015, 2016) has called this the research on the ‘depth’ of the dream experiences. Previous dream research was 
based on a framework that investigated the ‘breadth; how dream experiences vary from person to person (Solomonova, 
Fox & Nielsen, 2014). Contrary, Windt advocates for the study of the ‘depth’ of dreams; how dreams can be experienced 
by a person.  
15 Revonsuo’s model defends an account of dreams where they are described as experiences in an immersive and interactive 
virtual environment – an environment created internally. This virtually created world, the dream-world, is built around the 
main character, the virtual self (dream-self). Thus, dreams are a simulation of a world that is experienced as real (with the 
exception of lucid dreaming).  
16 Autoscopic Phenomena are full-body illusions that affect our perception of body ownership. For a detailed account of 
the different sort of Autoscopic Phenomena, including OBEs, see Blanke & Mohr (2005) and Blanke & Metzinger (2008)  
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The third tenet of the ISTH model is reportability. Reportability is crucial when 
considering dreamless sleep phenomena since we need to discriminate between experiences 
of absence and absence of experiences. This criterion will become clearer in chapter 4 where 
I present phenomenological reports of awareness of ‘absence’ during dreamless sleep. In 
these reports, individuals describe having had experiences of nothingness’, ‘void’ or a 
‘spaceless’ environment. Reports of absence need to be distinguished from ‘absence’ of 
reports. In the second case, individuals do not report any dreams either because they do not 
remember their dreams or because they did not experience anything. In this latter case, we 
find white dreams; dreams that were actually experienced but forgotten in the morning. They 
are usually reported as the experience of having dreamt but not knowing what the dream was 
about (Siclari et al, 2013). Windt et al. (2016) suggested that white dreams could partially 
involve contentless dreams, a view that has been disputed (Fazekas, Nemeth & Overgaard 
(2019). In chapter 5, I will retake this debate and compare white dreams with dreamless sleep 
experiences.  
Summing up, Windt’s ISTH model describes dreams are immersive spatiotemporal 
hallucinations because, unless lucid, the dreamer experiences herself as being in a veridical 
space and time in what it is, in fact, a dream-world.  Therefore, immersion and simulation 
are key elements for classifying mental phenomena during sleep as dreams. Immersion, as 
for Windt’s model, is understood as the feeling of presence — being here and now — in a 
particular environment, whereas simulation is the capacity of that environment to recreate a 
veridical world.  However, an important question strikes here: what about other forms of 
experiences occurring during sleep or sleep-onset transition? Do all of them fit into this 
description of immersion and simulation? Is it possible to have a simpler form of dream 
experience that does not involve an immersive experience in a virtual world? In the next 
section, I examine how dreamless sleep experiences are conceived as per the perspective of 
the ISTH model.  
3.2. Dreamless sleep experiences. Windt, Nielsen and 
Thompson’s classification. 
In their 2016’s paper, Windt, Nielsen and Thompson defined dreamless sleep experiences as 
phenomena occurring during sleep that lack the immersive and simulational character of 
dreams (p.873). By following the simulation model of dreams, these authors characterise 
dreams as a ‘self-centred’ phenomenon; an experience where one has a sense of presence in 
what is actually a simulated world (Windt, 2015b; Windt et al. 2016). Thus, they distinguish 
between two kinds of phenomena during sleep and sleep-onset. On one side, we have dreams 
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— we experience ourselves as being present in a hallucinatory world (dream-world) which at 
that moment we recognise as real. On the other side, we find sleep phenomena that cannot be 
classified as dreams since they lack their immersive character– we do not have a sense of 
presence in a different world. They also fail to be simulative – they do not recreate the 
perception of world (in Chapter 5 I will discuss whether these two features do in fact describe 
dreamless sleep). Following this distinction, Windt et al. provide a classification of dreamless 
sleep experiences that differ in their imagistic and propositional content (see table 2). While 
all dreamless sleep experiences, according to Windt and colleagues, lack the immersive and 
simulational character of dreams, each subtype varies regarding the imagistic and 
propositional content that they exhibit. 
 Immersion Simulation Imagistic 
content 
Propositional 
Content 
Dreams Yes Yes Yes Yes 
A) Non-Immersive 
Imagery and Sleep 
Thinking 
No No Yes Yes 
B) Perceptual 
Experiences and 
Bodily Sensations 
No No Some Some 
C) Selfless States 
and Contentless 
Experiences 
No No No No 
Table 2. Comparison of the different features of dreams and dreamless sleep according to Windt. et al. (2016)’s 
classification. 
3.2.1. Non-Immersive Imagery and Sleep Thinking 
Under this first cluster fall dreamless sleep experiences that, although quite hallucinatory, lack 
immersive character.  To describe this cluster, Windt et al. talk of static experiences in which 
the subject does not feel immersed in a virtual world. As examples of those phenomena, they 
include “static visuospatial, auditory, or kinaesthetic imagery lacking a clear hallucinatory 
context, movement sensations, and propositional thought (sleep thinking)” (p.873). Although 
these authors do not mention it explicitly, I take it that Non-Immersive Imagery during 
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dreamless sleep refers to hypnagogic experiences, at least to those that are described as 
‘static’. Hypnagogic experiences display a wide variability and they can appear in different 
forms, from linguistic intrusions, kinaesthetic images to visual and auditory hallucinations. In 
the first chapter, I distinguished hypnagogic experiences from dreams, and I categorised them 
as cases of awareness of substantial content (AoSC) during dreamless sleep. The reason for 
this is the lack of immersive character that those experiences present. While hypnagogic 
experiences do also present a hallucinatory character — they are non-veridical forms of 
perception — they are not immersive nor complex enough to be considered dreams. I will 
examine them in more detail in section 5, but for the moment, I include them as a case for 
Windt and colleague’s Non-immersive imagery. 
Regarding Sleep Thinking, we find forms of propositional thought during dreamless 
sleep that can be better described as mind wandering. This form of thought refers to the 
subject’s wakefulness experience, not to their dream experience. Gillespie (2002) includes 
‘sleep thinking’ in his seven-cluster classification of dreamless sleep and claims that this sort 
of thinking is not based on the dream reference frame, but the wakefulness one (p.202). To 
explain this, Gillespie quotes Foulkes: “[…] subjects report “thinking” about something. 
They’re not simulating life, they’re just thinking about some aspect of it” (Foulkes, 1985:58, 
in Gillespie, 2002:202). Thus, in both cases, ‘Non-immersive imagery’ and ‘Sleep thinking’, 
the reference frame is not that of the dream world, but that of the real and wake-world (or 
actually, the sleeping-world). The subject, while experiencing these phenomena is sleeping, 
but has not crossed over to the dream world yet. 
3.2.2. Perceptual Experiences and Body Sensations 
In this second cluster, Windt et al. (2016) classify dreamless experiences that are more 
dynamic than the previous ones.  In dreams, sensory perceptions and body sensations appear 
regardless of our senses being shut down; they are independent of any sensory modality 
(Windt, 2010). Windt explains how, despite not being aware of external stimuli during 
dreaming, we are fully capable of experiencing a dream reality with plenty of sensorial 
qualities. In our dreams, we can hear, see, and smell, but our senses are not processing 
veridical stimuli – these experiences are ‘amodal hallucinations’ (Windt, 2010) because they 
do not depend on our senses. What we experience in dreams is a wide range of different 
sensorial experiences that are internally generated.  However, in dreamless sleep, the situation 
is different. According to Windt and colleagues, since we are not fully immersed in the virtual 
reality of the dream world, our perception of this second kind of experiences still relies on 
external stimuli and is, hence, modality dependent. Thus, we hear, see and smell through our 
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sensory system. Examples of this cluster include hearing a noise in our room or feeling our 
body in the bed, which are described as Perceptual Experiences and Bodily sensations. 
A similar proposal on perceptual experiences during dreamless sleep is made by 
Gillespie (2002) who also considers different sorts of ‘True perceptions’ during dreamless 
sleep (p.202). According to him, this sort of perceptual phenomena is experienced by the real-
self, not the dreaming-self and thus, should be considered veridical perceptions. Some 
examples of this sort of perception offered by Gillespie are the perception of darkness and the 
perception of light during dreamless sleep. He asserts that these are actual experiences of 
‘absence of light’ and ‘intense light that appears on the periphery of the visual field’ (p.202).  
3.2.3. ‘Selfless’ States and Contentless Sleep Experiences  
 Finally, Windt and colleagues propose a third cluster of dreamless sleep phenomena 
which includes "any mention of sleep experience lacking subjective immersion, imagistic 
and propositional content” (Windt et al., 2016: 873). During the experience of these 
phenomena, even the simplest form of phenomenal selfhood— the experience of being 
someone (Blanke & Metzinger, 2008) — has disappeared, leaving a selfless and contentless 
experience (Windt et al., 2016:878) — an experience with a lack of sense of self and a lack 
of intentional content. 
 Windt et al. proposed this cluster to accommodate the anecdotical descriptions found 
in Indo-Tibetan philosophical traditions about a special sort of awareness during deep sleep. 
In this cluster, they refer to the different descriptions found in the Advaita Vedānta, Yoga, 
and Indo-Tibetan Buddhist traditions (which I presented in the previous chapter) as 
‘witnessing sleep’ (Windt et al., 2016). 17  According to these authors, investigation of 
‘witnessing-sleep’ can shed light on the possibility of selfless and contentless forms of 
experiences. Therefore, it should be studied regardless of whether these experiences exist or 
not. Yet, in the absence of any more research in this area, Windt and colleagues develop 
their own definition of that Selfless states and Contentless sleep. According to them, 
phenomena under this cluster involve a sort of “minimal form of phenomenal consciousness” 
(p.873) — there is something it is like to be in this state of selfless and contentless sleep. 
Windt (2015b) has claimed that the experience during selfless and contentless sleep takes 
the form of a ‘phenomenal now’; the experience of just ‘nowness’ or present.  Thompson 
 
17 At the end of the previous chapter, I already mentioned the implications of referring to awareness during deep sleep as ‘witnessing sleep’. 
Remember that this terminology was used by the Transcendental Meditation programme to refer to an underlying experience common to 
all sorts of conscious experiences – the essence of consciousness. I take that Windt and colleagues (2016) do not take this reading and 
instead, they refer to ‘witness consciousness', following the definitions made by the Advaita Vedanta about the sākṣīn. Therefore, I urge 
these authors to clarify their use of ‘witnessing sleep’ and to distinguish among the different readings that can be made of the descriptions 
found in Indian philosophical traditions.  
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(2015b) has defended a view in which selfless and contentless states during sleep involve a 
“minimal mode of sentience” (Thompson, 2015b); the experience of being.   
Although Windt and colleague’s classification provides the groundwork for a 
taxonomy of dreamless sleep, I argue that their third subtype presents some problems that 
should be addressed. Similarly, I argue that their classification does not capture all the 
possible candidates for explaining conscious dreamless sleep as my taxonomy does. Given 
the lack of research in this field, I claim that, Windt and colleague’s account can misrepresent 
the definitions of awareness during dreamless sleep documented in the Indian philosophical 
texts.  In the rest of the chapter, I will focus on analysing Windt’s proposal of ‘lucid 
dreamless sleep’ (LDS) and the problems that follow from this account.  For this, I will start 
by examining her argument on the phenomenal now or pure temporal experience as the mark 
of LDS. 
3.3. Lucid Dreamless sleep. Pure temporality 
Windt and colleagues use the phrase ‘lucid dreamless sleep’ (LDS) to refer to a very minimal 
form of conscious dreamless sleep. Later I will argue that, although these researchers 
describe LDS as a contentless state, their account entails the existence of some content. To 
find this minimal form of conscious dreamless sleep, Windt (2010, 2015a, b) takes her ISTH 
model as a starting point. According to her model, spatiotemporal situatedness — the 
experience of being immersed in an environment here and now —  is the phenomenological 
core of dreams. Moreover, Windt claims that spatiotemporal situatedness is also the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the minimal phenomenal selfhood (MPS; Blanke & 
Metzinger, 2008), which is the most minimal form of self-consciousness. Therefore, 
spatiotemporal situatedness is identified as the most basic feature for both dream experiences 
and the experience of MPS. If this is the case, what happens when even this basic form of 
self-consciousness, the MPS, is lost, as it is in the case of LDS? Would spatiotemporal 
situatedness still be the mark of these experiences? According to Windt, in the case of LDS, 
we should break down spatiotemporal situatedness and examine which of its dimensions 
remains. 
Spatiotemporal situatedness, explains Windt, involves two dimensions, (i) the 
experience of space (‘here’), and (ii) the experience of time (‘now’). 18 Windt claims that 
only the second, the experience of time, can be had alone. Her explanation is that to 
experience ‘hereness’, we also need to experience ‘thereness’. To experience ‘hereness’ I 
 
18 The two dimensions of Spatiotemporal location are explained by Blanke & Metzinger (2008:7) as well as by Metzinger 
(2003). 
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need to be able to have an MPS so I can have a minimal awareness of myself and I can 
distinguish myself from other things. Thus, to experience ‘hereness’, a subject-object 
distinction needs to be established where myself starts and where it finishes. According to 
Windt, an experience of space will involve some experience of self.  In contrast to this, the 
dichotomy of subject-object is not found in the case of time, says Windt. For Windt, to 
experience ‘nowness'’, I do not need a subject-object dichotomy — I can have a selfless 
experience with no sense of space and only sense of time. Her reasoning is that time, as a 
reference frame, does not require the experience of another thing – I do not need an MPS 
and then, I do not need to distinguish myself from the other. Moreover, for Windt, the 
existence of time as an experiential dimension cannot be eliminated.  According to her, and 
following her ISTH model, when investigating dreamless sleep experiences, we examine 
reportable experiences — subjective descriptions made by a subject who says they 
experienced something. Windt claims that the time dimension is a necessary condition for 
reporting an experience. She argues that some sort of continuity needs to remain for me to 
report that I had an experience — there needs to be a before and after for me to report that I 
experienced something (Windt, personal correspondence). Therefore, Windt claims that pure 
temporality experience (PTE) is the mark of LDS. In the next section, I will analyse further 
this assumption and I will argue otherwise. I will also claim that time is not a necessary 
condition to report an experience and that more minimal forms of states can be found.  
Following the above, Windt identifies pure temporality as the most basic form of 
conscious experience, or what she calls, the MPE (Windt, 2015a:18). According to her, if 
there is a minimal form of awareness during LDS, it would have a time dimension – the 
experience of ‘nowness’ 
 [LDS]it is a condition for but still more basic than minimal phenomenal selfhood. 
It can be described as subjective only because it involves phenomenal experience; 
yet, it does not involve the additional experience of being a self, or a separate 
entity having the experience” (Windt, 2015a:18)”.  
For Windt, LDS is a state where we lose the MPS. While LDS is still a phenomenal 
experience — there is some sort of phenomenal consciousness, something it is like to have 
that experience — we do not experience an MPS associated with it. Therefore, LDS is an 
objectless experience that lacks not only the immersive structure of wakefulness and dreams 
but also a first-person perspective (Windt, 2015b:18; Windt et al., 2016:878). LDS 
experiences are selfless and, according to Windt et al. contentless experiences. Consequently, 
according to Windt, if LDS is an experience that is more minimal than the most basic form 
of self-awareness (the MPS), LDS should be the target of research for the MPE. However, 
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is the investigation of bare consciousness vindicated by the examination of LDS? And should 
we describe LDS as an experience of pure temporality? In the next sub-section, I analyse the 
different shortcomings in Windt’s description of LDS and her claim on the MPE.   
3.4. Lucid dreamless sleep as awareness of minimal content 
According to Windt and colleagues, LDS is an example of a subtype of dreamless sleep, 
Selfless and Contentless experience, which is described as “any mention of sleep experience 
lacking subjective immersion, imagistic and propositional content” (Windt et al., 2016: 873). 
Moreover, as presented above, Windt claims that LDS can be described as an instance of 
pure temporal experience (PTE), which at the same time is the barest form of consciousness 
(MPE). However, their description of LDS, although is compared to some Indian traditions 
such as the Advaita Vedanta and Yoga schools, is not about a state completely devoid of 
content. Windt et al stress that LDS lacks content, but they still defend a definition of LDS 
as that a state with content. For this reason, I argue that their account of LDS has the 
following shortcomings that should be addressed. 
(i) Their characterisation of ‘lucidity’ is not clear  
The use of the term ‘lucidity’ by Windt and colleagues to account for conscious, and 
contentless, dreamless sleep is not clear. In their 2016 article, these authors talk of LDS as a 
phenomenon that could be compared to lucid dreaming (p.878). But, what do they mean by 
‘lucid’ when they talk about dreamless sleep? According to Wind et al., ‘lucidity’ is used to 
refer to the “awareness of one's current state of consciousness” (p.872). This is in fact a 
similar use of the term ‘lucid’ to refer to ‘lucid dreaming’, that of a dream where the dreamer 
is aware of the fact of being dreaming while dreaming (Van Eeden, 1913; Green, 1968; 
LaBerge, 1985). However, taking the same meaning of the term ‘lucid’ in lucid dreaming 
and applying it to dreamless sleep can have unwanted implications.   
 Usually, a lucid state entails the awareness of that mental state (i.e. “I am aware that 
I am in a state M’). In a lucid dream, I am aware of what I am being aware, and thus, I can 
recognise the dream as such. Moreover, I can reflect on that mental state – I am aware that I 
am dreaming, and this means that what I am experiencing is not real. Therefore, lucidity 
entails the acquisition of ‘insight’ — the awareness of being in a particular state (Voss et al, 
2013; Kühle, 2015). Gaining insight has been characterised in the literature as an 
indispensable feature of lucid dreams, and thus, as a necessary feature to be aware that you 
are dreaming. Can we say the same of dreamless sleep? Do we need lucidity in order to have 
a conscious experience of dreamless sleep? My claim is that we do not. As I have shown in 
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my taxonomy in Chapter 1, we can experience different types of awareness during dreamless 
sleep. This awareness can be propositional or not propositional, and in some cases, it has 
content but in other it lacks. However, even when it lacks content (AdC), we are still 
conscious. Then, what does involve attributing ‘lucid’ to a dreamless sleep state? 
If we apply the same reasoning of ‘lucidity to the case of LDS, we would then define 
this phenomenon as the ‘awareness of one being in a state of dreamless sleep'. However, this 
acquisition of insight into our state of dreamless sleep would make of this a mental state with 
content, that of ‘awareness of being in a state of dreamless sleep’. Thus, by attributing 
‘lucidity’ to a period of dreamless sleep, we will be attributing to that state content, 
something that Windt and colleagues say is missing in conscious dreamless sleep. For this 
reason, talking of ‘lucid' dreamless sleep to refer to the experiences reported by Indian 
philosophical traditions can be misleading. If what we are describing is a contentless, selfless 
and imageless experiences that is not immersive enough to be considered a dream, the term 
‘lucid’ is not warranted; this would entail a content of awareness. Therefore, I argue that we 
should instead (i) find a different term to describe these experiences (ii) consider whether 
some types of conscious dreamless that lack sense of self, imagery and immersion have 
propositional content. In both cases, my proposed taxonomy would solve this problem. By 
referring to ‘conscious dreamless sleep’ we would be referring to different sorts of awareness. 
Then, we would assign a type of awareness depending on the content.  
(ii) Describing LDS as PTE, does not match with the fact that this is a ‘lucid’ state, 
neither with the lack of content as the signature of LDS 
Following the previous point, there is the fact that LDS is described by Windt as the ‘pure 
temporal experience’ (2015b).  Remember that Windt claims that the most minimal form of 
conscious dreaming, should be described as an experience of ‘nowness’. LDS is an 
instantiation of this state (ibid). However, how can a state be just pure phenomenal 
experience, but in addition, be lucid? Again, following the meaning of ‘lucidity’, this state 
should be described as ‘the awareness of knowing that one is having an experience of pure 
temporality’. Thus, the ascription of ‘lucidity’ seems to involve a higher order state than the 
one Windt and colleagues want to account for. Moreover, Windt’s account of LDS as pure 
temporality contradicts the claim that LDS is a contentless state. Referring to LDS as an 
experience of ‘just present time’ where the individual preserves a feeling of ‘nowness’ or 
‘presence’ still involve an awareness of something; in this case, of ‘nowness’ or ‘presence’. 
If we describe LDS as the experience of nowness, it means that some sort of content was 
experienced during dreamless sleep, and thus, this is not a form of state lacking content. For 
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this reason, I argue that this should be understood as an instance of awareness of minimal 
content (AoMC) instead. Thus, we would refer to non-propositional, imageless and selfless 
dreams that had some content as AoMC.  
(iii) MPE is wrongly characterised as the PTE. 
Finally, the description of LDS by Windt does not only present problems for a 
taxonomy of dreamless sleep, but also for an account of consciousness. One of the main 
claims in Windt’s view is that LDS is an instance of the minimal phenomenal experience 
(MPE). Moreover, she describes LDS as the pure temporal experience (PTE), a state where 
only a pure phenomenology of ‘now’ remains. Moreover, Windt et al. (2016) defend the 
investigation of LDS as a means to find the MPE, an experience that is described as pure 
temporal experience. However, does it follow from the above that the MPE should also be 
understood as PTE? It does not. 
First of all, we do not have enough evidence to conclude that LDS (as described by 
Windt and colleagues) is a case of MPE, or in any case, that LDS is the MPE. Thus far, the 
argumentation provided by Windt (2015b) and Windt et al (2016) is that LDS could be 
characterised by the phenomenology of nowness or PTE. In any case, this does not make 
LDS be the MPE, but just a possible instance of PTE. Therefore, an instance of conscious 
dreamless sleep could be described as non-propositional content, imageless and selfless 
experience, which I have argued we should refer to as awareness of minimal content (AoMC). 
However, this instance of AoMC would not be per se, an instantiation of the MPE. 
Second, I argue that Windt’s assumption that the PTE is the simplest form of 
phenomenal experience is wrong. Data from other altered states of consciousness, such as 
self-dissolution and non-dual meditation, shows experiences where even the time component, 
as the experience of present time, has been lost. This ‘timelessness' experience without even 
the ‘present time' component is quite difficult to achieve and not all practitioners are 
successful in reaching this state. Berkovich-Ohana et al. (2013) reported this difficulty in 
their study which expert meditators were trained to have ‘timelessness’ and ‘spacelessness’ 
experiences. However, some participants reported losing the feeling of ‘nowness’:  
“The mechanism that senses time was absent. There was a sense of 
immediateness, without a centre aware of temporality” (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 
2013:4) 
  Similarly, in the literature of mysticism, the disappearance of the time dimension 
has been defined as the mark of mystical experiences (Stace, 1960: 109), the same for the 
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so-called cases of transcendental consciousness, which are said to be unbounded by space 
and time (Alexander et al., 1990). Supporters of mysticism have shown evidence of 
phenomenal states exempt from the phenomenal experience of ‘nowness'.  Therefore, the 
experience of time is not the most minimal form of phenomenal experience and that ‘pure 
temporal experience’ should not be regarded as the MPE. 
Third, if we want to develop a theoretical account of MPE, an account of 
consciousness as such, it cannot include any form of awareness that contains any content – 
the barest form of consciousness should be consciousness as such. The same theoretical 
assumptions are made by Metzinger in his framework to investigate the MPE. According to 
Metzinger, possible phenomenological reports of MPE would be better described as 
instances that lack a sense of self, and content altogether. These would be better described 
as “contentless process of knowing as such, an isolated phenomenology of pure observation” 
(Metzinger, 2019:34). This idea would fit with my proposal on awareness devoid of content 
(AdC), an instantiation of a non-intentional state with only phenomenal character. Thus, 
characterisations of MPE cannot contain descriptions from a first-person perspective, the 
experience of self or any other content of awareness, including a time dimension. For this, if 
we want to target LDS as an instance of MPE, LDS cannot be described as an experience of 
bare time because this will not consider the ‘emptiness’ signature of the MPE experience 
(ibid, p.20). 
Summing up, if we want to follow Windt’s definition of LDS, LDS should not be 
regarded as the MPE, but in any case, as an instance of minimal experience – a state that 
involves the experience of PTE. For this, I defend my argument that LDS should be better 
understood as a case of awareness of minimal content, or AoMC. Similarly, if we want to 
question whether LDS can be understood as an immersive and contentful experience, we 
should consider an alternative classification of awareness during dreamless sleep. Following 
my analysis on Windt et al. and the definitions of awareness during dreamless sleep 
examined in the previous chapter, I advocate for the following categorisation of conscious 
states during dreamless sleep:  
(1) Awareness of content, AoC: During these states, there are clear contents of 
experience. These can take the form of visual, auditory or kinaesthetic hallucinations 
such as hypnagogic experiences, but they also can include the perception of thoughts 
like sleep-thinking.  
(2) Awareness of minimal content, AoMC: These states lack the perception of 
sensorial forms such as visual, auditory or kinaesthetic perception. However, there 
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still remains a minimal form of perceptual experience, that of ‘just time’, as described 
by Windt (2015b). 
(3) Awareness of awareness itself, AoAi: Following Indo-Tibetan Buddhist traditions, 
we can find instances of awareness during dreamless sleep in which the subject is 
conscious of her very own state of awareness – the subject is aware of the 
phenomenology of awareness of awareness. 
(4) Awareness of devoid of content, AdC: Finally, by taking the interpretation 
provided by the Advaita Vedanta and Yoga schools we find other instances of 
awareness in which the subject is not aware of anything, not of content, not of 
consciousness itself, not of anything. Reports of this kind of awareness would take 
the form of an epistemic report upon awakening such as ‘I knew there was a period 
I was aware’. Reports of AdC cannot include any object of awareness or any time or 
space dimension. 
In chapter 5, I will retake again this classification. For now, I outline the different types of 
awareness as possible states that can be had during dreamless sleep. These states are not 
mutually exclusive, and more than one state can be found in an episode of dreamless sleep. 
In the next chapter, I present a pilot study that I carried out where I gathered subjective 
reports of experiences of awareness during dreamless sleep. The goal of this study was to 
investigate whether these different types of conscious state during dreamless sleep could be 
identified.  
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Chapter 4: Qualitative study on awareness during 
dreamless sleep 
 
4.1. Methodology and procedure 
 
4.1.1. Research question 
The main aim of the present study was to investigate the experience of awareness during 
dreamless sleep. In particular, the study aimed at collecting more findings on how this 
experience of awareness unfolds and which are its different components. Specifically, the 
goal of the study was to find reports of experiences similar to those reported in Indian 
philosophy — experiences of bare awareness during dreamless sleep and nothing else (see 
Chapter 2). Given the descriptions of LDS in the literature as the ‘absence of an object of 
awareness’, the hypothesis was that this phenomenon would be described by the participants 
as a period during sleep in which there was nothing to be perceived. The expected reports 
would, in turn, involve descriptions mentioning the perception of lack of imagery, absence 
of a content of awareness or the experiences of a void.  
4.1.2. Methodology 
The micro-phenomenological interview (MPI) is a technique initially developed by Pierre 
Vermersch (1994/2010) and adapted by Claire Petitmengin in the realm of Cognitive Science 
(Petitmengin, 1999, 2006; Bitbol & Petitmengin, 2017), which aims at gathering fine-
grained descriptions of the subject’s lived experience.19 The purpose of the MPI is to help 
the interviewee to redirect their attention from the content of the experience to its dynamics 
(Bitbol & Petitmengin, 2017:10). To start this process, the interviewer encourages the 
interviewee to evoke an experience by asking questions that can elucidate it. The goal is to 
bring the interviewee back to their past experience. Once the interviewee has evoked an 
experience situated in place and time, the interviewer can start delving into its different 
dimensions. The approach of the micro-phenomenological interview is drawn from the 
phenomenological tradition initiated by Husserl, since it uses the ‘phenomenological 
conversion’ for the study of the subjective experience (Petitmengin, 2006: 240). The 
phenomenological conversion consists in helping the interviewee to move their attention 
from the perceived objected to the act of perceiving (ibid). In this way, during the micro-
phenomenological interview, participants will be guided in shifting their attention from the 
content of a particular experience to the processes that yielded that experience.  
 
19 In phenomenological research, the term ‘lived experience’ is used to refer to the subjective aspect of how a particular 
event was experienced, in a similar way as the expression of ‘what-is-likeness’ (Nagel, 1974) in analytical philosophy. 
  58 
In recent years, different studies have applied this method for studying the dynamics 
of specific experiences, such as the genesis of intuition (Petitmengin-Peugeot, 1999), 
epileptic seizures (Le Van Quyen & Petitmengin, 2002; Petitmengin, 2005; Petitmengin, 
Baulac & Navarro, 2006), the Rubber-Hand Illusion (Valenzuela et al. 2013),  the dissolution 
of self-boundaries (Ataria, Dor-Ziderman and Berkovich-Ohana, 2015), and the practice of 
meditation (Petitmengin et al., 2017). To the best of my knowledge, no study to date has 
used the MPI approach to explore the phenomenology of dream and sleep. However, some 
studies have used other forms of phenomenological research to investigate sleep experiences, 
such as Nielsen (2017) (for more details of the study see §5.1.2.).  
The MPI offers many advantages over other methodologies and, as such, it was the 
chosen method for the present study. First, the MPI technique facilitates the evocation of a 
lived experience, allowing the participant to recall more details of their experience. Second, 
the central tenet of the MPI technique is that the reported experience needs to be situated in 
space and time. Thus, the interviewer guides the interviewee to situate the lived experience 
in a particular place and moment (Petitmengin, 2006). Therefore, with the MPI the 
researcher avoids reports of generalisations, such as ‘this is something that I usually 
experience when…’; ‘sometimes I experience this’. Instead, through the MPI, the 
interviewer focuses in specific experiences that took place in a well-defined moment. Third, 
the MPI method permits the examination of different dimensions of the same experience and 
facilitates the isolation of dimensions not identified a priori. Finally, contrary to quantitative 
methods, the MPI technique is characterised by ‘content-free’ questions. The role of the 
interviewer is to facilitate the recollection of the experience by guiding the interviewee in 
the evocation process. Because of this, the interviewer asks questions that do not prompt any 
particular answer in the participant. Instead, the role of the interviewer is to guide the 
participant during their recollection. While guidelines are in place on how to perform the 
MPI (Petitmengin, 2006), the specific questions differ from participant to participant and the 
interview varies according to the descriptions granted by the subject (see Appendix I for a 
guideline of a micro-phenomenological interview. Consequently, the MPI technique is the 
perfect method to study elusive and brief experiences such as lucid dreamless sleep because 
it facilitates the evocation, facilitates the recollection, and guides the examination of the 
different dimensions of the experience. The application of this method results in fine-grained 
subjective reports that allow a consequent qualitative analysis.  
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4.1.3. Participants 
Participants were recruited via social media (Twitter) and word-of-mouth. The principal 
inclusion criterion was having had a recent experience (no more than 6 months) of awareness 
during dreamless sleep. Prospective participants were excluded if they experience a mental 
or physical illness, were taking medication that could affect the central neuro-system or 
reported poor sleep quality. Prospective participants contacted me via email and received the 
information sheet, consent form, and the study specific Screening Questionnaire. The 
Screening Questionnaire had different questions about demographics, medical information, 
lifestyle, sleep routine and sleep experiences that participants needed to answer to ensure 
that they met the inclusion criteria of the study (see Appendix II).   
Six participants (n=6, mean age= 46 years old; 2 females and 4 males) who meet the 
inclusion criteria were recruited to take part in the study after completion of the screening 
questionnaire. Two of them said to practice meditation very rarely, whereas the other four, 
one was an occasional (<5 times a week) meditator and the other three practiced daily. The 
ones who practice meditation occasionally and regularly, practice a sort of open-awareness 
meditation; a meditation practice where there is no specific focus of attention, but the 
practitioner is instructed to observe the passing thoughts and perceive the body. The rest of 
participants mentioned to have practice some breathing techniques very sporadically.  
4.1.4. Ethics 
The pilot study was approved by the Ethics Committee from the University of Glasgow 
(reference 300170275) and followed the guidelines of the British Psychological Association 
(BPA). 
4.1.5. Interview procedure 
Due to geographical location, all participants were interviewed online using the free platform 
Zoom (https://zoom.us/). With consent of the participants, all the interviews were recorded 
for transcription purposes (verbatim, audio only). The interviews averaged 2h and consisted 
of three sections: 1) Pre-Interview, 2) Micro-phenomenological interview (MPI), 3) Post-
Interview. The format of the interview was developed following the MPI method that advises 
to carry out a small exercise (pre-interview) before undertaking the interview. Similarly, the 
MPI method also advises to take some time after the interview to ask the participant about 
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their experience during the interview and raise any concerns or questions that they might 
have. 20 
1) Pre-Interview (30min):  This first stage of the interview process served the aim to train 
the interviewee on the MPI method. Following Petitmengin’s suggestion to replicate the 
experience to be recalled before the interview (2006:243), participants were asked to 
memorise a short list of words.21  Participants were asked questions about a recent 
experience, in this case, the experience of ‘memorising the list of words’ and show them 
what the MPI method consist of and which kind of questions are going to be asked in the 
next stage.  
2) Micro-phenomenological interview (1h): This second stage involved the main aim of the 
study: investigating the phenomenology of experiences of awareness during dreamless 
sleep. Here, participants were asked to recall a specific experience they had during sleep 
that could be described, in their words, as an awareness during sleep in the absence of 
dreams. The interview followed the MPI method developed by Petitmengin (2006), 
consisting of five steps: (a) stabilisation of attention, (b) phenomenological conversion, 
(c) evocation and identification of a singular experience, (d) attention to the different 
dimensions of the experience, and (e) deepening of the experience. For an example of a 
micro-phenomenological interview, see Appendix III. 
a) Stabilisation of attention: The interview started by situating the interviewee in a 
context and establishing clear boundaries about the reported experience. This process 
consisted of making clear to the interviewee that the interview is about a specific 
experience that happened in time and space. Following this, the interviewer brings 
the subject back to the singular experience, moving them away from generalisations, 
preconceptions and other thoughts related to their experience. The MPI method aims 
at helping the interviewee to redirect their attention from the content of the 
experience to its dynamics (Bitbol & Petitmengin, 2017:10). To start this process, I 
encouraged the subject to evoke the lived experience by asking questions that 
elucidate this process, such as ‘Try to come back to the moment you were having this 
experience’, ‘When does the experiences start?’ ‘What happens in the moment 
that…?’, ‘What happens next?’ (see ‘Evocation’ questions in Appendix I). 
 
 
20 Most of the advice and other recommendations of the MPI technique are taken from my attendance to the MPI training 
facilitated by Claire Petitmengin in Paris, May, 2017. 
21 The list of words is presented in the screen and they consisted of (actual order): lion, daffodil, tyrolean, academic, 
distraction, teardrop, triumph, shade, validation and welcome.  
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b) Phenomenological conversion: Once the subject has evoked an experience situated 
in place and time, I delved into the different dimensions of the experience. For this, 
I made several questions that aimed at redirecting the interviewee’s attention to the 
way they experienced the event, not what the event itself was. Petitmengin describes 
this as the ‘phenomenological conversion’ proposed by Husserl (1982) which 
consists of “diverting attention from the objects which appear to the consciousness 
towards the subjective modes of appearance of these objects” (Petitmengin, 
2016:240). Thus, the interviewer needs to guide the interview by asking questions 
that return the participant to ‘how’ they experienced the event. In this way, the 
interviewer prevents the interviewees from judging the event or extensively 
describing their features. The purpose is to encourage the interviewee to describe 
how they experienced the event. In the study, I followed this step by asking the 
participants more questions about their experience and encouraging them to describe 
them to me. 
c) Evocation and Identification of a singular experience: By following the same practice 
of the first step, I kept redirecting the attention of the participants to report a specific 
experience in time and place each time the report moves to a general description. 
One way to do this is by asking questions about the context each time the participant 
drifts away, similarly to the first step. Another away is to reformulate the report of 
the participant, recovering the focus of the interview.  
d) Attention to the different dimensions of the experience: As the interview unfolds, 
different questions were made to cover the different dimensions of the experience, 
the diachronic dimension— the evolution of the experience in time—and the 
synchronic dimension – the experience of the different elements. These questions 
start by content-empty questions like ‘What do you see?’, ‘Where are you?’, and they 
become more specific as the participant reports the different elements. 
e) Deepening of the experience: Once the participant has explained the experience and 
how it unfolded, different questions were asked to gather more specific descriptions 
of each of the elements that appear. These questions vary from participant to 
participant, and I elaborate them as the participant describes the experience. While 
these questions intend to be as content-empty as possible, they become more specific 
to trigger more detailed descriptions from the interviewee. For instance, when one of 
the participants in the study reported that, among others, the experience he had was 
that of ‘awareness having itself’, I asked him to describe this with: ‘when you 
describe that this is ‘awareness having itself’, could you describe me that a bit 
more?’  
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3) Post-Interview (30min):  
After the main interview, participants were asked questions that were related to the 
specific experience reported during the MPI. For instance, participants were asked extra 
questions to clarify the context of the experience, the frequency of this type of 
experiences and to investigate other dimensions that are not mentioned during the MPI. 
The post-interview also aimed at letting the interviewees express themselves more 
informally and freely and ask questions about the interview and the study. 
4.1.4. Analysis procedure 
For the analysis phase, only five out of the six interviews were selected. One of them was 
not included as the experience reported by the participant did not match with the targeted 
phenomenon.22  The analysis was based on the methodology described by Petitmengin, 
Remillieux & Valenzuela-Moguillansky (2018), and Valenzuela-Moguillansky & Vásquez-
Rosati (2019) and consists of five major steps: 1) Data preparation, 2) Specific Diachronic 
Analysis, 3) Specific Synchronic Analysis and 4) General Analysis.  
1) Data preparation:  
a. Transcription  
Interviews were transcribed verbatim with non-verbal components and repetitions 
excluded. Then, exclusively the second part of the transcription, the micro-
phenomenological interview, was numbered chronically, including the questions by 
the interviewer (see Appendix III for some excerpts of a real interview). For the 
answers, the numbering was done by identifying the ‘descriptemes’ which are 
defined by Petitmengin et al. (2018) as “minimal units of meaning”. Here, the task is 
to identify in the answers the different descriptive components of the reported 
experience and to separate them from each other. For instance, in an answer, we can 
identify different descriptemes (e.g. a participant is talking about where they are, 
what they are wearing and what they are feeling. Each part of the answer will be 
identified as one descripteme).  
b. Refining the text 
Then, I prepared the text that is going to be used for analysing the results. For this, I 
only wanted to keep the procedural descriptions and eliminate the rest. ‘Procedural 
descriptions’ refer to those descriptions made by the participant where there is a clear 
 
22 P#05 described different experiences in their report. One of them was a non-lucid dream and the other two were short 
descriptions of other dreamless sleep phenomena more related to sleep thinking than to an experience of a scenery 
lacking imagery or a void. 
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description of the subjective experience of a particular event. The rest of the 
descriptemes that refer to general descriptions, judgements or commentaries were 
deleted and were not used in the analysis 23  
2) Specific Diachronic Analysis 
For the diachronic analysis the aim is to identify each phase of the experience. In this 
study, two different diachronic lines were distinguished. First, a more general one, 
analysing the whole report, from start to end. Second, a more specific diachronic line 
that only considered the diachronic structure of the experience of dreamless sleep, 
omitting the structure of the reported dreams.  
In both cases, the task is to examine each of the descriptemes and to identify different 
moments of the experience. First, I grouped similar moments and attribute them to a 
moment in time (the chronological order of the experience does not always match 
the order of the report). Second, I assigned to each group a phase name. This 
assignment is done following an ‘iterative interrogation’ process (Valenzuela-
Moguillansky & Vásquez-Rosati, 2019) in which we describe the criterion followed 
for the grouping process. What is the reason or criteria for grouping those 
descriptemes? What do they have in common? What are they referring to? The 
iterative interrogation can be carried out several times to discover sub-phases in each 
of the phases identified, as well as to redefine phases previously identified. Each 
individual diachronic analysis is later illustrated in the form of a diagram. 
3) Specific Synchronic Analysis:  
For the synchronic analysis, the aim is to identify different themes within the reported 
experience. I examined the descriptemes in each of the diachronic units previously 
identified and I repeated a similar iterative interrogation process. The difference with 
the diachronic analysis is that in the synchronic analysis the descriptemes are 
grouped according to what they are referring to. This time, the iterative interrogation 
is repeated several times to create themes that can define each group of descriptemes; 
from lower to higher levels of abstraction (Valenzuela-Moguillansky & Vásquez-
Rosati, 2019). As in the previous stage, I designed a diagram to illustrate the 
synchronic analysis of each participant. These different themes are different 
experiences reported by the participants that refer to the same period (same 
diachronic dimension).  
 
 
23 The descriptemes that cannot be considered as procedural descriptions are considered by Petitmengin as ‘satellites’ of 
the experience (2016). This can be understood as the descriptions that do not refer to ‘how’ the experience was lived, but 
instead, to ‘what’ the experience was. For a more detailed description see Petitmengin (2006) and Petitmengin et al 
(2018).  
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4) General Analysis:  
The goal of this study was to investigate the structure of the experience of awareness 
during dreamless sleep and compare it with the descriptions found in the literature. 
The aim of the general analysis was to (i) compare the phenomenological reports 
with the descriptions of awareness during dreamless sleep found in the literature and, 
(ii) describe the experience of awareness during dreamless sleep. This general 
analysis was carried out in both Diachronic and Synchronic analysis. 
i) General Diachronic Analysis: To carry out this comparison, first I identified a 
generic structure in the experience of awareness during dreamless sleep. Then, I 
identified which categories describe better this phenomenon.  
ii) General Synchronic Analysis: The generic analysis identifies the common 
synchronic categories in all the participant’s reports. This results in the 
identification of different ‘experiential dimensions’ within each of the diachronic 
dimensions.  
4.2. Results  
In this section, I present the results of the analysis for the general diachronic and synchronic 
analysis to show which phases and categories were common to all participants.  
4.2.1. General Diachronic Analysis 
The diachronic analysis revealed two different types of diachronic structure: Type 1 and 
Type 2. Participants #01, #03 and #06, displayed Type 1 (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. General diachronic structure for participants #01, #03 and #06. The diagram results from analysing 
the reports given by the mentioned participants and identifying different phases within them. For the three 
participants, the resulting diachronic structure was the same. The report stared with the description of a non-
lucid dream (Phase 1), which eventually turns into a lucid-dream (Phase 2) – the participants realise that 
they were dreaming. This lucid-dream then starts to dissolve (Phase 3) and participants describe how the 
scenery around them fades and turns into a period of no scenery or void (Phase 4). Finally, participants 
mentioned that this phase ends with the appearance of some images and/or thoughts (Phase 5). Given the goal 
Phase 1: 
Non-Lucid Dream
Phase 2: 
Lucid Dream
Phase 3: 
Dream Dissolution
Phase 4: 
No scenery
Phase 5: 
Other dreamless 
sleep phenomena
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of the study, only phases 3, 4 and 5 undertook a further diachronic analysis since were the phases of ‘dreamless 
sleep’.  
The diachronic structure of these participants consisted of five phases. However, for the 
analysis I only considered Phases 3, 4 and 5 because were the ones classified as conscious 
dreamless sleep phenomena.  Phase 3, ‘Dream Dissolution’ marks the precedent of the 
experience of dreamless sleep. This phase starts with the dissolution of the lucid dream (see 
figure 2). P#01 described the dissolution as the imagery in front of her “fading away”. P#03 
mentioned that the dissolution starts while they were falling down from the sky (they had a 
lucid dream in which they were flying).  
“And after I said that to all the people in the mirror, the scene started to fade 
and all of it faded away”. P#01 
“As soon as the sensation of falling began to happen… the dream world around 
me [the dream construct with the café and the sky I was around] it folded it as 
quickly as I was falling”. P#02 
P#06 described this dissolution as a more sudden process that starts after him shouting out 
“dissolve this dream in the ultimate state” in the dream. This was something that they had 
been practicing before without any success.  
“So, I shouted out the same phrase [‘dissolve this dream in the ultimate state’] 
and the room started to spin, it started to move but it never got that far […] The 
whole dream was dissolving”. P#06 
The dissolution of the dream is followed by Phase 4, ‘No Scenery’. The transition between 
one phase and the other is marked by a ‘transitional event’ (Petitmengin et al., 2018). The 
transitional event marks the switch between phases and allows the differentiation between 
one phase and another (see figure 3 for all the transitional events). In P#01, P#03 and P#06 
the transitional event is the noticing of the absence of dream-scenery.   
 “it feels like there’s nothing around it. It was just image and it’s fading and 
there’s nothing”. P#01 
 “I dropped into nothing. A space of nowhere”. P#03 
 “The next thing that happened is that there’s empty space”. P#06 
For all three participants, the end of the ‘No Scenery/Void’ occurred with another 
transitional event that marks the beginning of Phase 5. In this event, they described losing 
attention towards the ‘Void (see figure 3). For P#01 and P#06, this occurred with the 
appearance of some visuals:  
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“it seems to lose a bit the lucidity or something […]  when the colours 
appear, I was also less present…”. P#01 
“Then smoothly this image appeared of two hands”. P#06.  
P#03 reported that they started feeling that they were lowering and that they started thinking 
whether they were still in bed: 
 “I felt myself moving into a different…how do I describe it? Lowering in 
some way. Then I started to think, ‘I wonder if I’m still in bed”.  
Following the categorisation by Windt et al. (2016), the phenomena happening during this 
phase cannot be classified as ‘dreams’ because of their lack of immersion. On the contrary, 
the phenomena appearing in this period fit well with the description of another type of 
dreamless sleep classified by these authors as ‘Non-Immersive Imagery and Sleep Thinking 
(ibid. p.873). Thus, phase 5 receives the name of ‘Other dreamless sleep phenomena’. 
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Figure 3. Specific diachronic structure for each P#01, P#03 and P#06 during phases 3, 4 and 5. The diagrams 
show in detail the diachronic structure for each participant and the sub-phases in each of the phases 3, 4 and 5. 
In between the phases, the doted boxes show the transitional event that mark the change of phase for each 
participant.  
Participants #02 and #04 displayed a different diachronic structure that was classified as 
Type 2. This structure shows an evolution of the experience in 3 phases: (1) Other dreamless 
sleep phenomena, (2) Void/Dream Matrix and, (3) other sleep phenomena. Yet, P#04 
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explained that before phase, the participant experienced a Non-Lucid dream. In this dream, 
P#04 wanted to become a tree, but for this, they realised that they need to die:  
“So, at this point I’d die and re-form. I don’t want to be a human, I don’t want a 
human experience. I chose death to have this experience”.  
From this point, P#04 described a phase where they absorbed a lot of energy through their 
spine:  
“At this point of the dream, I absorb a lot of energy. Something that might count 
as light, something that might count as vibrating ‘meta’” […] “Isn’t a Lucid 
Dream… […] It’s very abstract in nature”.  
After this episode of transition to death, P#04 identified what they call the ‘Void’, Phase 2, 
a state where they have arrived after the transition (see figure 4).: 
“You go in the transition into this space.”  
In the case of P#02, they did not report any dream right before the experience of dreamless 
sleep (although they commented that they had various dreams that night). What they 
described instead is a period of moving into ‘lucidity’ (see figure 4): 
 “there’s a sensation of an opening up into the lucid space. It’s like the regular 
dominating mind and out of a sudden, there’s a shift and there’s an opening up 
into the lucidity”.  
From that point, P#02 moved to another space that they call the ‘dream matrix’ (Phase 2): 
“In the dream matrix I can’t see any visuals”.  
For both participants, this experience in the ‘Void/Dream matrix’ finishes suddenly, with the 
experience of some brief thoughts, Phase 3, and then waking up (see figure 4). P#02 
described this as: 
 “It seems rather than staying in the dream matrix were the lucidity would 
continue, it pops out more to the ruminating mind”. P#02 
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Figure 4. Specific diachronic analysis for P#02 and P#04. The diagrams show in detail the diachronic structure 
for each participant and the sub-phases in each of the phases 2, 3, 4 and 3, 4 and 5, respectively. In between 
the phases, the doted boxes show the transitional event that mark the change of phase for each participant. 
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Of all those states, ‘No scenery’ and ‘Void/Dream Matrix’, respectively, were the 
only states that unfolded similarly to all the participants in the study. Consequently, this 
became the focus of further analysis.  This period was generally described as a period of 
absence. Participants mentioned the perception of a lack of environment (absence) and their 
presence in a void (nothingness). This experience was usually accompanied by a sense of 
self and body dissolution, but it adopted different forms in each of the participants. The 
experience was felt as a positive experience and it was pleasant. Awareness during this 
episode took different forms, ranging from a total lack of content (‘Just awareness’) to higher 
forms of cognition, including lucidity. From the descriptions provided by the participants, 
this state seemed to be more related to the phenomenon of lucid dreamless sleep described 
in the literature — an awareness during deep sleep devoid of intentional content. The 
following synchronic analysis aimed at investigating in detail the structure of this state of 
‘No Scenery/Void’ to find similarities between the reports of this state and the descriptions 
found in the literature. 
4.2.2. Generic Synchronic analysis 
As described in the analysis procedure, the synchronic analysis started by grouping the 
descriptemes for each phase and sub-phase for each participant in categories following an 
iterative interrogation — I asked myself what the criteria was for grouping the descriptemes. 
Once I identified the different categories, I ask myself again if I could find new themes to 
classify the categories found.  This process of iterative interrogation keeps repeating until 
we cannot find new grouping categories or themes. As a result, I identified four themes, 
within the period of ‘No Scenery/Void’, common to all participants: 1) Perception of absence, 
2) Self-perception, 3) Perception of emotions, and 4) Perception of awareness (see diagram 
6). For each theme, I identified different subthemes. The themes and subthemes are not 
presented in order of importance or influence, but instead, following the order that appeared 
in the transcriptions. 
1) Perception of absence 
This first theme was identified from grouping descriptemes that referred specifically to 
how participants experienced the ‘No Scenery/Void’ itself. Participants described the 
features of the ‘No Scenery/Void’ as the perception of absence. In these descriptions, we 
can identify three subthemes: 
a. Object of absence 
One of the main features of the ‘No Scenery/Void’ is that of ‘Absence’: 
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“there wasn’t any scenery, there are no images”, P#01; “The space 
around me was very… was not like the sky or the stars, it was like a void”, 
P#03; “There was nothing to see”, P#06 
And ‘Emptiness’: 
“no physical infinite holding space”, P#3; “here’s empty space”, P#04. 
b. Perception of visuals 
Although there was nothing to see, participants described this vacuum or void state as 
‘Dark’:  
“there’s a visual sense but it’s like vibrant blackness”, P#02; “it was very 
dark”, P#03, “this black space”, P#04.  
      At the same time, they also described it as being ‘Light’: 
“there’s a clarity that this light”, P#02; “it wasn’t the absence of light, 
but it was very light”, P#03; “there was a light and it was white in colour”, 
P#06 
Finally, P#04 also described the void as a “multicolour lining but it’s everywhere 
around. A massive grid”. 
c. Quality 
Participants also described this phase by referring to its qualities. Two of the most 
frequent categories were the terms ‘Familiar’ and ‘Non-conceptual’. Three participants 
described the ‘No Scenery/Void’ as something that was familiar to them: 
“there are familiar spaces”, P#02, “I’ve experienced it before”, P#04.  
Both P#02 and P#04 explained that they experienced this before, but in the case of P#04, 
this was the first time that the experience lasted so long and was fully lived. Although 
P#03 mentioned that they never experienced this before, once in this state they 
recognised it as something familiar: 
“It felt very…not familiar as in terms of me having been in there, but in 
terms of having known”, P#03 
Both P#03 and P#04 described this state as ‘Non-conceptual’: 
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“It was like it was beyond any… there wasn’t no need of any constructs of 
the mind to have anything to do with that”, P#03; “Isn’t constructed in 
any way”, P#04  
Other categories of Void’s quality include ‘Vibrance’ (“It has like a vibrant quality”, 
p#02) ‘Electrical’ (“It’s like is electrical or live”, P#02) and ‘Expansive and limitless’ 
(“I found it incredibly expansive. Very limitless”, P#03) 
2) Self-perception 
This theme includes descriptemes that made reference to oneself while in the ‘No 
Scenery/Void’. In this theme, the descriptemes are not about describing the features of 
the environment (such as the absence of imagery or the perception of darkness or clarity), 
but about describing the self-experience while in the ‘No Scenery/Void’. Three different 
subthemes were identified: 
 
a. Self-Location 
Only P#01 mentioned that they could feel themselves located while they was in the ‘No 
Scenery/Void’. They made several remarks about their body and their location in space: 
“I’m just left like in the centre of nothing” P#01 
b. Bodily-sensations 
Again, P#01 was the only participant that mentioned awareness of a body while in the 
‘No scenery/Void’. They made several descriptions referring to their body- parts, 
including the perception of ‘Movement’: 
“It’s all very like fluid movements, like being in water or something”. P#01 
However, P#01 also described how they felt a sort of ‘Resistance’ that prevents 
them from moving their head: 
“I couldn’t move my head around” P#01 
P#03 and P#06 mentioned being aware of the absence of their body, ‘Lack of 
physicality’: 
 
“I didn’t feel any physicality”, P#03; “I didn’t have my physical body”; P#06 
P#02 and P#04 did not mentioned any awareness of their bodies. 
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c. Absence 
Not only P#02 and P#04 did not mention any bodily feelings while in the No 
Scenery/Void (including any mention of them lacking bodily feelings), but they also 
explained that their ‘selves’ where absent during this period. During the interview, both 
participants commented several times that they did not know how to describe this 
experience without using the indexical ‘I’ (e.g. ‘I was there’), because during the 
experience itself, they experienced a complete lack of self. For this reason, they make 
the following remarks about the experience:  
“It’s like my experience is able to kind of sustain it. I don’t know if there’s 
an agency sustaining it”, P#02; 
“There’s no scenes of self, no scenes of human, no scenes of being”, P#04. 
P#06 mentioned lack of physicality during the ‘No Scenery/Void’, but they also 
stressed the fact that they did not have any sort of self perception while in it: 
“There was no intellectual content of awareness like ‘I’m X, I’m here’”, 
P#06 
1) Perception of emotions 
This theme was isolated to differentiate instances where participants described their 
emotions while in the ‘No Scenery/Void’. In general, their experienced this period as 
something positive. 
 “Now, I’m not nervous anymore”, P#01; “but not frightening in any way”, 
P#03;  
“I loved it. I really loved being in there”, P#03; “It was very peaceful”, 
P#06;  
Participants #02 and #04 did not specifically mention any emotional features during this 
stage. 
3) Perception of awareness 
This last theme was isolated from the others because it does not refer to either how 
participants experienced the ‘No Scenery/Void’ or how they experienced themselves. 
Here, the descriptemes refer to how participants experienced their own perception of 
awareness instead.  
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a. Cognition 
This first category refers to those descriptemes in which participants describe the 
presence of thoughts during the ‘No Scenery/Void’. I mentioned before that the presence 
of thoughts marked the end of the ‘No Scenery/Void’ and the start of ‘Other Dreamless 
Sleep Phenomena’ period. However, in the case of P#01, the presence of cognition did 
not seem to disrupt her experience. While they described her thoughts, they still 
mentioned to be in the ‘No Scenery/Void’. They mentioned several times that, while in 
this period, they were wondering what they were going to do. 
“I’m just wondering to myself: ‘I wonder if I should do something”. P#01 
Is not until they noticed the appearance of some colours and shapes that they noticed that 
they were getting out of the ‘No Scenery/Void’.  
b. Lucidity 
Two participants described being aware that they were in this state of ‘No Scenery/Void’ 
while in it.  These descriptions are categorised as ‘Lucidity’ because the participants 
have insight of their own state: they know that they are in a period of ‘No Scenery/Void’. 
“The experience of being aware of my consciousness inside this void was 
very… it felt like a more advanced and deeper understanding of that 
freedom of being lucid could offer”, P#03;  
“I realised I was awake inside the dream was still very present but in a 
much more profound way”, P#03;  
“That wasn’t something that I could mistake for a dream. Nor could I 
mistake a dream for that. They are experientially very distinctive”, P#06. 
“When I had this experience of emptiness, I still know I was dreaming, I 
was aware I was asleep”. P#06.  
c. Content of awareness 
This subtheme involves descriptions of awareness that were distinguished on the base of 
what the awareness refers to. P#02, P#03, P#06 described this awareness as just 
experience – an awareness that did not have any content of awareness: 
“it’s emptiness. It’s emptiness but awareness of emptiness. But well, when 
I say awareness you can say, ‘oh, there’s awareness of emptiness’, but 
sometimes, it’s like emptiness and awareness it’s the same, there’s no 
‘being’ being aware of emptiness, it’s emptiness is awareness”, P#02 
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 “[…] and start to have an awareness…isn’t you, it’s just an awareness. 
[…] It’s like if we were going to drop a mind in a computer and whatever 
we drop into the computer is what it’s left. It can experience but isn’t 
saying, isn’t feeling, isn’t tasting…it can’t describe the experience”, P#04  
“I was aware […] It wasn’t that I was thinking consciously I’m in sleep or 
I’m in a dream. It was more that it was an awareness”, P#06 
However, at some points, this awareness does seem to have a content. The more abstract 
one is that of an awareness of awareness itself: 
“awareness of awareness being aware”, P#04 
This is also described in the terms of awareness of clarity: 
“Just clarity”, P#02; “And then I realised that this was the nature of 
mind”, P#06 
Other mentions of awareness with some content included the awareness of energy (“It’s 
like energy of your mind”, p#02; “I was aware of my energy” P#03), the awareness of 
just being: (“absence of physicality, and just moving into an essence of pure beingness”, 
P#03; “being aware. Being present”, P#06) and awareness of an observer (“There’s an 
awareness of the observer, which I guess I identify with, but there’s not a typical sense 
of the self”, P#02). 
 
d. Quality 
Finally, the category of ‘Quality of awareness’ was identified to classify those 
descriptemes that mentioned how this awareness was. P#02 described this as ‘No 
constructs’: 
‘very non-conceptual stuff going on’, “It’s just awareness without an 
agenda, without movements,” P#02 
Thus, similar to the descriptions made by other participants referring to the ‘No 
Scenery/Void’, but in this case, P#02 was referring to the sort of awareness experienced. 
The perception of awareness is also described as ‘Luminous and open’ by P#06: 
“is luminous and open awareness”, “It was open, without being focus on 
anything 
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Figure 5. General synchronic structure for all the participants while in the phase of ‘No Scenery/Void’. The 
diagram includes all the themes and subthemes discussed in the results section. 
4.3. Discussion of the study 
The present study is a unique exploration of consciousness during dreamless sleep with the 
use of the micro-phenomenological interview (MPI).  The study investigated the dynamics 
of the experiences of awareness during dreamless sleep described by five participants.  The 
aim of this investigation was to conduct an exploratory comparison of the experiences 
described by the participants to those found in the current literature (presented in chapters 2 
and 3) and the taxonomy presented at the beginning of the thesis (chapter 1). From the results 
of this study, I conclude that during dreamless sleep there exists a significant variability of 
conscious states.  
As noted in the results section, the episodes of dreamless sleep gathered from the 
interviews were labelled as ‘No Scenery/Void’ and ‘Other sleep phenomena’. I will start 
with the first one, ‘No Scenery/Void’. Participants described a period during sleep in which 
they were aware of what they said it was a period that lacked imagery whatsoever.  This 
period was described with the words of ‘no scenery’, ‘the void’, ‘dream matrix’, or ‘the 
nothing’. Similarly, this period seemed to entail the lack of object of awareness and 
conceptual content. Although participants described the ‘No Scenery/Void’ in terms of 
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‘absence’ or ‘emptiness’, I argue that these descriptions should not be understood as the 
actual perception of ‘absence’ or ‘emptiness’. Instead, ‘absence’ or ‘emptiness’ should be 
understood as placeholders used by the participants to describe adequately their experience. 
Similar case applies to the descriptions made by the participants referring to the period of 
‘No Scenery/Void’ as that of ‘dark’ or ‘light’. These should be understood as metaphors and 
not as the perceptual experience of ‘darkness’ or ‘light’.  Remember from chapter 2 that the 
Advaita Vedānta and Yoga schools described awareness during deep sleep as sushupti, a 
mode of consciousness that is equalled to a state of absence, including the awareness of 
awareness itself. Sushupti is said to be a state in which the subject is aware of having known 
nothing during dreamless sleep, yet there was nothing to perceive: 
Bhattacharyya’s intriguing explanation is that in sushupti, the consciousness still 
functions in a ‘knowing of objects mode’, but the ‘object’ perceived by it is 
merely a blank; or as they further puts it, sushupti is ‘the consciousness of a 
positive nothing. Furthermore, they explains that upon waking up from sushupti, 
the self remembers that it was in a ‘knowing of objects mode’ even though the 
object was a blank" (Bhattacahryya, 1983: 27 in Raveh, 2008:327), 
In chapter 2, I gave my interpretation of the descriptions made of sushupti by the 
Advaita Vedānta and argued that these should be understood as the experience of awareness 
devoid of content; an experience of bare awareness. From the reports gathered, I make a 
similar reading and conclude that this is a special kind of conscious dreamless sleep 
experience inasmuch as participants experience instances of awareness devoid of content. 
The period of ‘No Scenery/Void’ is then a sleep phenomenon different from dreams because, 
at some points, it lacks awareness of any content – during this period, we can have an 
awareness that lacks any representational content. Moreover, participants themselves 
experience this period of ‘No Scenery/Void’ as something completely different to any dream 
experience they ever had.  
Notwithstanding this assumption, I argue that this period of ‘No Scenery/Void’ should not 
be understood solely as an instance of awareness devoid of content. While we should 
conceive the descriptions of ‘no scenery’, or ‘nothing’ as metaphors and not actually as the 
perceptual experience of absence, in some cases, the descriptemes seems to entail something 
different: 
“I dropped into nothing. A space of nowhere”. P#03 
“The next thing that happened is that there’s empty space”. P#06 
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These two descriptemes were labelled as transitional events that established the shift 
between the dream to the ‘No Scenery/Void’. From them, we understand that something 
changed in the experience of the participants; the dream experience has ceased to exist, and 
they are left in a void environment. Shall we conclude then that the participants did perceive 
(in visual terms) an environment of absence? Or shall we understand that the dream 
terminated and then there was nothing else to experience? These are questions that should 
be explored further in future research, but for now, I conclude that participants experience 
both. In some moments, they do experience awareness with some minimal content: there is 
an experience of absence, albeit not perceptual. I will explore this further in chapter 5. In 
other moments, this period is experienced as bare awareness, but upon waking up 
participants try to explain this period as something ‘absent’, ‘empty’ or ‘dark’.  
Similarly, I argue that the period of ‘No Scenery/Void’ is not always experience as 
awareness devoid of content, but as awareness of awareness itself instead. In chapter 2, I 
introduced the notions of ‘Dream of Light’ by Tibetan Buddhism. This tradition described 
the instances of awareness during dreamless sleep as a period where we reach the “natural 
light” (Norbu, 1992) or ‘clarity light’ (Padmasambhava, Rinpoche, & Wallace, 2008). The 
practice of Sleep Yoga aims at maintaining awareness in the transition between sleeping 
and dreaming with the goal of recognising the nature of the mind, or a state of ‘pure 
awareness’ (Ponlop, 2006:86; Padmasambhava, Rinpoche, & Wallace, 2008:209): 
Clear light is defined in most texts as the unity of emptiness and clarity. 
(Rinpoche, 1998:115).  
If you recognize the clarity and emptiness of that occasion, which is free of the 
intellect, this is called “recognizing the clear light” (Padmasambhava, Rinpoche, 
& Wallace, 2008:209)  
In chapter 2, I discussed the different interpretations that we could make of this perception 
of the ‘clear light’. I concluded that the best interpretation was to read this awareness of the 
light as the experience of awareness as such. Thus, the experience of the ‘light’ should not 
be understood as a perceptual experience of ‘lightness’ but again, as a metaphor to describe 
the experience of awareness itself. In the study, some participants (#02, #03 and #06) 
described the period of ‘No Scenery/Void’ in terms of light (see §4.2.2.). Following this 
interpretation, it is important to note that the participants who described the period of ‘No 
Scenery/Void’ using the concept of ‘light’ they were either expert meditators or had 
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knowledge of meditative traditions. 24 Consequently, I conclude that the participants did not 
actually perceive light, but instead, used ‘light’ as a descriptive term to talk about their 
experience of awareness during dreamless sleep. 
These periods of ‘No Scenery/Void’ were distinguished from another period that followed 
this experience called ‘Other dreamless sleep phenomena’. Contrary to the descriptions of 
‘No Scenery/Void’ as a non-perceptual, and non-conceptual experience, the descriptions 
regarding ‘Other sleep phenomena’ should be categorised as awareness of substantial content. 
For instance, during this period, some participants (P#01, #03 and #06) described the 
awareness of some object, such as colours or images appearing, or the perception of thoughts 
(see §4.2.1). There is the special case of P#01 whose instances of awareness with content 
also appeared in their descriptions during ‘No Scenery/Void’. They were aware of 
themselves during the dissolution of the dream, and could even situate themselves and their 
body: 
“I’m just left like in the center of nothing” 
“It’s all very like fluid movements, like being in water or something”. 
“I couldn’t move my head around” 
“I’m just wondering to myself: ‘I wonder if I should do something’” 
These intrusions of ‘Other dreamless sleep phenomena’ during the episode of ‘No 
Scenery/Void’ show that both phenomena do not have a straight cut-off line that separate 
them, but instead, display gradual differences. Thus, future research should also investigate 
further whether the descriptions provided by P#01 was a weak experience of ‘No 
Scenery/Void’, if it should be regarded as a case of ‘Other dreamless sleep phenomena’, or 
if it was something else. 
Finally, we should consider whether the reports made by the participants match the 
descriptions made by contemporary traditions about conscious dreamless sleep.  Remember 
that, according to Windt et al. (2016), some cases of conscious dreamless sleep are instances 
of selfless experiences. Some authors, like Thompson (2015a,c), understand the notion of 
‘selfless’ as a period in which there is not a sense of self during the experience itself – during 
 
24  Both participants #02 and #06 declared to be expert meditators; #02 had extensive experience as Yoga 
practitioner and #06 was trained in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Although participant #03 admitted to not following a 
regular meditative practice, they had knowledge of some meditative traditions, including the teachings on sleep yoga.  
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the period of conscious dreamless sleep there was no self-awareness. However, Thompson 
claims that during this period, we have a ‘pre-reflective’ sense of self – we do not have self-
awareness, but there is a minimal sense of self that prevails. For Thompson, this minimal 
sense of self translates to a feeling of being alive (2015b:11). On the contrary, Windt (2015a) 
talks of a selfless experience that lacks sense of self altogether, including any minimal sense 
of self.  She describes this experience as the experience of pure temporality — we have an 
experience of present time, of ‘nowness’.  
In the study, except for P#01, the rest of participants described lack of physicality and 
lack of sense of self altogether. Regarding the former, lack of physicality, I understand that 
there was still a self-perception; participants felt themselves in the period of ‘No 
Scenery/Void’, but they experienced their body as missing (see §4.2.2). As for the later, there 
was no sense of self, including a minimal sense of self. One of the participants also reported 
their experience during the ‘No Scenery/Void’ as both, lack of physicality and pure being 
and presence. 
 “absence of physicality, and just moving into an essence of pure beingness”; 
“being aware. Being present” P#03. 
I argue that this description could accommodate both Thompson’s and Windt 
description. In this case, the participant described an experience in which they identify that 
lack a body, but that is experienced as a bare experience of present time.  Thus, conscious 
dreamless sleep experiences can present a range of variability on the feeling of self. In some 
cases, this would be experience as selfless experience — our sense of self disappears, and it 
is only afterwards (upon waking up) that we attribute the experience as something had by 
ourselves. In other cases, a minimal sense of embodiment would still remain. Sometimes this 
minimal sense would be related to the body (i.e. they feel the whole body, body parts, or the 
lack of it), or minimal sense of self (i.e. they know they were there, but there is no allusion 
to a body, or spatiotemporal location). Some other times this would be experienced as the 
feeling of nowness.  
From the discussions of the results of the present study, I conclude that we should 
distinguish among the different types of awareness during dreamless sleep. These types were 
proposed in the taxonomy I laid out in chapter 1, namely: (1) awareness of substantial content 
AoSC, (2) awareness of minimal content AoMC, (3) awareness of awareness itself (AoAi), 
and (4) awareness devoid of content (AdC) in the reports of awareness during dreamless 
sleep.  
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Regardless of its novelty, the present study has its own limitations that should be 
taken into account. First, while originally six participants were recruited, the analysis was 
effectuated in basis of only five interviews. Although the interviews presented fine-grained 
descriptions, with the current sample we cannot make generalisations about the experience 
of ‘No Scenery/Void’ during dreamless sleep. Second, because of the evasive nature of the 
phenomenon of research, the microphenomenological interviews were extremely difficult to 
carry out. The full interview could not be focused on just the experience of ‘No Scenery/void’ 
but needed to also explore the experiences that preceded this period. For this reason, during 
the analysis of the reports, it was difficult to distinguish between descriptemes referred to 
the experience while in the ‘No Scenery/Void’ and to experience in the other phases. Finally, 
since the interviews were not carried out in a sleep lab, we do not have any way to check 
whether the reported experiences do actually describe episodes had during sleep.  
In the next and last chapter, I will lay out the goals for future investigations on 
dreamless sleep. I will also examine the results gathered in the present study and I contrast 
dreamless sleep with other associated phenomena. Finally, I will review current research on 
the area that can serve of guide for future research. 
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Chapter 5: How to differentiate between dreamless sleep 
and other associated phenomena 
The research presented in this thesis aimed to provide an account of conscious states during 
dreamless sleep — states of awareness during deep sleep that cannot be considered dreams. 
However, from the onset, it has also been shown the difficulties of providing an account of 
dreamless sleep phenomena without comparing them to their counterpart: dreams. Could 
things other than dreams during sleep be dreams? Shall we refer to dreamless sleep as a ‘type 
of dream’ instead? Are other associated phenomena, like hypnagogic states, a kind of 
dreamless sleep phenomenon, a kind of dreams or sui generis phenomena? I have briefly 
addressed these questions throughout this thesis. Regarding the distinction between 
dreamless and dreamful sleep, I introduced the Immersive Spatiotemporal Hallucination 
(ISTH) model by Windt (2010, 2015 a, b). I stated that I would adopt this model and would 
follow Windt and colleagues in their definition of dreamless sleep. Remember that, 
according to these authors, dreamless sleep experiences differ from dreams insofar the 
former lack the immersive and simulational character of the latter. However, is that the case? 
Are dreamless sleep phenomena characterised by lack of immersion and simulation? I hav 
also presented other associated phenomena, such as hypnagogic experiences and other sleep-
onset experiences. They existence asks for a better criterion that could distinguish between 
dreamless sleep and other sleep phenomena. I have presented hypnagogia as an example of 
awareness of substantial content (AoSC) during conscious dreamless sleep. Again, a similar 
question arises here. What does make hypnagogia different from dreamless sleep? How can 
we properly distinguish hypnagogic experiences from period such as the ‘No Scenery/Void’ 
described by my participants? And should they be regarded as a no-dream experience solely 
because their lack of immersion? I shall address these questions here.  
In this last chapter, I consider the relationship between dreams, dreamless sleep and other 
associated phenomena. By taking again Windt’s ISTH model, I claim that there is no clear 
cut-off line between sleep-onset and dream experiences and that, instead, the differences 
among them are gradual. However, I advocate for the development of a future taxonomy of 
sleep phenomena in which we can determine the sufficient and necessary conditions for 
having conscious dreamless sleep. This taxonomy should be able to discriminate 
prototypical cases of conscious dreamless sleep from dreamful sleep. The aim of such 
taxonomy should be properly accounting for the different conscious states during dreamless 
sleep highlighted in this thesis. To develop this future account, we shall consider the 
following goals: 
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1.  The development of a taxonomy of conscious of dreamless sleep that can distinguish 
this phenomenon from other sleep experiences, such as dreams, hypnagogic and sleep-
onset experiences.  
2. The development of a neurophenomenological approach to study the correlation of the 
dreamless sleep reports with their sleep stages 
Throughout this thesis, I have defended a taxonomy of minimal conscious states during 
dreamless sleep that does not only considers lucid dreamless sleep (LDS), as defined by 
Windt et al. (2016). Instead, I have advocated for a classification of four different kinds of 
awareness that we possibly have during conscious dreamless sleep: (a) awareness of 
substantial content (AoSC), (b) awareness of minimal content (AoMC), (c) awareness of 
awareness itself (AoAi), and (d) awareness devoid of content (AdC). To accomplish a final 
and operational taxonomy, the first step is to establish the differences between dreamless 
sleep and other associated phenomena. An operational taxonomy of dreamless sleep should 
be able to answer questions such as, what does it make conscious dreamless sleep different 
from dreamful sleep? Where does the difference between awareness of substantial content 
and awareness of minimal content during dreamless sleep hinges? Which sort of phenomena 
is included in each kind of conscious mental states? While these questions cannot be 
completely solved with the currently research available, in this chapter, I address them by 
taking the results of my pilot study (chapter 4). 
5.1. Dreamless sleep and other sleep phenomena 
 
5.1.1. Dreams and dreamless sleep 
To compare dreamless sleep with dream phenomena, I borrow the Immersive 
Spatiotemporal Hallucination (ISTH) model from Windt (2010, 2015a). Remember that, 
according to this model, dreams are (1) spatiotemporal hallucinations that (2) occur during 
sleep or sleep-onset and that (3) are reportable. First, dreams are conceived of as a sort of 
immersive experience where individuals feel located in space and time in a simulated world. 
Second, dreams are considered to happen during sleep or sleep-onset, and they need to be 
reported. In the pilot study I performed, participants reported immersive experiences — they 
themselves appeared to be located somewhere different from the real world. These 
experiences, apparently, happened during sleep. However, why should we consider those 
reported experiences as conscious dreamless sleep phenomena and not as dreams? Do we 
have enough reasons to think that dreamless sleep experiences are not dreams?   
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If we accept Windt and colleague’s (2016) proposal, conscious dreamless sleep 
experiences, including LDS, should not be considered dreams because they do not have 
immersive and simulational character. The main reason provided by these authors is that, in 
conscious dreamless sleep, individuals lack a sense of presence — they do not perceive 
themselves as being immersed in a place (ibid). Moreover, the same authors also claim that 
conscious dreamless sleep experiences are not simulational — they do not simulate a real 
world. However, if we examine in detail the reports gathered in my study, we get a different 
impression of what dreamless sleep is. For instance, in some cases, the study participants 
reported a sense of presence. In addition, they offered descriptions of the ‘No Scenery/Void’ 
that referred directly to its features. These descriptions exemplify the feeling of being 
situated in a world during their episode of ‘No Scenery/Void’ by the participants — they 
said to be situated in a ‘void’ or an ‘emptiness’. Could we then say that, in some moments, 
participants were describing a dream experience?  
To answer the previous questions, we should look again at the analysis carried out in 
Chapter 4. Remember that participants did not solely report an episode of ‘No Scenery/Void' 
in their experiences, but also other phenomena, including non-lucid dreams and lucid dreams. 
Moreover, from the analysis, I concluded that there seemed to be a qualitative difference 
between the descriptions of dreams (non-lucid and lucid) and the descriptions about the 
period of ‘No Scenery/Void’. Participants described an event that marks the transition 
between the dream and the dreamless sleep episode ‘No Scenery/Void'. Each of these 
transitional events had as a common feature the noticing of the new phase, ‘No 
Scenery/Void'. Participants reported noticing a different scenery, which they described as 
‘absence of imagery’, ‘void’ or ‘dream matrix’ (see §4.2.2. for all the categories identified 
in the description of the ‘No scenery/void' episode). Which are the criteria to categorise this 
episode of ‘No scenery/Void’ as a dreamless sleep phenomenon? Could we instead classify 
this episode of ‘No scenery/void’ instead a sort of ‘dream’? My claim is that we cannot. I 
argue that the period of ‘No scenery/void’ experienced by the participants should be 
understood as an instance of conscious dreamless sleep; thus, it is something different from 
a dream experience. To argue this, I will first explore whether the descriptions of ‘No 
scenery/Void’ could fit into the descriptions of dream phenomena.  
If we follow Windt’s definition of dreams (2010, 2015b), the descriptions during ‘No 
scenery/void’ seem to fit with her criteria for dreams. First, the reported experiences do seem 
to involve a sort of spatiotemporal location. Subjects reported that ‘they fell’ or ‘went’ into 
this ‘nothingness’ (e.g. “I dropped into nothing”). At least, in the transition from the lucid 
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dream to the ‘No Scenery/Void’, there is a clear mention to an ‘I’ that has the experience 
and can situate themselves; at least in space (“I dropped into nothing”). One of the 
participants who reported having this experience quite frequently, said that there is a feeling 
of presence associated with it, although this feeling is different from any other experience: 
“There’s a sense of presence. But there’s not like typical waking life that there’s 
a lot of distractions. In that space that doesn’t happen. It’s almost like attention 
and awareness are together” 
“This awareness isn’t dependent on me, it just is” P#04 
Second, the experiences also seem to be immersive enough for the subjects to feel that 
they were in that environment (e.g. “The space around me was very… was not like the sky 
or the stars, it was like a void”; “You’re in a massive dark space, but it’s like the vacuum 
space”). They also noticed the difference between being in the environment and getting out 
of there. 
“And coming out of it sometimes is slower sometimes is quicker and it’s like 
coming out of it. The typical sense of self is like putting its clothes back. It’s like 
coming to the playing mind, the ruminating mind. It’s definitely shifted from a 
very simple state of being consciousness, very powerful, to one that it's 
distracting, disperse and over the place” P#04 
And finally, apparently, those experiences happen during sleep or sleep-onset 
transition and can be reported. However, classifying these experiences as ‘dreams’ could 
pose a problem. I claim that we should not categorise the experiences had during ‘No 
scenery/void’ as dream experiences. The reason of this is that the term ‘dream’ does not 
seem to make justice to the experience reported by the participants during the ‘No 
scenery/void’.  
Although participants still say to be located in a spatiotemporal frame and feel 
immersed, their reports do not seem to match the typical descriptions of either non-lucid 
dreams or lucid dreams. First, some participants talk of this state as something qualitatively 
different from any other experience they might have had:  
 “It’s called the void state, isn’t unfamiliar. There’s a high probability in any 
dream I’m lucid that I’d go into the void state”. P#04 
Second, they are not normal dreams, because some participants also claimed to be aware that 
they are in them (e.g. “I was still lucid [and knew I was dreaming]”; “I realised I was awake 
inside the dream”). However, they cannot be classified as lucid dreams either. Although 
some participants acquire insight while in this experience – they know they are having this 
  
86 
experience and can reflect on it — they perceive this phenomenon as something different 
from a dream. For instance, some participants reported how different the experience in the 
‘No Scenery/Void’ was from a typical lucid dream: 
“In terms of my experience in the rest of the world, including lucid dreams, it’s 
a higher one compared to that”. P#02 
 “The experience of being aware of my consciousness inside this void was very… 
it felt like a more advanced and deeper understanding of that freedom of being 
lucid could offer […] I had a sense of the limitless possibility of lucidity when I 
was surrounded by an image dream, but with the absence at all that sense of 
limitlessness was really expansive”. P#03 
 “That wasn’t something that I could mistake for a dream. Nor could I mistake a 
dream for that. They are experientially very distinctive”. P#06 
Could it be that these reports of the ‘No Scenery/Void’ are instances of what has been 
named ‘imageless lucid dreams’ (Magallón, 1991) or ‘hyper-space lucidity’ (Bogzaran, 
2003)? In the literature, there are mentions to a type of lucid dream that involve non-
conceptual imagery, including the appearance of “abstract imagery, mathematical equations, 
concentric circles, light dots, light phenomena, and oscillating lines, followed by a sense of 
“awe” and “spiritual opening” (Bogzaran, 1990:30). Similar experiences have been reported 
by Hurd (2008) who refer to this experience as ‘cosmic snow’. Other authors have described 
them as the experience of being in a void – a state of nothing (Magallón, 1991).   
These experiences of imageless dreams have been classified as ‘minimal perceptual 
environments’ (LaBerge & DeGracia, 2000) because in most cases, there is still some sensory 
imagery present. Moreover, some authors argued that these sorts of experiences involve a 
minimal-body sense (Johnson, 2014:63).  Following these assumptions, Windt (2015b) has 
argued that imageless lucid dreams are a kind of dream because they involve spatiotemporal 
situatedness (p. 523-4). 25  However, should imageless dreams be regarded as ‘dream’ 
experiences if they involve a minimal sense of spatiotemporal location? Or should they better 
be accounted as a case of conscious dreamless sleep? In the absence of further research on 
these sorts of experiences, I am unable to offer a definite answer. From the descriptions found 
in the literature, it seems that, again, we are encountering different sorts of experiences. In 
some cases, these sleep experiences involve the perception of minimal imagery (Gillespie, 
2002; Bogzaran, 2003; Hurd, 2008). In other cases, these experiences involve a minimal 
sense of embodiment (Johnson, 2014; LaBerge & DeGracia, 2002). However, some other 
 
25 Remember that spatiotemporal situatedness is the mark of dream experiences according to Windt (2015a) and her 
ISTH model 
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descriptions talk of experiences that lack imagery and content altogether (Magallón, 1991). 
For this reason, future research should investigate further the relationship between imageless 
dreams and immersion and determine whether all imageless dreams do in fact involve some 
sense of spatiotemporal situatedness. Moreover, despite the descriptions of these experiences 
as ‘lucid’ we should also investigate what the ‘lucidity’ means in these cases. Were the 
individuals aware that they were having the experience while this experience was unfolding? 
This does not seem so clear in all the available descriptions. In the case of my participants, I 
assigned ‘No scenery/Void’ as a case of conscious dreamless sleep because the participants 
explicitly say that their experience was different from any other dream experience. 
What about the simulative character? Should the experiences had during the ‘No 
scenery/Void’ be considered simulational? According to Simulational Theories of dreaming, 
such as the ISTH by Windt, an experience is simulational inasmuch it recreates a world for 
the subject who is having the experience (Revonsuo, 1995). Could we say the same for 
conscious dreamless sleep? Does it recreate a world? In the case of the experiences reported 
during the episode of ‘No scenery/Void’, this seems quite difficult. Participants reported this 
period as the experience of perception of absence or emptiness — they describe the 
experience of a void; there are no images and no visual experience — there is nothing. Thus, 
it does not seem that conscious dreamless sleep experiences can be simulational in this 
respect or, at least, not the sort of experiences in which we recognise awareness of minimal 
content (AoMC), awareness of awareness itself (AoAi) or awareness devoid of content 
(AdC). In the case of awareness of minimal content (AoMC), such as the perception of 
hallucinatory imagery, we should consider further whether these are simulational because of 
their perceptual character (I will discuss this point when referring to hypnagogia).  
Therefore, I claim that the experiences reported by the participants during the episode 
of ‘No scenery/void’ should be better understood as conscious dreamless sleep experiences 
— they are experiences happening during sleep that cannot be categorised as dreams. I do, 
however, accept that these are limit experiences in the verge of dreaming and thus, they 
might resemble dreams in some ways. The transition between conscious dreamless sleep and 
dreams is gradual, and thus, some experiences classified as conscious dreamless sleep might 
display some features resembling dreams. Because of this fact, future research should 
consider further the different sorts of awareness had during dreamless sleep and their 
defining features. Consequently, we will be able to improve my proposed taxonomy and 
establish differences between typical cases of conscious dreamless and dreamful sleep. 
Moreover, future research should also reconsider the ISTH model of dreams by Windt and 
  88 
explore further whether the lack of ‘immersion' and ‘simulation' are the defining features of 
conscious dreamless sleep. 
5.1.2. Dreamless sleep and Hypnagogia 
Hypnagogia or hypnagogic experiences occur during sleep-onset transition (Maury, 1848; 
Mavromatis, 1987). We usually experience these phenomena when we are falling asleep and 
we start feeling drowsy; between wakefulness and NREM sleep (Vogel, 1991). They can 
take different forms, with fleeting and isolated imagery as the most common one 
(Mavromatis, 1987; Foulkes & Vogel, 1965; Schacter, 1976; Hori, Hayashi, & Morikawa, 
1994, Stickgold et al., 2000). Some other times, hypnagogic experiences can appear as 
auditory, vestibular, and kinaesthetic sensations (Hayashi et al., 1999). However, sometimes 
it is difficult to establish a clear cut-off between hypnagogic and dream experiences. Reports 
on sleep-onset experiences can show a more complex form of imagery and describe the 
perception of pictures as if it was a cinema screen (Mavromatis, 1987:14-15). Some other 
times, these phenomena are experienced similarly to dreams (Nielsen, Stenstrom, et al. 2005; 
Stenstrom et al., 2012). Because of this phenomenology, Windt argues that hypnagogic 
experiences can present some overlapping characteristics with dreams, and thus, we should 
refer to them as ‘oneiragogic’ experiences instead – experiences that lead into dreaming. 
Oneiragogic experiences thus, are phenomena that occur between wakefulness and dreaming 
(Windt, 2015:530). Therefore, we should conceptualise the transition between sleep-onset 
to full-fledged dreaming as a gradual shift in spatiotemporal situatedness – a gradual 
transition from a veridical reference frame to a hallucinatory one. This gradual shift explains 
reports of experiences where there is an overlapping of reference frames (for an example see 
Ernest March report mentioned in Windt, 2015:530). 
Given the gradual transition between sleep-onset and dreams, if we want to establish 
the differences between both kinds of phenomena, we should investigate both extremes of 
the spectrum: clear cases of oneiragogia and clear cases of full-fledged dreams. Oneiragogia 
is usually static, brief and fragmented and subjects claim that its experience is different to 
that of dreams (see Collard, 1953; Myers, 1957). Contrary, dreams are lived as fully 
immersive experiences with a complex narrative (Windt, 2015a). Moreover, oneiragogic 
experiences usually only involve the perception of visual, auditory or kinaesthetic 
hallucinations but not a full-body hallucination, neither a shift in the reference frame (Windt, 
2015b:530). Similarly, oneiragogia are usually experiences being presented “in front of 
one’s eyes”, similar to daydreaming (Leroy, 1933; Mavromatis, 1987). In the case of dreams, 
we feel integrated into the scenery. Windt exemplifies this difference by comparing 
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oneiragogia to watching a movie and dreams to virtual reality experience (2015a:530). Thus, 
oneiragogic experiences are not immersive nor simulational enough to be considered dreams. 
The shift to a hallucinatory reference frame has not been completed yet. However, it needs 
to be noted again that this differences between oneiragogia and dreams is clearer if we 
observe prototypical cases of each of them.  
I claim, following Windt and colleagues (2016), that oneiragogic experiences should 
be considered as conscious dreamless sleep phenomena. I hold, like Windt, that oneiragogic 
experiences can take different forms and thus, some of them will be more similar to dreams 
than others. This will depend on the immersive and simulational character of each individual 
experience. Moreover, I have defended a classification in which oneiragogic experiences 
should be regarded as instances of awareness of substantial content. First, reports of 
oneiragogic experiences display the perceptual awareness of an external object. Individuals 
report having been aware of an image and thus, cannot be classified as a form of conscious 
dreamless sleep involving minimal or lack of content. Second, oneiragogic experiences are 
described as being different from other episodes of dreamless sleep, such as awareness 
devoid of content (AdC). In the case of my participants, oneiragogic experiences can be 
recognised after the termination of the period of ‘No scenery/void’. A couple of participants 
(#01 and #06) described the appearance of visual forms after the end of this phase. These 
descriptions were classified as transitional events that distinguished between the period of 
‘No scenery void’ and the experience of ‘Other dreamless sleep phenomena’. 
In his book, Mavromatis (1987) also exemplifies the comparison between hypnagogia 
and dreams. An interesting comparison is made with ‘initial dreams’, a term coined by Van 
Eeden (dreams happening in the first stages of sleep). Van Eeden bring the examples of 
‘initial dreams’ to describe an interesting form of hypnagogic experience: 
"[I]n hypnagogic hallucinations we have visions, but we have full bodily 
perception. In the initial dream type, I see and feel as in any other dream. I have 
nearly complete recollection of day-life, I know that I am asleep and where I am 
asleeping, but all perceptions of the physical body, inner and outer, visceral or 
peripheral, are entirely absent. Usually, I have the sensation of floating or flying, 
and I observe with prefect clearness that the feeling of fatigue, the discomfort of 
bodily overstrain, has vanished. I feel fresh and vigorous, I can move and float 
in all directions; yet I know that my body is at the same time dead tired and fast 
asleep" (Van Eeden, 1969 quoted in Mavromatis, 1978:96) 
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This citation by Van Eeden resembles a description made by one of the participants in my 
study who described the end of the ‘No Scenery/Void’ period with the recovery of the 
awareness of their body. 
“[following the experience of the void] And then I felt myself falling, not falling 
because it wasn’t physical… I felt myself moving into a different…how do I 
describe it? Lowering in some way. Then I started to think, ‘I wander if I’m still 
in bed’. I did start to feel my physicality but I wasn’t sure if I was dreaming or I 
was in bed or actually in bed so I decided to put my hands between my back and 
the bed behind me to see if I was really in bed and when I did it I only feel space, 
I felt I was almost hovering back to my body again, and then I did and then I 
woke up” P#03 
Therefore, we should consider the transition between wakefulness, oneiragogic experiences 
and conscious dreamful sleep as a gradual transition. In between oneiragogic phenomena 
and dreams, we could identify, in some cases, instances of awareness devoid of content (AdC) 
– reports lacking image and content altogether. One of the participants in my study 
recognised this state of AdC and named it ‘the dream matrix’. According to them, this is a 
familiar space that they can enter willingly and describes it as space in between dreams. In 
their reports, they described the dream matrix as a transitional state between waking 
consciousness and dreaming. 
“when I notice this the dream matrix has a very beginning and then it seems to 
recognise it because… sometimes it’s a dream and sometimes it’s like moving 
into this lucid stage. If it’s a dream it happens in the first stages of the dream 
matrix and then the dream it will fade. This lucid state will still be there”  
“The dream phase and the sense of the shift to a more normal consciousness, 
didn't seem so dramatic, but a realisation that I'm outside the dream matrix. This 
state isn't a kind of access state where another dream will happen” P#04 
Previous research in hypnagogia also calls for a more gradual transition among the 
different sleep phenomena. While the original scoring system by Rechtschaffen and Kales 
(1968) only identified among four different stages before REM sleep (Wake, S1, S1, S2 and 
S4), Hori et al. (1994) proposed a classification of up to nine different stages. Following 
Hori’s classification, the traditional Wake, S1 and S2 of sleep are divided into nine stages. 
Thus, Hori’s stage 1 corresponding to Wake and stage 9 corresponding to the beginning of 
Rechtschaffen and Kales’ Stage 2. With this classification, Hori and colleagues identified a 
wider spectrum of physiological changes between the beginning of sleep-onset and the 
appearance of the sleep spindles. Following this division, several projects found a correlation 
between Hori’s stages and the appearance of different hypnagogic mentation (Michida et al. 
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1998; Ogilvie, 2001). More recently, the content of linguistic intrusions during sleep-onset 
has also been studied (Noreika et al., 2015; Speth, Schloerschedit & Speth, 2016), as well as 
the phenomenological characteristics of these sorts of mentation (Windt, 2015b; Nielsen, 
2017). This research undertaken after Rechtschaffen and Kales has shown a wide variability 
of hypnagogic experiences. Similarly, a large number of sleep studies has also been looking 
into the differences between NREM and REM sleep and showed local changes between 
phases, which indicates the possibility of different conscious experiences through the sleep 
spectrum (Siclari et al, 2017; Siclari & Tononi, 2017; Lee et al. 2019).  
As I argued in the introduction, the traditional scoring system does not seem to integrate 
a wide range of sleep phenomena. Even after the implementation of the AASM system in 
2007, the canonical taxonomy of sleep does not properly correlate the different sleep 
phenomena experienced with the neural correlates displayed in the EEG. 26 Thus, in the 
quest towards the development of an improved sleep taxonomy, we should start by 
identifying all sorts of sleep phenomena, including those appearing in sleep-onset and 
NREM sleep. Research in oneiragogia can shed light on this taxonomy by providing us with 
more fine-grained descriptions of the different oneiragogic experiences that we have.  
A recent example of this research can be found in the work of Nielsen (2017). In this 
study, Nielsen investigates micro-dreams, which are described as brief and simple images 
that appear during the early stages of sleep-onset transition (p.5).  With the use of 
phenomenological reports and polysomnographic measures, Nielsen has described seven 
phases between waking and full-fledged dream that recognise a more detailed spectrum, 
ranging from hallucinatory and fleeting images to full-blown dreams. Similarly, Nielsen has 
also proposed an amendment of the sleep-onset spectrum proposed by Windt (2015). The 
work of Windt and Nielsen identifies six phenomenological categories to describe this 
transition which includes the acquisition of immersion and the experience of a simulated 
world. 27  Similarly, Windt has recently argued that the case of micro-dreams exemplifies 
how these phenomenological categories can categorise micro-dreams as a case or 
oneiragogic experiences instead of immersive dreams (Windt, 2019). 
 
26 The American Academy of Sleep Medicine amended the original Rechtschaffen and Kales’s system (1968) by merging 
Stages NREM 3 and 4 (original scoring system) to Stage N3. 
27 The phenomenological categories are: (i) visuospatial scene, (i) phenomenal embodiment, (iii) temporal reference 
frame, (iv) waking memory sources, (v) autobiographical historicity, (vi) spatiotemporal kinesis (Nielsen, 2017). 
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5.1.3. Dreamless sleep, contentless and imageless dreams and white 
dreams 
In dream research, the absence of dream reports upon awakening can be interpreted in 
different ways. One way is to understand this absence of reports as the absence of any 
experience. There is no report because there was nothing it was like to be in the period of 
sleep — there was no experience. At the beginning of this thesis, I have described the 
absence of reports as non-conscious experiences and I have set them aside. Another way is 
to understand the absence of reports as failure to recall the dream content. I wake up and I 
have the feeling that I had a dream, but I am unable to recall it – I have forgotten the dream. 
In this case, there was a conscious experience during sleep, but we are unable to recall it. 
This phenomenon is known as white dreams (Cohen, 1972; Lewis et al., 1966; Fazekas, 
Nemeth & Overgaard, 2018).   
There are also different ways to interpret white dreams. One interpretation is that 
white dreams are actually contentful dreams had during sleep – while sleeping I had a full-
fledged dream. However, upon awakening, there is no memory of that dream (Siclari et al., 
2017). A different interpretation is that white dreams are imageless dreams – while sleeping, 
I had a dream that lacked any imagery. This interpretation asserts that what I recall upon 
waking up is an actual experience that lacks any visual features (Windt, 2015a). A third 
interpretation of white dreams is also available. White dreams are a memory report of a 
contentful dream, but a dream that was somehow of reduced content (Fazekas, Nemeth & 
Overgaard, 2018).  
Further exploration of white dreams could help us understand if instances of 
awareness during deep sleep were actually dreams or if it was the other way around: white 
dreams are not actually dreams, but conscious dreamless sleep experiences.  Thus, future 
research should be able to distinguish between: (i) experiences that lack content, (ii) 
experiences that had content but lacked imagery, (ii) experiences with reduced content, (iv) 
experiences which content was forgotten. For instance, studies on serial awakenings 
(Noreika, 2009) show similar amounts of reports of dreams, white dreams and absence of 
reports during N2 and N3. 28  In these cases, subjects describe static content — their 
experiences lack movement sensations and narrative progression (Noreika, 2009, 
2010). Windt argues that the fact that we can find the three forms of reports (dreams, white 
dreams and absence) suggests the existence of a transition between sleep and dream (Windt, 
 
28 In sleep research, serial awakening is paradigm of research were subjects are woken up during different sleep stages 
and are told to report the experiences immediately prior to their awakening.  
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2015b: 878). However, we need to develop more research of white dreams to clarify whether 
these are instances of AdC, failures in recalling contentful dreams or the experience of 
reduced content. 
In sum, the conceptual worries highlighted in this section can be addressed through the 
second goal for future research: the development of neurophenomenological studies in 
dreamless sleep.  
5.2. Developing a neurophenomenological approach to study 
the correlation of dreamless sleep reports to sleep stages 
Future research should aim to develop a neurophenomenological approach that combines the 
micro-phenomenological interview method (MPI) with experimental sleep research. By 
following this approach, we would be able to correlate the subjective reports with their sleep 
stage and thus, have more tools to compare dreamless sleep phenomena with other associated 
phenomena. Similarly, the adoption of a neurophenomenological framework will allow the 
construction of an improved taxonomy of sleep phenomena that combines the 
phenomenology and physiology of sleep.  
Neurophenomenology is a scientific method for the collection of first-person data 
started by Francisco Varela (1996). This method aims at bridging neuroscience and 
phenomenology by considering subjective experiences in the experimental setting. In all 
experimentation, there are variables that cannot be controlled, but influence the results. 
Gallagher (2003) describe the uncontrolled variables that refer to subjective reasons, 
subjective parameters or SPs (p.86). Usually, in experimentation, SPs are ignored 
or generalised by the results of other participants. However, knowing them and taking them 
into account could change the conclusions drawn by the experiment’s results.  Thus, Varela 
set the neurophenomenological method as a tool for understanding the participant’s 
phenomenology better. An excellent example of the use of this method is the experiment of 
Lutz et al. (2002). This experiment recorded the neural activity of participants while seeing 
a three-dimensional illusion. Participants were trained to identify their SPs during the 
experiment, such as their level of attention or they perceived readiness. A posteriori, each 
participant was categorised into different clusters in base of their SPs. Thus, the 
interpretation of the results was based on the relationship between the performance of the 
participants and their SPs. In this way, the researchers could explain why some participants 
were performing poorly and understand better the difference in performance among the 
subjects.  
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Unfortunately, dream research cannot be performed in the same way – we cannot ask 
participants about their SPs while they are sleeping (or dreaming in this case). With the 
exception of lucid dreamers, dream research is carried out using the reports made by the 
subjects upon waking up. However, a neurophenomenological approach can also be adopted 
in this area of research. With techniques like the MPI (see chapter 4), we can improve the 
gathering of phenomenological reports upon awakening and thus gain more fine-grained 
descriptions of the experiences had during sleep. On top of the MPI, adequate sleep research 
performance can enhance the reports provided by the participants by associating the 
phenomena described to a different sleep stage. An example of a future research undertaking 
this approach is the replication of the pilot study presented in chapter 4. A future study could 
replicate the same procedures in a sleep-lab so we can corroborate whether participants were 
in fact in a sleep state during the episodes of conscious dreamless sleep. Thus, a combination 
of sleep recordings, serial awakenings and MPI will help to compare the reported 
experiences by the participants with other associated phenomena during sleep-onset and 
sleep. This approach for studying the ‘depth’ of dreams — how dreams are subjectively 
experienced (Solomonova, Fox & Nielsen 2014) — has been encouraged by lead dream 
researchers (Windt, 2015b; Thompson, 2015b; Solomonova & Wei (2016). Thus far, no 
study to date has developed a neurophenomenological approach to study in detail the micro-
structure of sleep phenomena as the one presented in the previous chapter. 
There is, however, a large number of studies adopting the neurophenomenological 
method to investigate changes in sleep physiology on expert meditators. The replication of 
these studies, and the adoption of similar ones in the wider population, is an option for future 
research on dreamless sleep.  For instance, the study by Dentico et al. (2016) demonstrated 
that short-meditation sessions with a group of expert meditators could induce gamma activity 
(low-frequency waves) during sleep. These results corroborate previous research that 
showed the increase of EEG gamma activity during meditation (Berkovich-Ohana, Glickson 
and Goldstein, 2012; Lutz et al., 2004; Cahn, Delorme and Polich, 2010). These changes 
seem to occur not only during meditation, but also during NREM (Ferrarelli et al., 2013), 
suggesting local changes in sleep EEG due to meditation training. A good empirical question 
is to investigate whether participants who display an increase in gamma activity during 
NREM also report conscious dreamless sleep experiences. The reason for this is that gamma 
activity during sleep has previously been associated with lucid dreaming (Voss et al., 2009, 
2014) and thus, will better insight of one’s sleep experiences. Similarly, increases in theta 
and alpha oscillations with gamma activity have also been found in studies with 
transcendental meditator practitioners. Dentico et al. (2015) have suggested that these 
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findings could be related to the increase in the level of awareness during sleep. A study by 
Maruthai et al. (2016) also showed changes in REM sleep on expert meditators. Expert 
meditators displayed an increase in frequency and duration of REM episodes, including the 
activity of the eye movements. Moreover, expert meditators exhibited shorter NREM stage 
2 periods and a decrease in REM onset latency. 
There has also been some research on the phenomenon studied in this thesis — 
experiences of awareness during dreamless sleep. In particular, some studies have looked 
into the sort of awareness that I have described as awareness devoid of content (AdC). 
Examples of this, are the studies performed by advocates of the transcendental meditation 
programme (TM) to study ‘witnessing-sleep’ experiences. As I highlighted at the end of 
chapter 2, TM practitioners understand ‘witnessing sleep’ as a period of ‘pure awareness’ 
experienced during deep sleep, which, at the same time, they conceive of as the essence of 
consciousness (Travis et al., 1994; Mason et al., 1997). For instance, Travis et al. (1994) 
reviewed different studies investigating EEG patters during different transitions. Those 
studies show similar EEG patterns — peaks of delta/alpha power — during (i) the transition 
of sleep-onset to REM, NREM to REM and REM to wakefulness, (ii) the experience of the 
so-called ‘witnessing sleep’, and (iii) the practice of TM. According to Travis et al., similar 
EEG patterns evidence the presence of an underlying experience, namely, ‘pure awareness’ 
or consciousness as such (ibid). From this evidence, Travis and colleagues developed the 
‘junction point model’, which asserts that pure awareness underlies the states of waking, 
NREM and REM (Travis et al., 1994:72). However, there are some problems with the studies 
performed by Travis, colleagues, and other proponents of the TM programme. In §2.3, I 
claimed that we should not understand the sort of experiences named as ‘witnessing sleep’ 
as the essence of consciousness, but instead, as conscious states that can be had during 
dreamless sleep. Similarly, the studies carried out by the supporters of TM are also 
questionable. None of their research accompanies the results with the phenomenological 
reports provided by the participants. Therefore, it is difficult to analyse what the experience 
was, and what the structure and dynamics of the experience were. Nonetheless, the different 
studies performed by researchers of the TM programme can serve as a guide for the 
performance of future studies. It would be interesting to investigate whether similar 
experiences can be had during each of the sleep stages transitions, and what the 
phenomenology of those is. 
More recently, a study by Siclari et al. (2017) aimed to find the differences between 
dreaming experiences and lack of experiences during sleep, as well as the difference between 
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reported content and reported lack of content. They distinguished among dream experiences 
(in their terminology, DE), no-dream experiences (NE) and dreaming experiences without 
recall (DEWR). The results showed that there was less Slow Wave Activation (SWA) 
preceding reports of dream experiences (DE) than preceding reports of no-dream 
experiences (NE). This similar zone was active when participants reported dream 
experiences without content (DEWR). These results brought the researchers to conclude that 
this hot zone was a marker for the type of experiences recalled.  However, recently, Fazekas 
et al. (2018) have commented on this study by suggesting that DEWR are actually reports 
of dream experiences with reduced content, not examples of white dreams (forgotten dream 
experiences). On their side, Windt et al. (2016) have claimed that white dreams could be a 
case of contentless sleep phenomena. These disagreements in the interpretation of the results 
evidence the need for distinguishing among different sorts of sleep experiences. Thus, in the 
future, we should consider the possibility of finding sleep experiences that: (a) have content, 
(b) have reduced content, (c) do not have content, and (d) have content but is forgotten.   
Following the different states spelled out thorough this thesis and the phenomena 
analysed in this last chapter, I propose the several states that should be considered in the 
construction of a taxonomy of sleep phenomena (see figure 7). 
 
Figure 6. Schema of sleep phenomena and associated states 
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Future research should be able to provide a taxonomy of sleep phenomena that considers 
all the full range of states during sleep. In this thesis, I have constructed part of this taxonomy 
by providing a novel account of conscious dreamless sleep that considers a variety of mental 
states that differ in their content (awareness of substantial content, awareness of minimal 
content, awareness of awareness itself, and awareness devoid of content). I have argued that 
these states should be better referred as oneiragogia, following Windt (2015), to describe 
transition states between wakefulness and dreaming. A future taxonomy should also 
investigate further dream experiences and spell out the differences between non-lucid and 
lucid dreams. In this case, we should distinguish between the possibility to have non-lucid 
and lucid dreams that have minimal or reduced content, and non-lucid and lucid dreams that 
have substantial content. This work, which has already been started by Windt (2015b), have 
argued for spatiotemporal situatedness as the mark of dreams. Thus, dreams are a special 
kind of sleep experiences because they involve immersive and simulational character (Windt 
et al., 2016). As I have argued in §5.1.1 is open to future research whether some forms of 
conscious dreamless sleep do also display immersive and simulational character, and in that 
case, how they would fit in a taxonomy of sleep phenomena. Finally, we should also consider 
experiences occurring during wakefulness that display a dream-like character, such as 
daydreaming (Morley, 1998), mind-wandering (Voss & Windt, 2018) and other imaginative 
experiences or hallucinations (Waters et al., 2016). Similarly, other wakeful altered states of 
consciousness, occurring during meditative practice or under drug consumption, such as ego-
dissolution or timelessness experiences (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013), should be 
considered for a comparison with oneiragogic experiences. Their study would allow us 
properly describing the phenomenology of the different sleep phenomena.  
Summing up, the goals proposed in this chapter reveals that the adoption of a taxonomy 
of dreamless sleep like the one I have developed can shed light on the phenomenology of 
sleep phenomena. Shifting from a two-dimensional approach to consciousness to a 
multidimensional approach where we consider different conscious states during the same 
global state, allows us to investigate a wider range of phenomena. Similarly, the adoption of 
first-person tools for the study of consciousness, such as the micro-phenomenological 
interview, can enhance the examination of the microstructures of different experiences. 
Finally, by moving towards a neurophenomenological approach that considers 
phenomenological and neuroscientific research, we will be able to develop a more adequate 
taxonomy of sleep states.   
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Conclusion 
This thesis argued for the possibility of having different conscious states during deep sleep. Deep 
sleep, usually associated with stage 3 of NREM, has been deemed a period of neural inactivity. 
Contrary to other sleep stages, during deep sleep the EEG activity shows very low brain activation, 
which leads to the assumption that during this period we are not conscious. However, is this 
assumption warranted? Can we conclude that consciousness is merely related to the amount of 
activation? Is it still possible to have instances of consciousness during deep sleep?  By taking 
evidence from sleep research, anecdotical reports from meditators, and descriptions from Indian 
philosophical traditions, this thesis argued that some forms of awareness do occur during deep sleep. 
I investigated different phenomena classified under the umbrella term of ‘dreamless sleep’; 
phenomena that occur during sleep that cannot be classified as dreams. This thesis advocated for the 
existence of different dreamless sleep phenomena by developing a novel taxonomy of dreamless 
sleep.  
In Chapter 1, I introduced this taxonomy by spelling out different possible states during  
conscious dreamless sleep: (1) awareness of substantial content (AoSC), (2) awareness of minimal 
content (AoMC), (3) awareness of awareness itself (AoAi), and awareness devoid of content (AdC).  
The first three, AoSC, AoMC and AoAi are understood as conscious states with content. I 
stated that AoSC is different to AoMC and AoSC inasmuch as during this state there is perception 
(veridical or non-veridical) of an object of awareness. Contrary, during AoMC and AoAi, although 
there is no perceptual experience, we can still recognise some sort of intentional content that 
describes these mental states. In the literature, forms of AoMC have mainly be described as 
awareness of non-conceptual content. Moreover, these forms do not involve the perception of any 
sensorial elements (i.e. visual perception). The solely difference between AoMC and AoAi is that 
the intentional content in AoAi is exclusively about awareness of awareness itself. In this case, 
awareness is the object and the act of awareness at the same time.   
Lastly, I argued that, in the same way we should consider the possibility of different 
contentful states during conscious dreamless sleep, we should also consider the possibility of a state 
that lacks content altogether. Thus, AdC is understood as a period of awareness lacking any 
intentional content, including that of ‘emptiness’ or ‘nothingness’. I have defended a view in which 
a conscious state does not require representational content to be conscious. I have described instances 
of AdC as phenomenological reports made once the subject wakes up and says to ‘know’ they were 
aware during dreamless sleep and nothing else.  
Chapter 2 started by considering further the possibility of having different sorts of conscious 
states during conscious dreamless sleep by looking into the descriptions made in Indian philosophical 
traditions. I considered (a) states of awareness with no content, (b) awareness of the very state of 
dreamless sleep, and (c) awareness of the very awareness. The first type is mentioned by the Advaita 
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Vedānta and Yoga schools. According to those schools, dreamless sleep is a special mode of 
consciousness — sushupti — that differs from wakefulness and dreaming consciousness. During 
this state of sushupti, we experience bare awareness, an awareness lacking any sort of object. The 
Advaitins and Yogis explain this bare awareness by referring to the sākṣīn –awareness that cannot 
become the object of awareness. I claimed that this interpretation made by the Advaita Vedānta and 
Yoga schools, that of dreamless sleep as a special sort of awareness, should in fact be understood as 
one of the few case of awareness with no content (AdC) described in the literature of dreamless sleep.  
The second and third type, awareness of the state of dreamless sleep, and awareness of the 
very awareness, are mentioned in the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. I introduced the practice of 
Yoga Nidra, a meditative practice that aids the acquisition of lucidity during deep sleep. This practice, 
which also receives the name of Luminosity Yoga, is said to reveal the nature of our own mind. Thus, 
according to Tibetan Buddhism, the practice of Yoga Nidra leads us to recognise a state of luminosity 
during dreamless sleep. I argued that this state should be understood as a self-intimating state –I am 
aware of my awareness itself (AoAi). I argued that AoAi is the state that has received most of the 
attention in dreamless sleep research and has led to the coinage of the term ‘lucid dreamless sleep’ 
(LDS). However, as I argued later in this chapter, AoAi should be only one of the possible readings 
that we should make of awareness during dreamless sleep. Thus, we should not always consider 
instances of consciousness in dreamless sleep as ‘lucid’, or as a state in which we can recognise an 
object of awareness (in this case, awareness itself).  
Finally, I introduced the concept of ‘witnessing-sleep’ proposed by the transcendental 
meditation programme (TM). According to the proponents of TM, during deep sleep we can reach a 
state of pure consciousness — a state that is purely phenomenal. However, although this definition 
of witnessing-sleep may be similar to that of awareness devoid of content (AdC), advocates of TM 
consider pure consciousness as the essence of consciousness. I argued against this conceptualisation 
and claimed that instances of AdC should be understood as forms of bare consciousness, but not as 
a sort of all-prevailing awareness present in every conscious state. Consequently, I claimed that the 
term ‘witnessing-sleep’ can lead to a misunderstanding of the metaphysical constraints associated 
with this state of awareness during dreamless sleep and its use should be avoided. Future 
investigations should consider further whether they want to conceptualise awareness devoid of 
content as an example of the essence of consciousness — what is common in all conscious states — 
or just as an instance of bare awareness that we can experience sometimes — an experience of 
awareness as such alone.  
Chapter 3 analysed one of the most recent views of conscious dreamless sleep by Windt et 
al (2016). Windt and colleagues described LDS as a form of pure awareness during dreamless sleep. 
These authors proposed a similar description of LDS to that of the descriptions of awareness devoid 
of content found in Indian traditions. Moreover, Windt (2015b) describes LDS as characterised by 
the experience of present time or ‘nowness’ — during LDS we only experience a bare form of present 
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time. Therefore, Windt et al. conclude that since LDS is the MPE and LDS is understood as the 
experience of nowness, pure temporality is the simplest form of conscious experience and the MPE. 
I argued that Windt proposal on LDS and thus, in conceiving what the MPE is, has several 
shortcomings. I argued that we should understand Windt and colleague’s definition of LDS as 
awareness of minimal content (AoMC) instead, and thus, conceive this as a possible experience had 
during dreamless sleep, but not the most minimal one. I do accept the existence of LDS, but I argued 
that, for avoiding possible conflation between Windt and colleague’s definition and that found in the 
different Indian traditions, we should not use ‘lucid dreamless sleep’ for referring to an awareness 
devoid of content during dreamless sleep. Instead, we should use my proposed taxonomy to 
discriminate among the different sorts of awareness had. 
In chapter 4, I presented a pilot study performed with the aim to corroborate the different 
conscious states identified in my taxonomy. The study consisted of micro-phenomenological 
interviews (MPI) with five participants that described periods of awareness during sleep in the 
absence of dreams. The analysis of the interviews identified different phases in the reported 
experiences and distinguished among periods of non-lucid dreaming, lucid dreaming, dream 
dissolution, no scenery/void, and other dreamless sleep phenomena. A more a careful analysis of the 
period of ‘No Scenery/Void’, revealed descriptions of awareness quite similar to those found in the 
literature I revised in chapters 2 and 3. All participants described a period that followed the 
dissolution of the dream-world as the perception of a ‘void’ or ‘absence of imagery’.  
In the discussion of the study, I argued that the different sorts of conscious experiences identified 
in my taxonomy could be isolated across the period of ‘Other dreamless sleep experiences’ and ‘No 
Scenery/Void’, namely: 
1) Awareness of substantial content (AoSC) 
Instances of AoSC, involve the perceptual (veridical or not) experience of an external object of 
awareness. In the study, these descriptions were found during the period of ‘Other dreamless 
sleep phenomena’ identified in the reports, which described the appearance of colours and shapes 
after the period of ‘void’. In these descriptions, participants assert the end of the period of ‘No 
Scenery/Void’ because they perceive something again; there is no absence of imagery or 
perception any longer, but there is no dream neither. I argued that these instances of AoSC should 
be referred as examples of hypnagogic experiences. 
2) Awareness of minimal content (AoMC) 
In chapter 1 and 3, I argued that examples of AoMC appear in the literature as minimal forms of 
awareness during deep sleep – instances in which there is not a substantial content of awareness, 
but that still involve some content of awareness. In this type of awareness, I included all the 
descriptions referring to ‘No Scenery/Void’ as a period where participants perceived an absence 
or emptiness, which was described in visual terms, such as the perception of darkness or light. I 
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claimed that these descriptions should not be understood as actual perception of an object, such 
as ‘I perceived the period of void as dark’, but instead, should be understood as a metaphor used 
by the participants to describe their experience. Similarly, other descriptions included mentions 
to a lack of physical body or lack of self-representation altogether during the void. In this type 
of awareness, I also included descriptions of feelings during this period. 
3) Awareness of awareness itself (AoAi) 
This type of awareness, quite similar to the above AoMC, also includes the perception of a 
minimal content of awareness; in this case, the content refers exclusively to that of the mind. 
Instances of this awareness were in descriptions that referred to awareness of awareness itself. 
Here, I also included those descriptions that took a similar form to that of Tibetan Buddhism and 
instead, participants described the awareness of awareness itself by making allusion to a period 
of ‘clarity’, ‘nature of my own mind’ or alike. The reason of this, is that, as I explained in chapter 
2, in Tibetan Buddhism, awareness during dreamless sleep is understood as a period in which 
we realise the nature of our mind – we perceive awareness itself. Thus, I included descriptions 
that use similar metaphors used in Buddhism.  
4) Awareness devoid of content (AdC) 
Finally, in AdC, there is not perception of an object of awareness, nor we can identify any content 
of awareness. In this category, I found mentions to dreamless sleep similar to that of the Advaita 
Vedānta, Yoga and Tibetan Buddhism. Three of the participants described this perception of 
awareness as the absence of content – they said to experience only awareness and nothing else.  
In chapter 5, I reasserted the use of my proposed taxonomy of dreamless sleep. I argued that this 
taxonomy could help to discriminate among different states of awareness during sleep. By comparing 
dreamless sleep to other associated sleep phenomena, I claimed that the difference between them is 
gradual and thus, in some cases reports made by subjects can overlap with more than one type of 
sleep phenomena. These gradual differences make difficult the discrimination between some 
phenomena, such as dreamless sleep and hypnagogic experiences, or hypnagogic experiences and 
dreamful sleep. Therefore, I advocated for the construction of a larger taxonomy of sleep phenomena 
that can establish these differences. With this aim, I proposed two goals: the development of an 
account of dreamless sleep that distinguishes between dreamless sleep and associated phenomena, 
and the development of a neurophenomenological approach in sleep research.  
First, I considered different sleep phenomena, namely dreams, hypnagogic experiences and 
white dreams. I argued that conscious dreamless sleep should be considered as a sui generis 
phenomenon, and thus, should not be categorised as dreams. My argument has been that the 
phenomenology of conscious dreamless sleep experiences, especially those ones described as the 
experience of a ‘No scenery/Void’, do not seem to match with that of dreams. Participants themselves 
talk of their experiences during the ‘No scenery/void’ as something qualitatively different from any 
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other experience they might had. In some cases, they are also able to become lucid while in this 
period – they recognise the state of dreamless sleep while is happening. Even in those moments, 
participants say that the experience is different to that of a lucid dream. I contrasted the descriptions 
obtained in the study with descriptions of hypnagogic experiences. I concluded that hypnagogic 
experiences should be better understood as ‘oneiragogic experiences’ — experiences leading into 
dreams.  
Then, I introduced several studies that have collected successful results on the 
phenomenology of different experiences by adopting a neurophenomenological approach. I argued 
that future research should adopt a similar framework and carry experimental sleep research that also 
applies first-person methods of research such as the micro-phenomenological interview. By adopting 
a neurophenomenological framework, we will be closer to develop a multidimensional model of 
consciousness by first considering the different conscious states during dreamless sleep and sleep. 
Summing up, this thesis defended a taxonomy of dreamless sleep that considers different 
conscious states had during this period. I defended a taxonomy that can be used in the future to 
develop a multidimensional model of consciousness that does not consider the difference among 
conscious states as a that of ‘levels’ or ‘degrees’ or consciousness. Instead, this taxonomy should 
consider the differences between states in terms of type of content. I supported this taxonomy by 
analysing definitions found in the literature and by developing a novel qualitative exploration by 
experimental subjects. I analysed several definitions on dreamless sleep from Indian contemplative 
traditions and analytical philosophy and concluded that, what has largely been described as a period 
lacking any object of awareness and intentional content, it is in fact a period were different types of 
awareness can be found. This was also supported by the results in a study I conducted in which 
participants reported experiences of awareness during a period in sleep described as a ‘void’. Again, 
the different types of awareness were isolated from the reports gathered. Consequently, future 
research on sleep should shift the characterisation of dreamless sleep as that of ‘deep sleep’ – a period 
where consciousness is missing altogether – to that of ‘transition to dreaming’ – a state in the verge 
of dreaming. This shift can be done by the development of a larger taxonomy of sleep states that 
contemplates the existence of several types of awareness during sleep.    
 
 
 
 
. 
  103 
Appendix I – INTERVIEW TEMPLATE 
The following is an interview template that was used for all the micro-phenomenological 
interviews. The template includes prompt questions for the different phases of the interview. 
However, as detailed in §4.1.2, the specific questions vary from participant to participant 
and according to what each participant answers. The interview template it is just a guide for 
the interviewer (I) to carry out the interview and to cover the similar dimensions of 
experience in each participant.  
PRESENTATION 
I: Thanks [name] for agreeing in participating in this study. This session will be recorded 
and only an audio file will be saved for posterior transcription. The file will be stored using 
the remote desktop of the University of Glasgow and once the transcription is done it will 
be destroyed. If that it is ok with you, I will start with the recording.  
I: Following the Information Sheet you received, this session will consist in three parts. We 
will start with a pre-interview, which will consist in the execution of a small mental exercise. 
The aim of this is to practice the interview technique that I will use and to make you more 
aware of the kind of things you need to pay attention during the actual interview. Then, we 
will start the main interview, which will be about an experience of awareness during sleep 
in absence of dreams that you have had recently.  We will finish with a short post-interview 
in which you will have the chance to ask me questions about the study and to add any 
information or anything you have not mentioned during the first two stages. Is this ok? 
PHASE 1: PRE-INTERVIEW 
I: I am going to ask you to perform a small mental exercise and then I will ask you some 
questions about your experience.  The task is very simple and will not take more than 20 
minutes. I am going to ask you to memorise a short list of words: 
[SHOW LIST] 
[Lion, Daffodil, Tyrolean, Academic, Distraction, Teardrop, Triumph, Shade, Validation, 
Welcome] 
I: Take some minutes to memorise the list and when you consider you are ready, let me know. 
I:  OK, so now I am going to ask you to go backwards in time. Imagine that we are able to 
rewind the experience, as if it was a movie. The movie is about the experience that you have 
just lived right now: memorising this list of words. It is very easy, as you have just done it, 
so we are just going to rewind, and to do that I am going to ask you to immerse yourself 
again in this experience. Remember, I started out by me asking you to perform a small mental 
exercise and me showing you a list of words. I would like you to go back to the moment in 
which I show you the list of words.  What did you do, what happened? 
[Once the participant answers, the interviewer can follow the interview by covering the 
dimensions specified below] 
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A. Evocation state: First, the interviewer asks questions to bring the participant 
back to the experience. The questions aim at situating the participant back in 
the particular place and time where the experience happened.  
• Let’s go back to... 
• Where/When 
• Visual/Sounds 
• Position of body, Feelings, Sensations 
B. Diachronic Structure: The aim of the questions about the Diachronic 
structure is to investigate the evolution of the experience in time. The following 
questions are specific about the mental task that the participant carried out in 
the Pre-Interview. 
• Trigger: How do you know how to begin?  
• Beginning: How do you start? 
• Sequence: What do you do then? 
• The end: What happens at the end? 
• Test: How do you know...? 
• Deepen the description: And when you do X, what do you do? 
And when you feel X, what do you feel? 
And when you do nothing, what do you do? 
How do you know that you don’t know? 
C. Synchronic Structure: The aim of the questions about the Synchronic 
structure is to investigate the configuration of the experience at a given instant 
in time. The following questions are specific about the mental task that the 
participant carried out in the Pre-Interview. 
• Mental image:  
What do you see? 
Where do the words appear? 
How is the image? 
Are you inside the scene or do you see it as a film? 
• Auditory sensations: 
What do you hear? 
How is it your inner voice? 
• Bodily feelings: 
Could you come back to this feeling?  
And when you feel X, what do you feel? 
Where is this sensation? Is it located somewhere? 
 
PHASE 2: INTERVIEW PHASE 
I: Thanks [name]. Now that you have seen how the micro-phenomenological method works, 
we are going to move into the main interview. This is going to be similar than the one we 
just had about the memory exercise, but instead, we will talk about an experience you have 
picked. For this interview, I asked you to think of an experience that you have had recently 
while sleeping in which you recall some sort of awareness in absence of dreams. It is 
important that you pick a specific experience. Does not matter if it is too short, the important 
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thing is that you can recall it very vividly. I will ask you different questions about this 
experience and I will ask you to focus on some particular dimensions of that experience.  
Also, at some points, I will rephrase some of the things you have said, but feel free to 
interrupt me if I rephrase them wrong. As you agreed in the consent form, you are not obliged 
to answer all the questions and we can also stop at any time you wish.  
So, could you describe me any moment of awareness you had during sleep the days prior to 
this interview? 
I: [Rephrase what the interviewee has said] [Pick a moment] 
[Once the participant answers, the interviewer follows a similar process that the one outlined 
in the Pre-Interview. In this case, the interview focus on the experience of awareness during 
dreamless sleep reported by the participant] 
 
A. Evocation state 
• Let’s go back to...[pick a moment described by the participant] 
• Where/When this happened? 
• Visual questions:   
When you are there, do you see anything? 
I would like you to describe the place. Look around and what do you see? 
[REFORMULATION] 
• Auditory questions: 
At this moment, do you hear anything? Listen again, find noises 
       [REFORMULATION setting and perception] 
• Kinesthetic and interoceptive questions: 
What is the position of your body? Do you feel anything? 
B. Diachronic Structure 
• Beginning: How does the experience starts? 
• Sequence: What do you do then? 
• The end: What happens at the end? 
• Deepen the description: And when you do X, what do you do? 
And when you feel X, what do you feel? 
And when you do nothing, what do you do? 
How do you know that you don’t know? 
C. Synchronic Structure: Configuration of the experience at a given instant in time 
• Description of an inner image 
When you see X, what do you see?  
Are you inside the scene or do you see it as a film?  
Where do you see this image?  
• Description of an auditory sensation 
Does this sound come from somewhere?  
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What is its volume? Its tone? 
Is it your own voice, or the voice of somebody else? 
• Bodily feeling 
What do you feel? Is this feeling located somewhere?  
Does it have a size? What is it like? 
If you had to teach me how to feel it, what would you tell me? 
• Verifications:   
Is there anything else? 
What else is going on at this time?  
Did you have perhaps feelings, thoughts or anything else at this moment? 
What else is happening at this moment? 
PHASE 3: POST-INTERVIEW 
I: Is there anything else that you want to add?  
-Thank you [name]. With this, we have finished the main interview. Is there anything that 
you would like to add that we have not covered? 
-Are there any questions that you have about the project? 
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Appendix II – Screening questionnaire for participants 
 
Age: 
Nationality: 
Medical information 
Do you suffer from any physical or mental condition? (Diagnosed or no diagnosed) 
 Yes  No 
If any, which one? 
 
Are you currently taking any medication? (Prescribed or no prescribed) 
 Yes  No 
If any, which one?  
For how long are you expecting to be taking this medication? 
 
Lifestyle and alcohol/drug consumption 
Do you practice any sort of meditation? 
a. If so, how often? 
b. Which type of meditation? 
Do you consume alcohol? 
 Yes  No 
If you do, how often?  
Do you consume any recreational drugs? 
 Yes   No 
If you do, how often? 
Sleep (routine, quality and experiences) 
On a normal day, 
What time do you go to sleep? 
What time do you wake up? 
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How would you rate your quality of sleep? (average) 
 Excellent   Good        Bad  Very bad 
Do you have problems falling asleep?  (average) 
Do you usually remember your dreams upon awakening? 
 Yes   No 
If you do, with how much frequency? 
 Every day   <5 times a week  >5 times a week  Very rarely 
Are you ever aware of dreaming while dreaming? 
 Yes   No 
If you are, how often? 
 Every day   <5 times a week  >5 times a week  Very rarely 
Do you recall any sort of mental phenomena when you fall asleep? (e.g. images, sounds, 
thoughts) 
 Yes   No 
If you do, briefly describe an example 
 
Are you usually aware when you are falling asleep? 
 Yes   No 
a. If so, could you describe which sort of things you notice in that moment? 
 
 
Can you describe an episode of awareness during sleep in absence of dream content? 
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Appendix III – Excerpt of an interview 
The following are some excerpts of the transcription of the interview with participant #06. 
Every number specifies a different descripteme. P= participant #06; I= Interviewer. 
Section 2: Micro-phenomenological interview 
(1) I: You told me that you have experience awareness during dreamless sleep; that 
this was something that you knew about. 
(2) P: [Participant explains that they heard that you could induce and experience of 
awareness in deep sleep through his practice in Tibetan Buddhism and that he was 
practicing to achieve this state. He heard that he could go from a lucid dream to this 
state and they decided they wanted to practice this from some months each time he 
was getting lucid]. 
(3) P: I’m going to talk about the one I was going to talk you about.  
(4) In this dream [it happened around 1 year ago, but he had this in a dream diary and he 
really remembered this] I was having a normal dream, non-lucidly aware and  
(5) I was with my driving instructor and  
(6) I pulled out of the house. It was a terrace house, I think it was Victorian era house.  
(7) This isn’t unusual to me. A lot of my dreams, a lot of lucid dreams take place in this 
era.  
(8) I went to the house, I went upstairs, and my step-father was there so it was my mother 
and they said something which was odd,  
(9) and I had a previous dream that night which wasn’t lucid but involved hockey 
equipment. 
(10)  I don’t play hockey, doesn’t really have any significance for me but I know 
what it is. 
(11)  I was upstairs, and I looked around and this hockey equipment was in a 
corner by the door.  
(12) I think that what happened was that I saw the hockey equipment and I 
thought: ‘that it’s from my dream’  
(13)  and then I thought: ‘hang on, if this is from my previous dream that means 
that I’m still dreaming’.  
(14) As I said, at this time I was trying very much to induce this experience of 
awareness in non-dreaming sleep. 
(15) I realised I was dreaming, and I went to another room in the house  
(16) because I remembered what my dream goal was, my dream plan and  
(17) I went to another room and  
(18) I shouted out the dream ‘dissolve this dream in the ultimate state’.  
(19) It might have been different wording but that was the essence of it.  
(20) Nothing happened. The dream remained precisely as it was.  
(21) So I said: I try again.  
(22) So I shouted out the same phrase and  
(23) the room started to spin, it started to move but it never got that far.  
(24) I was in the middle  
(25) and everything was moving around like a carrousel.  
(26) It went from right to left but never went very far, maybe a quarter of the way 
round or something like that.  
(27)  At this point everything faded into white light, as you would see in a film, 
you know.  
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(28) But that again didn’t last very long,  
(29) was momentary,  
(30) and then it faded into blackness.  
(31) I was in space, 
(32) there were no visual images,  
(33) there was a light and it was white in colour.  
(34) There was nothing to see,  
(35) but there was a kind of radiance.  
(36) The radiance wasn’t coming from anywhere.  
(37) The light source was to my right or my left or in front of me, it was just there.  
(38) And then I realised that this was the nature of mind.  
(39) It was very peaceful.  
(40) I was very relaxed.  
(41) Then smoothly this image appeared of two hands  
(42) in front of me.  
(43) Palm up. Level of my belly button or whereabouts.  
(44) And behind them, in the ground, which I was looking down, there was grass.  
(45) This image didn’t last for very long,  
(46) but I remember thinking, ‘this is a dream’. 
(47)  So in other words, what it was formed out of this experience of former 
awareness was a lucid dream, which I already knew when all this started.  
(48) And this image lasted for a couple of seconds and then I woke up. 
(49) I: You are with your driving instructor and then you go into the house… 
(50) P: He stayed in the car and I went to the house alone. 
(51) I: And then you go upstairs and you meet your stepfather and your mum 
and they said something odd, which you don’t remember. There was some 
hockey equipment around which you remember from a previous dream which 
triggers the thought that you are dreaming. 
(52) P: It was from a previous dream I had earlier that night.  
(53) I: And then you go to a different room and you try this technique. 
(54) P: The reason I move to the other room it’s because I remember what the 
dream goal was. That was me taking ‘control’, deciding I want to implement my 
dream plan. 
(55) I: And the room you are moving is from the other dream? 
(56) P: No, this is just another room in the house.  
(57) It was a window opposite to me but I don’t remember other details. 
(58) I: You realise you are dreaming and you want to carry out this plan and 
then you shout out something like: ‘this is the ultimate state’? 
(59) P: Dissolve this dream into the ultimate state. 
(60) I:  You shout ‘dissolve this into the ultimate state’ and then nothing 
happens and then you try again and the room starts to spin from right to left. 
It’s like being in a middle of a carrousel because you aren’t moving but 
everything is moving.  
(61) P: Didn’t go very far, just a quarter of the way.  
(62) I: then you describe a white light. 
(63) P: Everything dissolves into the white light.  
(64) I don’t know if you have seen the Lord of the Rings film, but there’s a couple 
of moments towards the end of the last one in which you think the movie it’s about 
to end because everything becomes white light; it’s light that. 
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(65) I: What was momentary, the thing that everything was spinning or the 
dissolving? 
(66) P: Both. The spinning was momentary  
(67) and the white light was momentary.  
(68) The next moment was a bit longer. 
(69) I: Let’s say that this is the first stage of the dream. Started as a normal 
dream but then there’s a moment you are lucid when you realise the hockey 
equipment. Let’s try to go into detail to each of the stages. You are first with 
your driving instructor, you go inside the house, you go upstairs, you find your 
stepfather and your mum and they say something odd and you see the hockey 
equipment and you realise that you are dreaming. Where are you in the moment 
in which you realise you are dreaming? 
(70) P: Where was I?  I was in the front door of the house. 
(71)  I came up the stairs and there is a door in the right side as you came up the 
stairs. You…  
(72) I can’t remember whether you double back on yourself or there’s a door on 
your right as you come up stairs, either way, it was that room. Then it was in the front 
of the house.  
(73) I: you went to this room that was in the front of the house and then you 
went to this room and found your stepfather and your mum. 
(74) P: My stepfather was there I think my mum was there, yeah. 
(75) I: And then you realise about this hockey equipment. You are coming 
the door of the room and then the hockey equipment is right out of the door. As 
you came up the door, in the wall, which was slightly on the left, there is the 
hockey equipment which is leaning against the wall and the chest of drawers.  
(76) I didn’t notice as I first came in and then I was talking with my step father 
and I turned around and then I saw it was there.  
[…] 
(94) I: Where are you in that moment when you go into the other room and 
you shout: ‘dissolve the dream into the ultimate state’. 
(95) P: I was in a room at the back of the house. I don’t remember much detail. I 
have a vague impression that there was a Turkish rug on the floor. Again, I think 
there was a window on the other side of the room and the walls were white. My 
impression is that it was vague.  
(96) I: You are in this room at the back of the house that has a Turkish rug 
on the floor and white walls. Can you see yourself? 
(97) P: No, I can’t recall what I was wearing or my dream body.  
(98) When I was in this dream I was looking outwards. I wasn’t interested in what 
I looked like or in my body or something like that. I was interested in carrying out a 
dream plan.  
(99) I: Why do you mean by looking outwards? 
(100) P: for instance now, if I’m looking into the screen I’m not interested in what 
I’m wearing.  
(101) In that I wasn’t focused on what I was wearing.  
(102) I remember though that went I moved from one room to another I wasn’t 
flying.  
(103) I have the feeling I walked.  
(104)  I had a dream body but I wasn’t paying attention to it. 
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(105) I: Do you have the feeling of you shouting ‘dissolve the dream into the 
ultimate state’? 
(106) P: I shouted very loudly.  
(107) It wasn’t like shouting it in my head,  
(108) but shouting it out loud. 
(109) I: and can you hear yourself? 
(110) P: I’m not sure what you mean by that. 
(111) I shouted the words, they didn’t echo back or something like that.  
(112) I shouted and nothing happened. Very briefly because I didn’t wait to shout 
again. 
(113) I: You shouted out loudly, nothing happened and then immediately after 
you shouted again. 
(114) P: Then it’s when the spinning start to happened. The room move from right 
to left and it might also the spinning going downwards.  
(115) In terms of my reaction, this was so quick that I didn’t feel any emotion.  
[…] 
(125) I: What is the next thing you can remember? 
(126) P: The next thing that happened is that there’s empty space.  
(127) There are no shapes or anything.  
(128) On the other hand is very luminous, 
(129)  there’s this light. Isn’t red or green or yellow.  
(130) It’s just there and it’s all pervasive.  
(131) And I don’t think I had a body in this moment.  
(132) I wasn’t standing or sitting or laying down.  
(133) It was… I didn’t have a body. 
(134) I: So you go into the empty space, which there’s no much. You don’t have 
a body. What happened after? You were telling me that this lasted longer than 
what it normally does. 
(135) P: This was the first time that happened.  
(136) There was no other impression that what I said really except two things. I was 
conscious  
(137) and I was aware.  
(138) I might have thought, ‘ Do I have a body?’ or some other sort of thing. 
(139)  But it was very peaceful.  
(140) I: how was this experience that this was very peaceful? 
(141) P: It was peaceful. That was it. 
(142) I: Imagine I’m someone I have never experience what peace is. 
(143) P: No struggle.  
(144) No need to go anywhere or do anything.  
(145) No worries or concerns. 
(146)  Nothing to aim for or strive for.  
(147) But at the same time, being aware. Being present.  
(148) I: When you say that there were two things happening in that stage; 
Everthing is black. You don’t have a body. Nevertheless you know that you are 
aware; that you might have had some thoughts during that moment. Evertyhing 
is peaceful. And at the same time you are aware of being present. What do you 
mean by this? 
(149) P: There was no intellectual content of awareness like ‘I’m Ben, I’m here’.  
(150) It was open, without being focus on anything.  
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(151) It’s quite difficult for me to separate… the experience I had, I also read a lot. 
I can certainly use words that I found in these texts that describe it accurately but I 
want to use my own impression. I want to avoid using those phrases.  
(152) The awareness it’s… It was just unbounded.  
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